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Recent Cases
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-EFFECT OF SECTION 10(c) OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT ON THE
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
United States v. Consolidated Mines & Smelting Co.'
The United States brought this action as trustee for the Colville Indian
Tribe to quiet title to lands within the tribe's reservation. The defendant,
Consolidated Mines & Smelting Co., had asserted 56 mining claims on
the land, but the Department of the Interior had held them invalid in
six decisions. Four of these decisions were not appealed to the final
agency authority, the Secretary of the Interior.2 The district court first
granted summary judgment to the United States affirming these four
decisions on the ground that Consolidated had failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies. Upon reconsideration, however, the court held
that section 10(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act,3 (hereinafter
APA) limits the general doctrine of exhaustion in that "[i]ntra-agency
appeals are not a prerequisite to judical review except to the extent statutes
or appropriate agency rules command otherwise." 4 The decisions by the
Interior were, therefore, judically reviewable.
The court of appeals adopted this part of the district court's opinion
1. 455 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1971), affg in part & rev'g in part Civil No. 2412
(E.D. Wash., filed June 28, 1968).
2. A summary of the history of the decisions is as follows:
Decisions I & 2: No "contest proceedings." (A unilateral decision was made by
the Spokane Land Office Manager.) Appealed through the Secretary of the
Interior; therefore, exhaustion was not an issue with regard to these decisions.
Decision 3: No "contest proceedings." Appealed through Director, Bureau of Land
Management, but not to the Secretary of the Interior.
Decisions 4 & 5: "Contest proceedings." Appealed through Director, Bureau of
Land Management. No appeal to the Secretary of the Interior.
Decision 6: No "contest proceedings." No appeals.
Decisions, 1, 2, 3, and 6 invalidated certain claims because they had been
located after the reservation had been withdrawn from entry by order of the
Secretary of the Interior. Decisions 4 and 5 invalidated claims because they were
not supported by valid discoveries. Id. at 437.
8. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1946), which provides:
Actions reviewable-Agency action made reviewable by statute and final
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are
subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate
agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on
the review of the final agency action. Except as otherwise expressly re-
quired by statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes
of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined an
application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or,
unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action
meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.
4. 455 F.2d at 441.
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verbatim. Although the court dealt in detail with many other issues,
this note will focus on the court's ruling on the question whether sec-
tion 10(c) of the APA has changed the rule requiring exhaustion of all
available administrative appeals as a prerequisite to judicial review of
administrative action.
The general rule of exhaustion is that a party must exhaust his ad-
ministrative remedies before he may obtain judicial review of the validity
of administrative action.5 The rule has its parallel in the usual require-
ment that a final judgment must be obtained in the trial court before
an appellate court will grant review.6 As the Consolidated court noted,7
the courts apply the exhaustion requirement to deny judicial review in
different factual situations.8 A court may apply exhaustion to prevent
a party from challenging the jurisdiction of an agency before an admin-
istrative proceeding is completed. 9 A court may also invoke exhaustion
to deny review of an agency's interlocutory action or inaction,1 0 or of
issues not presented to the agency.l Finally, as the district court did
5. E.g., Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938);
L. JAFFE, JUDiCiAL CONTROL OF ADMmin Ty= AcnoN 424 (1965).
6. L. JAFFE, sup--ra note 5, at 424.
7. 455 F.2d at 438-39.
8. L. JAFFE, supra note 5, at 424.
9. K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW § 20.02 (1958). Despite the Supreme
Court's statement in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938),
that where an agency's jurisdiction is challenged it is a "long settled rule of
judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief . . . until the
prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted" (id. at 50), the Court has
not always applied the rule. See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964)(confusing because exhaustion excused, but this was decided after the substantive
issue had already been resolved); Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Corp., 347 U.S. 535(1954) (exhaustion excused because there was no properly authorized procedure
to exhaust); Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943)
(exhaustion excused where order of commission held invalid on its face). But
see Petroleum Exploration Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 804 U.S. 209 (1938).
Professor Davis recommends deciding the exhaustion question in such cases on
the basis of the weighing of three factors: (1) The degree of injury that would
result from requiring the pursuit of administrative remedies; (2) the degree of
certainty or doubt about the jurisdiction of the agency; and (3) the degree to
which the dispute involves specialized questions that the agency is best equipped
to resolve. K. DAvis, supra, § 20.03, at 69.
Some state cases suggest that exhaustion does not apply where the challenge
is constitutional in nature. See Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 55 Cal. 2d
736, 361 P.2d 921 (1961); Levitt &c Sons v. State Div. of Discrimination, 31 N.J.
514, 158 A.2d 177 (1960). The Supreme Court cases indicate that exhaustion
is excused more often where the constitutionality of the legislation creating agency
authority is challenged than where the constitutionality of the agency's application
of the statute is questioned. Compare Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
supra (proposed application of act allegedly unconstitutional and exhaustion re-
quired) with Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., supra (enabling act allegedly
unconstitutional on its face and exhaustion excused) and Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742 (1948) (statute allegedly unconstitutional on its face and exhaustion
excused). But see Aircraft &c Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 334 U.S. 742 (1948)
(constitutional attack on same statute attacked in Lichter but exhaustion required).
10. K. DAvis, supra note 9, § 20.05.
11. Id. § 20.06, at 92.
197-01
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initially in Consolidated, a court may apply exhaustion to deny review
of an administrative action which is final at the agency level at which
it is rendered, but which has not been appealed to a higher level of
review within the agency.1 2
The usual exhaustion case is one where administrative appeals are
still available and the plaintiff seeks judicial review prematurely. In some
cases, however, the administrative remedy no longer exists, and the party
who has not exhausted available remedies is the defendant. To apply
exhaustion in such cases may result in the loss of a right or a defense.13
Where application of the doctrine has resulted in the forfeiture of a
defense,14 objections have been raised to its application. Because the
doctrine is based on the judicial policy of encouraging administrative
efficiency,1 5 it is questionable whether it should be applied to a defendant.
Although in Consolidated the party who failed to exhaust available ad-
ministrative remedies was the defendant, the court did not analyze the
exhaustion problem in these terms. Instead, the court approached the
case as presenting the more limited question whether exhaustion applies
to situations where intra-agency appeals were not pursued after final
agency decisions.
The district court in Consolidated initially applied the general rule
that failure to appeal an administrative decision to higher agency authority
precludes judicial review. The Supreme Court formulated this rule in
United States v. Sing Tuck,1 6 where an alien was denied habeas corpus
because he failed to appeal an exclusion order to the Secretary of Com-
merce and Labor. The statute involved in that case defined an exclusion
order as "final" unless reversed by the Secretary on appeal.1 7 The Court
held that this statute required appeal to the Secretary before resort could
be had to the judicial process. According to the Consolidated court, the
Sing Tuck rule "has been consistently followed."13
Upon reconsideration, the district court held that section 10(c) of
the APA abrogated the rule in Sing Tuck.1 9 That section provides as
follows:
Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action
otherwise final shall be final for the purposes of this subsection
12. Id. § 20.08, at 104.
13. L. JAFE, supra note 5, at 450.
14. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (exhaustion principle used
to bar defense to criminal action); Falbo v. United States, 820 U.S. 549 (1944)
(because of failure to take all administrative appeals, defense barred). But see
Donato v. United States, 302 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1962) (exhaustion not required
when failure to go through selective service process was excusable); United States
v. McCrillis, 200 F.2d 884 (1st Cir. 1952) (defense of invalidity still available).
15. United States v. Harvey, 131 F. Supp. 493, 496 (N.D. Tex. 1954).
16. 194 U.S. 161 (1904).
17. Id. at 166.
18. 455 F.2d at 439. But see United States v. McCrillis, 200 F.2d 884 (lst Cir.
1952) (not seeking administrative appeal is not a bar to defending against enforce-
ment proceedings); United States ex rel. Bradley v. Watkins, 163 F.2d 328 (2d
*ir. 1947) (characterizing appellant as "alien" is a question of law for courts, so
exhaustion not required).
19. Id. at 439.
[Vol. 38
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whether or not there has been presented or determined any appli-
cation .... unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and
provides that the action meanwhile shall be inoperative, for an
appeal to superior agency authority.20
Relying heavily on Professor K. C. Davis's interpretation of section 10 (c), 21
the court said that under this section reviewability is the general rule,
subject to two exceptions. First, to the extent that an agency's governing
statutes determine finality, the rule does not apply. The Consolidated court
found no statute purporting to determine the finality of decisions of either
the Bureau of Land Management or the Department of the Interior.
Second, by its own rules the agency may condition reviewability upon
exhaustion of intra-agency appeals by requiring that a party exhaust
intra-agency appeals and providing that the agency action remains in-
operative pending appeal. The court noted that the relevant agency
rules22 required intra-agency appeal from those decisions by a hearing
examiner that the Director characterized as "recommended decisions." In
this case the Director had so designated decisions 3, 4, and 5; and Con-
solidated had appealed these decisions to the Director as required. Decision
6 was not designated a "recommended decision" under this rule, and appeal
to the Director was not required. Therefore, all four decisions were
judicially reviewable.23
The court of appeals affirmed this interpretation of section 10 (c) and
said that in so doing it broke new ground. It noted that cases within the
Ninth Circuit had indicated that the elimination of the exhaustion re-
quirement would be undesirable.24 The court also noted that two Ninth
Circuit cases involving mining claims 25 had required exhaustion of intra-
agency appeals, but distinguished these cases on the ground that neither
had considered the effect of the third sentence of section 10 (c). Moreover,
20. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1946) (emphasis added).
21. K. DAvis, supra note 9, § 20.08.
22. 43 C.F.R. § 221.76 (c) (1963).
23. Section 10 (c) is also relevant when the question is whether a party must
seek rehearing within the agency before seeking judicial review. The case law
with regard to rehearings is more confused than it is in the appeals situation. The
tendency has been to excuse exhaustion. See, e.g., United States v. Abilene &
S.R.R-, 265 U.S. 274 (1924); Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U.S. 43(1923). Later cases have excused exhaustion when the indication is that rehearing
will not produce substantial reconsideration. See, e.g., Levers v. Anderson, 326
U.S. 219 (1945). Professor Davis's interpretation of section 10 (c) is that such dis-
tinctions are swept away, and the simple standard of section 10 (c) applies. K.
DAvis, supra note 9, § 20.08, at 103-04.
24. Hills v. Eisenhart, 156 F. Supp. 902, 907 (N.D. Cal. 1957), afrd, 256
F.2d 609 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 832 (1958).
25. Davis v. Nelson, 329 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1964); Mulkern v. Hammitt, 326
F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1964).
In Davis, the court denied review on the basis of the second sentence of
section 10 (c). It interpreted that sentence to mean that preliminary or procedural
agency action could be reviewed only upon review of final agency action. See
SEC v. Eastern Util. Associates, 162 F.2d 385 (lst Cir. 1947). Such an interpre-
tation tends to undercut the apparent clarity and simplicity of the rules re-
garding the necessity of exhausting available appeal opportunities. Characterizing
the order objected to as "preliminary," "procedural," or "intermediate" would
allow the court to postpone judicial review.
1973]
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it recognized that Representative Walter, Chairman of the House subcom-
mittee that drafted the APA, remarked that "the provisions of this sec-
tion... involve no departure from the usual and well-understood rules
of procedure in this field."26 However, the court accepted Professor Davis's
contention that while this is accurate as to the first two sentences of sec-
tion 10 (c), the third sentence substantially changed the law.2 ' The court
acknowledged that judicial decisions have almost completely ignored the
directive of section 10 (c).28 Nevertheless, the court said that "there appears
to be little doubt that Congress intended to declare that failure to appeal
administrative decisions to higher administrative authority would not
preclude judicial review."29
Finally, the court examined the potential impact of its decision. In
rejecting the contention that the decision would flood the district courts
with theretofore ureviewable cases, the court gave as its reasons three
limitations upon the scope of its decision.
First, the court abandoned the requirement of exhaustion of intra-
agency appeals only subject to the two exceptions embodied in the last
sentence of section 10 (c).3 0 The court pointed out that given these two
exceptions, it is apparent why the government stated in its argument that
it could "live with" this holding. To require exhaustion, the agency need
only amend its rules. Hence, the exhaustion principle will remain a
weapon in the government's arsenal.
Second, the court obviated the exhaustion doctrine only insofar as it
applies to intra-agency appeals. The court's disposition of the appeal from
decision 6 illustrates this limitation. The court held that Consolidated
waived its argument that it was denied its right to an administrative hear-
ing, saying that section 10 (c) "does not affect the rule that the claimant
must raise his question in the agency proceedings, before he applies for
judicial review."3 1 This ruling helped the court to conclude that its de-
cision would not flood the district courts, for the claimant must still raise
his question initially before the agency.
Finally, the court held that its decision applies only to mining claims
"and does not apply to the rule of exhaustion of remedies as it may appear
26. Proceedings in the House of Representatives on May 24 and 25, 1946,
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 369 (1946).
27. K. DAvis, supra note 9, § 20.08, at 101.
28. 455 F.2d at 439.
29. Id. at 439-40.
30. Id. at 440.
31. Id. at 452. The authority relied on by the courts of appeals-Adams v.
Witner, 271 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1959), and United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck
Lines, Inc., 844 U.S. 3 (1952)-is arguably open to another interpretation. The
district court cited Adams and Tucker Truck Lines as well as Leedom v. IBEW,
278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960), for the proposition that the rule of waiver is
flexible. Furthermore, neither the district court nor the court of appeals cited
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941), which is contrary to the waiver theory.
According to Professor Davis, more penetrating opinions were written in Hormel
than in Tucker Truck Lines, which did not overrule Hormel. Also, Justice Frank.
furter, dissenting in Tucker Truck Lines, refers to APA requirements for adjudi-
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in other decisions of this court involving other agencies."3 2 It is unclear
why the court's analysis of section 10 (c) should be limited to mining claims.
The court stated that it had not had a chance to review the statutes of
other agencies and felt compelled to limit the decision. Although this is
perfectly consistent with the requirements of section 10 (c) in that the
section does require reading the rules and the governing statutes of the
pertinent agency, this language unnecessarily de-emphasizes the general
applicability of section 10 (c). Perhaps in order to make the change more
palatable, the court emphasized a case-by-case approach. Such an approach
obviates the very purpose of section 10 (c), which is to bring "simplicity
where simplicity is needed."33
ROSSELLE PEKELIS HiGG n s
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BURDEN OF PROOF IN
JUROR DISCRIMINATION CASES IN MISSOURI
State v. Strawther1
The Circuit Court for Pulaski County, Missouri, convicted Stellman
Strawther of first degree burglary. At trial, the defendant, a Negro, moved
to quash the all-white jury, alleging "systematic exclusion of Negroes
from jury panels in Pulaski County."2 In support of his motion, he pre-
sented testimony from the circuit clerk and the county clerk regarding
the method of juror selection in Pulaski County.3 Both witnesses testified
that the approximate 8000 registered voters in the county included only
80 to 100 blacks. Further, while both admitted that the names of Negroes
had been drawn as prospective jurors, their testimony also established
that no blacks had served on a venire4 within the county for the past
16 years. However, both witnesses stated that they knew of no systematic
or intentional exclusion. On appeal, Strawther challenged the trial court's
32. 455 F.2d at 452.
33. K. DAvis, supra note 9, § 20.08, at 103-04.
1. 476 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. 1972).
2. Id. at 577.
3. Id. The names of voters in the last election are typed on pieces of paper,
separated and placed in the box by township. The names of 24 regular members
of the petit jury panel and 24 alternates are then drawn from the box. These
slips of papers do not indicate race. When a name is called, the board of jury
commissioners decides whether the person is available and qualified. This board
consists of the circuit judge, the circuit clerk and the three county judges.
4. A venire is the larger body of individuals called for jury service from
which the actual trial jury is ultimately selected in the litigation process. For pur-
poses of this casenote the terms "venire" and "jury panel" will be used inter-
changeably. Although in its most precise sense "venire" does not denote the
body of persons from which juries are selected but only the writ by which these
persons are selected (Posey v. State, 73 Ala. 490 (1883); see BAcIl's LAw Dic-
TIONARY 1726 (4th ed. 1951); 2 Bouv-'s LAw DicTIONARY 3389 (3d rev. 1914)),
it is often popularly used as denoting the body of persons (Posey v. State,
supra), and will be so used in this note.
1973]
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denial of his motion, contending that he had established a prima face
case of juror discrimination against blacks, which shifted the burden
of proof on this issue to the state. The Missouri Supreme Court held that
the defendant had not established a prima fade case of systematic exclu-
sion of blacks from his venire. The court based its holding on three
distinct grounds. First, the defendant showed only the past, general prac-
tice of juror selection in Pulaski County. This alone did not demonstrate
the systematic exclusion of blacks from the defendant's venire.5 Second,
the statistical probabilities considerably favored "the selection of an all-
white jury panel."6 Third, the defendant's own witnesses established that
the jury commissioners selected the venire without discriminatory intent.7
A criminal defendant, via the sixth amendment right to jury trial
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, has the right
to "a jury selected from a representative cross-section of those persons in
the community who are eligible for jury service."8 A particular jury
or venire need not contain persons from every legally cognizable group.
However, a defendant cannot be "deprived by design of the chance" to
have members of a particular class on his jury.9 Peters v. KiffO set out
the rationale supporting this right:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is
excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury
room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience,
the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable."1
To establish an abuse of this right, the defendant must show that an
identifiable class within the community has been excluded from the juror
selection process. In each particular case, the court must determine whether
a jury without the excluded group represents a fair cross-section of the
community.12 The courts have recognized a wide range of social, political,
racial and religious groups as identifiable classes within the community.13
5. 476 S.W.2d at 578.
6. Id.
7. Id. The lack of discriminatory intent, however, does not destroy the
prima face case for discrimination by total exclusion. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S.
400, 404 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 811 U.S. 128, 132 (1940).
8. State v. Smith, 467 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Mo. 1971). "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury .... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. "[N]or shall any State deprive anj
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law... . ." Id. amend.
XIV, § 1. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 389 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
813 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 803 (1880).
9. State v. Smith, 467 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Mo. 1971). See also 16 LoYo.A L. Rv.
228 (1969).
10. 407 U.S. 498 (1972).
11. Id. at 503.
12. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
18. In the following cases, the court found a legally cognizable group: Thiel
v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (daily wage earners); Montoya v.
Colorado, 141 Colo. 9, 345 P.2d 1062 (1959) (Spamsh-Americans); State v. Smith,
467 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1971) (women); State v. McCarthy, 76 N.J.L. 295, 69 A. 1075(1908) (members of political parties); State v. Plenty Horse, 184 N.W.2d 654(S.D. 1971) (American Indians); Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W.1091 (1925) (members of religious groups). Even students might constitute a
legally cognizable group. See 29 WAsH. & LEE L. Rxv. 131 (1972).
[Vol. 38
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Until recently, most courts, including those in Missouri, stated that
a criminal defendant must be a member of the excluded class in order
to have standing to raise the juror discrimination issue.14 These courts
reasoned that unless a defendant belonged to the excluded class, the
discrimination did not harm him. However, the United States Supreme
Court recently reversed the conviction of a white man, because blacks
were purposely excluded from the juror selection process.' 5 The three
majority justices based their decision on the sixth amendment right to
jury trial and the fourteenth amendment right to due process.18 Three
justices concurred, stating that the exclusion of blacks from juries because
of race violated the Civil Rights Act of 1875.17 The three dissenting judges
argued that this discrimination did not harm the defendant.' 8 Thus, the
position of the United States Supreme Court on the standing question
is uncertain at the present time.
The major obstacle that confronts a criminal defendant alleging juror
discrimination is meeting his burden of proof. This burden of proof
fluctuates with the method of exclusion.19 If the state has used its per-
emptory challenges to exclude a particular group from jury duty, the
defendant faces a difficult burden of proof. Under Swain v. Alabama20
he must establish that
the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the cir-
cumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the
victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have
been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and
who have survived the challenges for cause .... 21
Missouri follows this rule.22 In State v. Davison2= the defendant attacked
the constitutionality of a statute that gave the prosecutor 15 peremptory
challenges in a 47-man venire.24 The defendant argued that this number
14. E.g., Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E.2d 711 (1964); State v.
Dowe, 432 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. 1968); State v. Brown, 119 Mo. 527, 24 S.W. 1027(1894); Winfield v. State, 293 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. Crim. 1955). See generally Note,
The Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury Selection, 74 YALE L.J.
919 (1965).
15. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
16. Id. at 498.
17. Id. at 505 (concurring opinion).
18. Id. at 507 (dissenting opinion).
19. See Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury
Discrimination Cases, 80 HARv. L. REv. 338 (1966); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination:
The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 235 (1968).
20. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
21. Id. at 223.
22. See, e.g., State v. Brookins, 468 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1971); State v. Smith,
465 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. 1971); State v. Clark, 465 S.W.2d 337 (Mo. 1971); State v.
Huddleston, 462 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1971); State v. Davison, 457 S.W.2d 674 (Mo.
1970).
23. 457 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. 1970).
24. § 546.180. 2 RSMo 1969 provides in part:(2) In all such trials, the state shall be entitled to the following number
of peremptory challenges:(a) If the offense charged is punishable with death, or by imprison-
ment in the penitentiary not less than for life, to the number of
fifteen, and no more ....
19731
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of challenges allowed the state to discriminate in jury selection. Citing
Swain, the court held the statute constitutional, because the defendant
failed to demonstrate a case-by-case abuse of the peremptory challenge.2 5
The apparent reasoning behind this rule is that the peremptory challenge
insures jurors which "in fact and in the opinion of the parties are fair
and impartial." 26 With a less stringent burden of proof, the challenge
would no longer be peremptory. Further, the peremptory challenge holds
a time honored position that the courts are reluctant to question.2 7 As
yet, no Missouri defendant has succeeded in meeting this case-by-case
requirement. 28
As argued in Strawther, juror discrimination can also occur when the
selection process totally excludes a particular group from the venire.
In Norris v. Alabama29 the defendant attacked his rape conviction alleging
discrimination in the selection of prospective jurors.30 The defendant
established that Negroes constituted 7.5 percent of the county population,
but that no blacks had ever been called as grand or petit jurors. He also
proved that no blacks had served on his venire, but offered no proof
of actual discrimination in his particular case. The Supreme Court held
that such evidence created a prima fade case of discrimination which
shifted the burden of proof to the state to prove its practices non-discrimina-
tory.81 Swain v. Alabama3 2 sets out the reasoning behind the prima fade
rule:
The [prima facie rule] is a highly pragmatic one. It is designed
to operate in jury cases so that once the defendant has made a
showing of total exclusion, the burden on going forward with the
evidence is placed upon the State, the party in the better position
to develop the facts as to how the exclusion came about. The
defendant is a party to one proceeding only, and his access to
relevant evidence is obviously limited. The State is a party to all
criminal cases and has greater access to the evidence, if any, which
would tend to negative the State's involvement in discriminatory
jury selection.83
A strong inference of discriminatory practice arises from evidence that
members of a particular class have never been called as prospective
jurors. This inference, when combined with evidence that no members
of the same group served on the defendant's venire, gives rise to a second
inference that discrimination occurred in his particular case.
8 4
25. 457 S.W.2d at 678.
26. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965).
27. Cf. 39 Miss. L.J. 157 (1967).
28. Since 1970, defendants in five Missouri cases have alleged juror dis-
crimination by peremptory challenge, but all have failed. Cases cited note 22
supra.
29. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
30. Id. at 588.
31. Id. at 591.
32. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
33. Id. at 240.
34. See Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 342; Kuhn, supra note 19, at 251-52.
"Tokenism" does not destroy a prima facie case. Arnold v. North Carolina, 376
U.S. 473 (1964); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
[Vol. 8
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In State v. Logan3 5 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant had established a prima fade case of juror discrimination by
total exclusion. In this case, the court reporter testified that to his knowl-
edge no Negro was summoned to serve on a venire in Callaway County,
Missouri, during his 26 years in office. 36 The defendant also established
that blacks constituted a significant percentage of the county's popula-
tion.37 Further, the sheriff testified that during his 6 years in office he
had never called a Negro for jury duty, because he was not "raised that
way."38 Citing Norris, the court stated that proof of past discriminatory
practices establishes a prima fade case of juror discrimination by total
exclusion.3 9 The Logan decision overruled 40 State v. Thomas,41 which
held evidence of past discriminatory practices immaterial to the question
of intentional exclusion. Thomas required the defendant to bear the
heavy burden of establishing actual juror discrimination in his particular
case. 42 The Logan opinion acknowledged that the Norris case controlled.
Nevertheless, the court also emphasized that the defendant had introduced
evidence of actual discrimination in his particular case.48 Because of
the absence of such additional evidence, Strawther was a more difficult
case than Norris. Nevertheless, prior to Strawther, the Missouri approach
to total exclusion complied with federal standards.
Finally, juror discrimination can occur when a particular group
is underrepresented in the venire selection process. In this area, the courts
are less inclined to shift the burden of proof to the state. Although a
showing of statistical improbability will establish a prima fade case in
the total exclusion area, the same showing is insufficient if the group
involved was partially represented on the venire. 44 One reason for this
position is the impracticality of demanding exactly proportionate repre-
sentation of each class on each venire. 45 Further, valid reasons exist for
excluding particular persons.46 Some citizens, regardless of their social,
economic, racial or religious affiliations, are simply unfit for jury duty.
Thus, the state can rebut a defendant's statistical evidence by showing
that the particular group was underrepresented because a number of its
members were unqualified. 47
In an underrepresentation case, the defendant bears a heavier burden
of proof than in the total exclusion area. In Whitus v. Georgia,48 two
35. 841 Mo. 1164, 111 S.W.2d 110 (1937).
36. Id. at 1169, 111 S.W.2d at 113.
37. Id. at 1170-71, 111 S.W.2d at 113.
38. Id. at 1168, 111 S.W.2d at 112.
39. Id. at 1173, 111 S.W.2d at 115.
40. Id.
41. 250 Mo. 189, 157 S.W. 330 (1913).
42. Id. at 203, 157 S.W. at 334.
43. 341 Mo. at 1172, 111 S.W.2d at 115.
44. See, e.g., Speller v. Allen, 344 U.S. 477 (1953).
45. See Haws, Jury Selection in Missouri, 27 J. Mo. BAR 398 (1971); Kubn,
supra note 19, at 260-72; 79 YALE L.J. 531, 531-35 (1970).
46. E.g., drunkeness; blood relationship to the defendant or the prosecuting
attorney; inability to read, write or communicate in the English language.
47. Kuhn, supra note 19, at 307.
48. 385 U.S. 545 (1968).
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black defendants appealed their murder convictions alleging systematic
exclusion of Negroes from the jury list.49 They presented evidence that
the jury list was drawn from segregated tax digests.5 0 In addition, the
defendants established that although blacks comprised over 27 percent
of the total county population, they constituted only 7.5 percent of
the petit jury venire.51 By considering both the statistical evidence and the
tax digest evidence, the Court found juror discrimination against blacks
and reversed the convictions.52 The Missouri Supreme Court followed a
similar approach in State v. Smith.58 In that case, the court found systematic
and intentional underrepresentation of women on juries in Boone County,
Missouri. Testimony by the circuit clerk, that not all women drawn from
the jury rolls were actually called for fear of overloading the juries, con-
stituted one basis for this finding.54 Statistical probabilities also influenced
the court's decision:
It is sufficient to say that we are convinced, from the record in
this case, that the statistical possibilities shown combined with the
testimony of those participating in the selection made a prima
facie case, which shifted to the state the burden . . .
Thus, in an underrepresentation case the defendant must show something
in addition to statistical probabilities in order to meet his burden of proof.
Arguably, Strawther was a total exclusion case. As in Norris and Logan,
the defendant complained of the total exclusion of blacks on the venire
in the county. 56 However, the court, as one of its three grounds for deny-
ing relief, imposed upon the defendant a burden of proof closer to the
standard reserved for underrepresentation cases:
While past practices may be shown past practices will not make a
prima facie case, unsupported by evidence that systematic exclusion
was practiced in the composition of the particular panel from
which the convicting jury was chosen. 57
Further, in Strawther the court distinguished Whitus, an underrepresenta-
tion case, rather than Norris and Logan, both of which involved total
exclusion.58
This confusion was arguably unnecessary, because the court probably
could have denied Strawther relief under existing federal standards. As
a second ground for refusing to find juror discrimination, the court
pointed out that the statistical probabilities considerably favored selec-
tion of an all-white jury.59 Even if the appropriate Norris standard had
been applied, the resulting disproportion would not have been significant
enough to raise a federal constitutional question. JOHN E. CUMAN
49. Id.
50. Id. at 546-47.
51. Id. at 550.
52. Id. at 551.
53. 467 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1971).
54. Id. at 8.
55. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
56. 476 S.W.2d at 577.
57. Id. at 578.
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CRIMINAL LAW-INSTRUCTING ON MANSLAUGHTER-
ELIMINATING THE PRESUMPTION OF MALICE
IN MISSOURI HOMICIDE CASES
State v. Ayers'
Defendant was tried on a charge of murder in the second degree. In
addition to evidence that defendant shot and killed the victim, there was
testimony that after defendant had been arrested and as he was leaving
the police station in custody of the police, he said to a woman, "I told
her I was going to do it if she didn't make up her mind between him and
me, who she wanted, me or [the victim]. "2 On the basis of this evidence
the judge instructed the jury on murder in the second degree and man-
slaughter. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter.
Defendant Ayers appealed the conviction, contending that the giving
of the manslaughter instruction was improper, that a child witness at
the trial was incompetent to testify, and that his admissions to the police
and the woman were improperly admitted into evidence. The supreme court
rejected all three of the defendant's contentions and upheld the con-
viction.
The court devoted the primary portion of its opinion to a discussion
of the appropriateness of the manslaughter instruction.3 In ruling that
the giving of the manslaughter instruction was proper,4 the court signifi-
cantly changed the law in Missouri on proving malice in an intentional
killing. The court rejected the position taken by State v. Williams,5 one in
a line of cases on the presumption of malice in a case of an intentional kill-
1. 470 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. En Banc 1971).
2. Id. at 536.
3. The court touched briefly on the issues of the child's testimony and the
admissions of the defendant. Regarding the child testimony, the court pointed
out the presumption under the Missouri statute in favor of a child over 10 years
of age being competent to testify and indicated there was no "dear abuse" of
discretion by the trial court in allowing the child to testify since the evidence
illustrated that she understood the obligation to tell the truth. Id.; see State v. Vfl-
linger, 237 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1951); State v. Jones, 360 Mo. 723, 230 S.W.2d 678(1950); Petty v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 354 Mo. 823, 191 S.W.2d 653 (1945);
Burnam v. Chicago G.W.R.R., 340 Mo. 25, 100 S.W.2d 858 (1936); State v.
Herring, 268 Mo. 514, 188 S.V. 169 (1916); State v. Anderson, 252 Mo. 83, 158
S.W. 817 (1913); State v. Sykes, 248 Mo. 708, 154 S.W. 1130 (1913); State v.
Connors, 233 Mo. 848, 135 S.W. 444 (1911); State v. Headley, 224 Mo. 177, 123
S.W. 577 (1909); State v. Jeffries, 210 Mo. 302, 109 S.W. 614 (1908); State v.
Brown, 209 Mo. 413, 107 S.W. 1068 (1908); State v. Prather, 136 Mo. 20, 37
S.W. 805 (1896); Cadmus v. St. Louis Bridge and Tunnel Co., 15 Mo. App. 86
(St. L. Ct. App. 1884); § 491.060, RSMo 1969.
The court also rejected the defendant's contention that the Miranda doc-
trine had been violated, ruling that the admissions by the defendant to the
woman and the police were voluntary and not barred by Miranda. 470 S.W.2d
at 537; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); State v. Peck, 429 S.W.2d
247 (Mo. 1968); State v. Burnett, 429 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1968). The court there-
fore allowed the admissions to come in as direct evidence of the defendant's
guilt. 470 S.W.2d at 536-37; see State v. Smith, 377 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1964); State
v. Hutsel, 357 Mo. 386, 208 S.W.2d 227 (1948).
4. 470 S.W.2d at 538.
5. 442 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
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ing, and in a rather vague opinion attempted to eliminate the presumption
of malice that previously had arisen whenever the state proved an inten-
tional killing by the defendant. In order to realize the impact of Ayers on
the proof of malice in homicide cases, one must examine the state of the
law in this area prior to the Ayers decision.
The generally accepted position before Ayers was that if the state
established an intentional killing by the defendant, a presumption arose
that the killing was done with malice.0 This is the traditional position
on the presumption of malice formulated under the common law and
developed fully by the time of Blackstone.7 Support for this presumption
had been strong in Missouri prior to Ayers as a result of a line of cases
decided between 1856 and 1968.8 These decisions expressed no doubt that
if the state proved an intentional killing, a presumption of malice arose.0
There still remains strong support for this position in many other jurisdic-
tions.10 These jurisdictions usually take one of two approaches in deter-
mining when the presumption is applicable. Some states say simply that
any intentional killing of a human being will be presumed to be with
6. 40 Am. JuL 2D Homicide § 260 (1968).
7. For a discussion of the historical development of the presumption of
malice at common law see Note, Criminal Law-The Abolition of the Presump-
tion of Malice and Second Degree Murder, 84 TEAnp. L.Q. 36 (1961).
8. See State v. Williams, 442 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. En Banc 1968); State v. Smith,
240 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. 1951); State v. Whited, 860 Mo. 956, 281 S.W.2d 618(1950); State v. Lawson, 860 Mo. 95, 227 S.W.2d 642 (1950); State v. Battles, 357
Mo. 1228, 212 S.W.2d 758 (1948); State v. Smith, 855 Mo. 59, 194 S.W.2d 905(1946); State v. Lyle, 858 Mo. 886, 182 S.W.2d 580 (1944); State v. Hogan, 352
Mo. 879, 177 S.W.2d 465 (1944); State v. Eaton, 154 S.W.2d 767 (1941); State
v. Kenyon, 848 Mo. 1168, 126 S.W.2d 245 (1988); State v. McCracken, 841 Mo.
697, 108 S.W.2d 872 (1937); State v. Majors, 829 Mo. 148, 44 S.W.2d 168 (1931);
State v. Malone, 827 Mo. 1217, 89 S.W.2d 786 (1981); State v. Eason, 322 Mo.
1239, 18 S.W.2d 71 (1929); State v. Richmond, 821 Mo. 662, 12 S.W.2d 34 (1928);
State v. Farrell, 820 Mo. 819, 6 S.W.2d 857 (1928); Ex Parte Johnson, 280 S.W.
702 (Mo. 1926); State v. Snow, 298 Mo. 148, 288 S.W. 1069 (1922); State v.Stewart, 278 Mo. 177, 212 S.W. 858 (En Banc 1919); State v. Larkin, 250 Mo.
218, 157 S.W. 600 (1918); State v. Kyles, 247 Mo. 640, 158 S.W. 1047 (1918); State
v. Bowles, 146 Mo. 6, 47 S.W. 892 (1898); State v. Frazier, 137 Mo. 817, 88 S.W.913 (1897); State v. Fitzgerald, 180 Mo. 407, 82 S.W. 1118 (1895); State v. Evans,
124 Mo. 397, 28 S.W. 8 (1894); State v. Anderson, 98 Mo. 461, 11 S.W. 981 (1889);
State v. Tabor, 95 Mo. 585, 8 S.W. 744 (1888); State v. Anderson, 89 Mo. 812,
1 S.W. 135 (1886); State v. Harris, 76 Mo. 861 (1882); State v. Gassert, 65 Mo.852 (1877); State v. Underwood, 57 Mo. 40 (1874); State v. Holme, 54 Mo. 153(1878); State v. Hays, 28 Mo. 287 (1856).
9. Typical of the position taken by the courts is that expressed in State v.
Battles, 857 Mo. 1223, 212 S.W.2d 758 (1948), in which it was said:
Where a homicide is intentionally committed with a deadly weapon used
upon a vital part of the body and there is no witness to the occurrence,
murder in the second degree is presumed in the absence of evidence
tending to show a different grade of offense or that such killing wasjustifiable or excusable.
Id. at 1228, 212 S.W.2d at 756, quoting State v. McCracken, 841 Mo. 697, 701,
108 S.W.2d 372, 874 (1987).
10. It is significant to indicate here that Ayers expressly repudiates the lan.guage of only one case, State v. Williams, 442 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. En Banc 1968), out
of the long line of precedent set out in note 8, supra.
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malice."1 Other jurisdictions require the intentional killing to have been
committed with a deadly weapon.12
Next it is important to examine the effect this presumption has on
the burden of producing evidence and the risk of non-persuasion in a
homicide case. Initially, the state has the burden of producing evidence
showing that the defendant did intentionally kill the victim. Once this
has been accomplished, a presumption arises that the killing was done
with malice, and the state can get to the jury on a charge of murder in
the second degree.13 At this point, the burden of producing evidence to
rebut the presumption devolves upon the defendant. 14 As a result, in order
for the defendant to be entitled to an instruction on manslaughter, he must
produce evidence of mitigating or extenuating circumstances surrounding
the intentional killing.' 5 Proof of these circumstances eliminates the malice
that is essential to convict the defendant of murder in the second degree.
In Missouri, these mitigating circumstances are referred to as adequate
provocation. Prior to State v. Williams, if the defendant based his claim
of provocation on an attack by the victim there had to be evidence in
the case of physical violence to his person; mere fear of the victim was
not adequate.' 6 However, the Williams case rejected this theory and held
a manslaughter instruction must be given if "there is evidence to warrant
a finding by the jury that the defendant was guilty of manslaughter"' 7
11. E.g., Houston v. State, 215 Ark. 754, 223 S.W.2d 188 (1949); People v.
Brunk, 258 Cal. App. 2d 453, 65 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1968); Holland v. State, 12 Fla.
117 (1867); Mann v. State, 124 Ga. 760, 53 S.E. 324 (1906); DeVaughn v. State,
232 Md. 447, 194 A.2d 109 (1963); Commonwealth v. York, 50 Mass. 98 (1845);
People v. Potter, 5 Mich. 1 (1858); State v. King, 87 N.J. 285, 181 A.2d 158 (1962);
State v. Riddel, 38 N.M. 550, 37 P.2d 802 (1984); State v. Warren, 242 N.C. 581,
89 S.E.2d 109 (1955); Adams v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 821, 111 S.E.2d 396
(1959).
12. E.g., Handley v. State, 96 Ala. 48, 11 So. 822 (1892); Herbal v. State,
243 A.2d 708 (Del. 1968); Fletcher v. State, 227 Ind. 687, 88 N.E.2d 146 (1949);
State v. Myers, 248 Iowa 44, 79 N.W.2d 882 (1956); People v. Horton, 19 App.
Div. 2d 80, 241 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1968); Nance v. State, 210 Tenn. 328, 358 S.W.2d
327 (1962); Rodgers v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 350, 71 S.W. 18 (1902); State v.
Bowyer, 143 W. Va. 812, 101 S.E.2d 248 (1957). This additional requirement of
a deadly weapon probably has little effect on the application of the presumption
since practically all intentional killings are committed with a deadly weapon.
13. State v. Snow, 293 Mo. 143, 288 S.W. 1069 (1922); State v. Kyles, 247
Mo. 640, 153 S.W. 1047 (1913); State v. Underwood, 57 Mo. 40 (1874); State v.
Mangino, 108 N.J.L. 475, 156 A 480 (Ct Err. & App. 1931).
14. Note, Criminal Law-Self-Defense-Burden of Proof-Instructions, 21 J.
Camn L. &c C. 609 (1981).
15. See State v. Tinson, 461 S.W.2d 764 (Mo. 1970); State v. Holt, 434
S.W.2d 576 (Mo. 1968); State v. Brookshire, 368 S.W.2d 878 (Mo. 1968); State v.
Kelton, 299 S.W.2d 498 (Mo. 1957); State v. Littlejohn, 856 Mo. 1052, 204 S.W.2d
750 (1947); State v. Creighton, 830 Mo. 1176, 52 S.W.2d 556 (1982); State v.
Carey, 313 Mo. 486, 282 S.W. 22 (1926); State v. Conley, 255 Mo. 185, 164 S.W.
198 (1914); State v. Jones, 64 Mo. 391 (1877); State v. Starr, 38 Mo. 270 (1866).
16. State v. Brookshire, 868 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. 1968); State v. Haynes, 329
S.W.2d 640 (Mo. 1959); State v. Bongard, 880 Mo. 805, 51 S.W.2d 84 (1982);
Stanford, Manslaughter: Adequacy of Provocation in Missouri, 80 Mo. L. Rlv.
112 (1965).
17. 442 S.W.2d at 64.
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as that offense is defined by the Missouri statute.18 As a result, although
the Williams case broadened the definition of adequate provocation by
eliminating the requirement of physical violence to the defendant's person,
the case also reaffirmed the presumption of malice in an intentional killing
and thus kept the burden of rebutting that presumption on the defendant.
However, the presumption of malice only shifts the burden of pro-
ducing evidence, not the burden of persuasion, to the defendant. In other
words, in order to get a conviction the prosecution still must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant did intentionally kill the victim.19
Unfortunately, the phraseology of some of the instructions in past cases
dealing with the presumption of malice seems to allow the presumption
to shift more than just the burden of producing the evidence onto the
defendant. Many of the instructions in the early Missouri cases actually
mentioned the presumption and specifically pointed out that it devolved
upon the defendant to rebut the presumption of malice or he would be
presumed guilty of murder in the second degree.20 Although this is a
correct statement of the law, an instruction worded in this fashion can
only confuse the jury and might lead them to believe that in order to
rebut the presumption of malice the defendant is required to prove he
did not intentionally kill the victim. Of course, this is exactly what the
presumption should not do.
As a result of the presumption's operation, if the evidence tended
to show an intentional killing, the presumption of malice would arise,
and the court would be required to instruct on murder in the second
degree. Further, if there was no evidence of adequate provocation in the
case, an instruction on manslaughter would be improper.21 In Ayers, neither
defendant nor the state presented any evidence indicating a basis for find-
ing mitigation. Therefore, if the court in Ayers had followed the above
analysis the giving of the manslaughter instruction would have been im-
proper.22
However, the court in Ayers approved the manslaughter instruction, 23
18. Section 559.070, RSMo 1969 provides that:
Every killing of a human being by the act, procurement or culpable
negligence of another, not herein declared to be murder or excusable
or justifiable homicide, shall be deemed manslaughter.
19. Note, supra note 14, at 610.
20. An example of such an instruction, from State v. Evans, 124 Mo. 897,
28 S.W. 8 (1894), reads:
If you find from the evidence that the defendant intentionally killed
Peter Fine by shooting him with a loaded pistol and that such pistol
was a deadly weapon, then the law presumes that such killing was
murder in the second degree, in the absence of proof to the contrary; and
it devolves upon the defendant to adduce evidence to meet or repel that
presumption, unless it is met or repelled by the evidence introduced by
the state.
Id. at 411, 28 S.W. at 12.
21. Hunvald, Criminal Law in Missouri-Manslaughter, A Problem of Defi.
nition, 27 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1962).
22. State v. Williams, 442 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. En Banc 1968); State v. Battles,
357 Mo. 1223, 212 S.W.2d 753 (1948); State v. Lyle, 353 Mo. 386, 182 S.W.2d 530
(1944); State v. Eaton, 154 S.W.2d 767 (1941); State v. Richmond, 321 Mo. 662,
12 S.W.2d 84 (1928); 40 Aiv. Jug. 2D Homicide § 531 (1968).
23. 470 S.W.2d at 537.
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thus implicitly rejecting the traditional presumption of malice resulting
from proof of an intentional killing.24 The court began by defining
manslaughter as the intentional killing of a human being.25 Under this
interpretation of the Missouri statute,20 if all the state's evidence shows
is an intentional killing the homicide would be manslaughter. The court
also stated that in order to prove a case of murder in the second degree
the prosecution must show an intentional killing with premeditation2 7
and malice.2 8 This approach requires the state actually to prove malice in
order to establish murder in the second degree and no longer allows the
state to rely on the presumption of malice arising from mere proof of an
intentional killing.
Therefore, it is clear from the opinion that when the evidence
merely establishes that the defendant intentionally killed the victim, an
instruction on manslaughter is required.29 The court expressly overruled
that portion of State v. Williams30 that required "proof of facts tending
to show want of premeditation and malice to warrant an instruction on
manslaughter."3 ' The defendant is no longer required to produce evidence
of provocation in order to get a manslaughter instruction. Further, in
light of the fact that in Ayers the defendant opposed the manslaughter
instruction, the trial court apparently is required to give this instruction
whether the defendant requests it or not.
Furthermore, it can be inferred from the opinion that for the state
to get an instruction on murder it must show an absence of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances.32 The court is not clear in this regard, but its
statement that the state must prove malice as an element of murder in
the second degree could be interpreted as requiring the state to produce
evidence of lack of adequate provocation in order to prove a malicious
killing. If the court places this requirement on the state it would sub-
stantially increase the state's burden in establishing murder in the second
degree. Therefore, in all probability, the court would allow the state to
fulfill any such requirement by showing all the circumstances surrounding
the killing and thus implying that there were no mitigating circum-
stances.33 Whichever approach the court takes, it will be a significant
change from the burden now on the state in homicide cases.
24. Louisiana and Pennsylvania also support the position taken by Ayers
on the presumption of malice. See e.g., State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086 (1880);
Commonwealth v. Myers, 402 Pa. 451, 167 A.2d 295 (1961).
25. See statute quoted note 19 supra.
26. The premeditation requirement of section 559.020 RSMo 1969 on murder
in the second degree merely refers to the defendant's fully formed intent to kill.
Therefore once the state establishes that the defendant intentionally killed the
victim it will have satisfied the premeditation requirement of the statute.
27. 170 S.W.2d at 537.
28. Id. at 538.
29. Id. at 537.
80. It should be emphasized that this is the only aspect of State v. Williams
that Ayers overruled.
31. 442 S.W.2d at 64.
32. This interpretation of Ayers is suggested by the comments on the PRo-
PosED CRIMINAL CODE OF MissouRI (1971) (unpublished draft by Prof. Hunvald).
33. This conclusion is suggested by id.
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Although it might appear from the court's ruling that a manslaughter
instruction is required in every homicide case, the court indicated that
there are circumstances in which the instruction is improper. The court
described this situation broadly as existing when there is an entire absence
of evidence upon which to base a conviction of manslaughter.3 4 In sup-
porting this position the court cited State v. Jones33 and State v. Bradley."
In State v. Jones the state produced witnesses who were with the defendant
before the killing and testified to facts tending to prove that the defend-
ant intentionally killed the victim with malice and premeditation. The
defendant produced no evidence to the contrary, and the court instructed
on murder only. In State v. Bradley, the defendant killed the victim while
perpetrating an armed robbery and was charged with felony-murder under
the Missouri statute. Therefore, it appears that the court at least would
uphold the refusal of a manslaughter instruction where the state pro-
duces unrebutted evidence of malice3 7 or where the evidence shows only
felony-murder.
The very least the Ayers opinion says is that if all that the evidence
in the case indicates is that the defendant intentionally killed the victim,
and it does not indicate premeditation or deliberation, a manslaughter
instruction is required. This will greatly increase the number of man-
slaughter instructions given in homicide cases, probably requiring such
an instruction in all instances except the two limited situations 8 de-
scribed in Ayers. This approach affords the jury the alternative of finding
the defendant guilty of manslaughter when they believe the evidence
warrants such a verdict but is not sufficient to convict the defendant of
murder in the second degree, whereas under the previous rule in this
situation the jury was only allowed to find the defendant guilty of murder
in the second degree or acquit him. In addition, because the opinion es-
tablishes proof of malice as an element of murder in the second degree,
Ayers seems to put a greater burden on the state in obtaining a murder
instruction. Whether the courts will require the state to prove a lack of
mitigating circumstances to establish malice or allow the prosecution
to show that all the circumstances surrounding the killing fail to indicate
the existence of mitigating circumstances in order to establish malice
and get a murder instruction is a matter of conjecture. But regardless of
the interpretation of Ayers in this latter situation it is apparent that the
case will have a far-reaching effect in the homicide area.
WILLIAm F. ARN T
54. 470 S.W.2d at 558. This position of Ayers was reaffirmed in State v.
Jackson, No. 56574 (Mo., Sept. 25, 1972), where the court held that a manslaughter
instruction was not required since there was an entire absence of evidence on
which to rest a verdict of guilty.
55. 64 Mo. 591 (1877).
56. 561 Mo. 267, 254 S.W.2d 556 (1950).
57. This position indicates that the Missouri case law requiring evidence
of mitigating circumstances (see cases cited note 15 supra) to get a manslaughter
instruction is still applicable in certain situations.
58. These two situations are when the state produces evidence of malice
and premeditation that goes unrebutted by the defendant or where the defendant
is charged with felony-murder. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
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EVIDENCE-ADMISSION OF VIDEO TAPE
Hendricks v. Swenson'
Joseph Hendricks was convicted of first degree murder by the Circuit
Court of St. Louis County. His conviction and resulting sentence were
affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court.2
Hendricks petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to the United States
District Court, which denied his writ. From that denial he appealed to
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred
in admitting into evidence statements made by him to police officers and
a video tape recording of those statements on the ground that the state-
ments were obtained by physical and mental coercion.
In affirming the denial of the writ, the court of appeals first upheld
the district court's conclusion that the statements were given freely and
voluntarily. The court went on to rule that the recording of the state-
ments on video tape and the introduction into evidence and display to
the jury of the tape did not impair appellant's rights under the Federal
Constitution. In support of this use of video tape the court cited recent
changes in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Civil Procedure
and several state court decisions. The court pointed out that the video tape
would be incriminating only if the statement it contained was incriminating.
Further, the court stated that the admission into evidence of video taped
statements and confessions could protect the rights of the accused and
aid the trier of fact in determining the truth if a proper foundation was laid.
The dissenting opinion observed that there were certain flaws inherent
in video tape reproduction that should prevent its use in criminal trials
except under strict safeguards.
Video tape recording is a process by which both video and audio
television signals are preserved as electromagnetic impulses on a layer
of magnetically sensitive material.3 The process is substantially similar
to audio tape recording.4
Audio tape recording utilizes a thin5 tape one-fourth inch wide con-
sisting of a tough, flexible backing8 coated on one side with magnetically
sensitive particles7 in a holding material called a binder. This tape is
1. 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972).
2. State v. Hendricks, 456 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1970).
3. See generally J. BERNSTEIN, VIDEO TAPn RECORDING (1960).
4. Much of the technical detail for this note was developed from an inter-
view with J. Wendell Jeffries, Associate Director of Instructional Television, and
Dan Klein, Chief Engineer for Instructional Television for the University of
Missouri-Columbia.
A detailed treatment of the technical aspects of magnetic video tape recording
is beyond the scope of this note. The discussion herein is intended only to
familiarize the reader with the basic process.
5. Thickness of audio recording tape in common use varies from .5 mils(one-half of one-thousandth of an inch) to 1.5 mils.
6. The material generally used today is Mylar. Earlier backings were of
acetate.
7. Finely divided iron oxide particles are generally used. Other coatings
are being used for special low-noise application in audio recording fields. Their
use may be extended into video fields.
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passed8 in front of a specially designed electromagnet called the recording
head, which imposes magnetic patterns on the sensitive coating of the
passing tape corresponding to the frequency and intensity of the input
signal.o The recorded signal may then be played back or reproduced
without further processing by rewinding the tape and passing it by another
electromagnet, the playback head, which senses these impulses and emits
a small current corresponding to the impulses. This current is then ampli-
fied and converted into sound.
The greater the speed of the tape past the heads, the wider the
spectrum of frequencies that can be recorded and reproduced. For repro-
ducing speech, a spectrum ranging from 100 cycles per second at the bottom
to 10,000 cycles per second at the top is considered quite adequate. A
greater range is preferable for reproducing music, especially high fidelity,
which requires a spectrum ranging from 20 cycles per second at the bot-
tom to 18,000 cycles per second at the top. Translated into tape speed,
the latter frequency requires at least 7.5 inches of tape per second to pass
the head. Professional machines used in recording studios operate at 15
inches per second in order to achieve maximum potential bandwidth.
Magnetic recording of television signals requires a very broad spec-
trum of frequencies, encompassing some 4.5 million cycles per second. 10
In order to facilitate such broad frequency response a tape speed in excess
of 90 miles per hour" would be required. Fortunately, the important
factor is not the tape speed alone; it is the speed of the tape relative to
the heads.
In addition to having a transport mechanism to move the tape at
uniform speed, the video tape recorder has a mechanism that spins the
recording heads so that the required tape/head speed can be achieved.
The prototype video tape recorder employed an assembly of four heads
revolving' 2 perpendicularly to the path of the tape. As the 2-inch wide
tape moved past the head assembly at 15 inches per second, the recording
heads traced a series of nearly vertical' 3 paths across its width.
These machines, called "2-inch quads," remain the standard of video
tape reproduction. Their expense 14 makes their use impractical, however,
by all but the major television stations and the networks.
More recently the helical scan recorder has produced highly satis-
factory results. The same principle of head motion is employed, but the
tape path encircles the heads in a spiral or helix. As the tape moves around
horizontally spinning heads a series of head paths some 9 inches long are
traced diagonally across the width of the tape. Tape to head speed approxi-
8. The motion of the tape must be uniform, because variations in the speed
will result in frequency variations of the reproduced audio. The machinery that
facilitates this uniform motion is called the tape transport mechanism.
9. J. BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 68.
10. Id. at 94-95.
11. Id. at 95.
12. Id. The head assembly rotates at 14,400 r.p.m.
13. The paths traced would be precisely vertical were it not for the motion
of the tape past the head assembly. The combination of motions produces an
inclination of 8.5 degrees from the vertical.
14. The price of one of these machines may be as high as $140,000.
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mating that produced by the 2-inch quads can be achieved. The mechanism
itself costs much less to manufacture, resulting in lower prices for helical
scan machines. 15 In addition, lower operating costs are possible because
some models operate at speeds of 7.5 inches per second, resulting in lower
tape costs.
As its cost has decreased, the video tape recorder has found increas-
ing use. Several suggestions have been made for its use in law practice. 16
Many law enforcement agencies have begun to avail themselves of the
device as a means of preserving evidence that ordinarily would have been
recorded on an audio tape recorder or motion picture camera. 17
The few courts to consider the admissibility of video tape have com-
pared the medium to sound motion pictures or sound recordings and
have stated that video tape is admissible if a proper foundation is laid.' 8
The criteria for admission that video tape must satisfy are those that qualify
sound motion pictures for admission. 19 These criteria rest on the rules
governing admission of still photographs.2 0 Inquiry will be directed toward
what should constitute a proper foundation for video tape admission.
Proper foundation for photographs, motion pictures, and video tape
requires evidentiary showings on two issues. There must first be testimony
identifying the content of the picture2' in order to establish the relevance
of the photograph to the lawsuit.22 In determining relevance, the court
15. Systems complete with camera may be obtained for less than $2,000.
See articles cited note 17 infra.
16. See, e.g., Merlo & Sorensen, Video Tape: The Coming Courtroom Tool,
7 TIAL 55 (1971).
17. Hicks, Vzdeo Recording in Police Identification, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
295 (1968) (details a program initiated by the Miami, Florida, police department
to replace the line-up system under a federal grant at a cost of less than .$13,000);
Kane, Videotape Recording, 50 J. Aar. JuD. Soc'y 272 (1967) (similar program
begun by Santa Barbara, California, police at a cost of $3,000).
18. See Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969); People v. Mines, 270
N.E.2d 265 (Ill. App. 1971); State v. Hall, 253 La. 426, 431-32, 218 So. 2d 320,
322 (1969); People v. Heading, 39 Mich. App. 126, 197 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1972)
(compares to motion picture and sound recording); State v. Lusk, 452 S.W.2d
219, 224 (Mo. 1970) (initial Missouri case on point); State v. Hendricks, 456
S.W.2d 11, 13 (Mo. 1970) (relying on Lusk).
19. People v. Heading, 39 Mich. App. 126, 197 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1972); State
v. Lusk, 452 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Mo. 1970). See generally 3 C. Scor, PHOTOGRAPHIC
EVIDENCE § 1294 (2d ed. 1969).
20. People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d 491, 497-98, 197 P.2d 1, 5 (1948); Heiman
v. Market St. Ry., 21 Cal. App. 2d 311, 315, 69 P.2d 178, 180 (1937); Lanford
v. People, 159 Colo. 36, 409 P.2d 829 (1966); Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361,
363 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1014 (1966); Morris v. E.I. DuPont
De Nemours & Co., 346 Mo. 126, 132, 139 S.W.2d 984, 987 (1940); Common-
wealth v. Roller, 100 Pa. Super. 125, 127 (1930); Richardson v. Missouri-K.-T.
Ry., 205 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Williams v. Texas, 461 S.W.2d 614(Tex. Crim. App. 1970); Housewright v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 101, 102, 225
S.W.2d 417, 418 (1950); 3 C. ScoTr, supra note 19, § 1291.
21. People v. Donaldson, 24 111. 2d 315, 181 N.E.2d 131 (1962); Williamson
v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 508, 252 S.W.2d 295 (1952); 2 C. Scorr,
supra note 19, § 1022.
22. In State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Cone, 338 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1960),
the court stated:
In final analysis the decision rests on the principles of relevancy of the
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must weigh the probative value of the evidence and its potential for
confusion of the jury. Courts exclude photographic evidence as irrelevant
where it is merely cumulative 23 or where the content or events represented
are so different in time, place, or circumstances from those in issue 24 as
to confuse or mislead.25 With motion pictures, and by analogy video tape,
the court may order irrelevancies excised.26 Such determinations and
orders are within the discretion of the trial court. 27
Second, photographic evidence must be authenticated or verified.2 8
In its simplest form, this requires testimony by a witness29 who has seen
the subject pictured that the photograph 3O fairly and accurately represents
that subject at the relevant point in time.3 1 Absent some special problem,
this showing coupled with identification meets the foundation require-
fact or facts pictured and not on the propriety of evidencing a relevant
fact by a photograph. If the fact to be evidenced by the photograph is
itself not admissible, it cannot be proved by photograph or otherwise.
Id. at 27; accord, 3 J. WCMOaE, EvENCE § 792, at 184 (3d ed. 1940).
Professor Scott suggests that a photograph should be admitted whenever it:
(I) Has a reasonable tendency to prove some material fact in issue; (2) appears
that it would have been competent for the jury to have viewed the subject
of the pictures at the time taken had such been practical; (3) assists the trier
of fact in understanding the case; (4) corroborates other evidence in the trial;(5) would be useful for impeachment; or (6) assists the witness in explaining
his testimony. 2 C. Scorr, supra note 19, § 1022.
28. Pursche v. Atlas Scraper & Eng'r Co., 800 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1962); Finn
v. Wood, 178 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1950).
24. Frankel v. Lull Eng'r Co., 384 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (different
machine portrayed); Avery v. Scott, 216 So. 2d Ill (La. App. 1968) (film taken
one year later offered to show degree of darkness); State ex rel. Chima v. United
Rys. & Elec. Co., 162 Md. 404, 159 A. 916 (1932) (unusual swaying of railroad
car not duplicable); Manning v. Lake Superior & I. Ry., 4 Mich. App. 316, 144
N.W.2d 831 (1966).
25. State ex rel. Highway Comm'n v. Cone, 888 S.W.2d 22, 27 (Mo. 1960);
Faught v. Washam, 829 S.W.2d 588, 600-01 (Mo. 1959) (color photograph inac-
curate); Morris v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 346 Mo. 126, 189 S.W.2d
984 (1940); Oglesby v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 388 S.W.2d 857, 862 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1960).
26. Morris v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours &c Co., 346 Mo. 126, 182, 189 S.W.2d
984, 988 (1940) (editing suggested on retrial).
27. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Acors, 293 A.2d 871 (App. D.C. 1972); Simms
v. Dixon, 291 A.2d 184 (App. D.C. 1972); Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812
(Miss. 1972); State ex tel. Highway Comm n v. Cone, 88 S.W.2d 22, 27 (Mo.
1960). But cf. Lamar v. State, 282 N.E.2d 795, 800 (Ind. 1972); Davis v. Illinois
Terminal R.R., 307 S.W.2d 895, 400 (Mo. 1957). See generally 32 C.J.S. EVIDENCE
§ 716, at 1018 (1964); 2 C. Sco-r, supra note 19, § 1021.
28. 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 793. See also 2 C. Scorr, supra note 19,
§ 1023; 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 715 (1964).
29. DeCamp v. United States, 56 App. D.C. 119, 120, 10 F.2d 984, 985 (1926).
80. Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719, 725 (2d Cir. 1970).
81. Pursche v. Atlas Scraper &c Eng'r Co., 800 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1961);
Miller's Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1958);
Finn v. Wood, 178 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1950); Simms v. Dixon, 291 A.2d 184 (D.C.
App. 1972); Berkovitz v. Am. River Gravel Co., 191 Cal. 195, 215 P. 675 (1928);
Williamson v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 863 Mo. 508, 252 S.W.2d 295 (1952);
Housewright v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 (1950).
Neither passage of time nor changed conditions render a photograph inad.
missible if the changes are explained or are insubstantial. People v. Mines, 270
[Vol. 58
21
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
RECENT CASES
ment.3 2 Modern cases tend to regard proof of the technical details of
still photography and processing as "irrelevant and immaterial" "un-
realistic roadblocks."3 3
In determining the admissibility of motion pictures, however, courts
have been concerned about the powerful effect on juries of the repro-
duction of motion coordinated with sound.34 Courts have also been troubled
by the susceptibility of motion pictures to distortion and alteration.35
This concern manifests itself in requirements of proof beyond the testimony
described above.36 Technical proofs designed to guarantee the accuracy of
the film are made the sine qua non of admission. 37 These technical proofs
generally relate to showing that events or motions are accurately portrayed.
Where accurate representation of motion is particularly important,
as is frequently the case with surveillance films showing a plaintiff perform-
ing activities inconsistent with his claims of injury, the courts have demon-
strated considerable concern with the speed of the film through the
camera,38 and film has even been excluded where adequate proof of
the speed could not be given.3 9 Courts have placed particular emphasis
N.E.2d 265 (II. App. 1971); Davis v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 307 S.W.2d 395,
400 (Mo. 1957); Phillips v. Prugh, 255 S.W.2d 84, 87 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953);
Richardson v. Missouri-K.-T. Ry., 205 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947);
32 C.J.S. EVIDENCE § 715, at 1009 (1964).
32. 2 C. Scorr, supra note 19, § 1027.
33. E.g., United States v. Hobbs, 403 F.2d 977, 978-79 (6th Cir. 1968). Judicial
notice may be taken of the technical and chemical process of photography. In re
Strosahl v. Cross & Brown Co., 232 App. Div. 587, 251 N.Y.S. 587 (1931).
34. See, e.g., People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d 491, 501, 197 P.2d 1, 5 (1948).
35. See, e.g., Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Frolich, 195 F. Supp. 256, 263 (S.D.
Cal.), affd, 296 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1961).
36. See Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1970); Kortz v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co., 144 F.2d 676 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 728 (1944); McGoorty
v. Benhart, 305 II. App. 458, 27 N.E.2d 289 (1940); Philippi v. New York, C. &
St. L. Ry., 136 S.W.2d 339 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940); Commonwealth v. Roller,
100 Pa. Super. 125 (1930); Williams v. Texas, 461 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1970).
37. McGoorty v. Benhart, 305 Ill. App. 458, 27 N.E.2d 289 (1940); Avery
v. Scott, 216 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 1968); Richardson v. Missouri-K.-T. Ry., 205
S.W.2d 819, 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).A more difficult problem is presented when the event is reconstructed or
re-enacted. Courts have been concerned over the reconstructor's bias. Grant v.
State, 171 So. 2d 361, 364 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1014 (1966); 3
J. WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 798 (a), at 203: "[M]oreover, the party's hired agents
may so construct [the event] as to go considerably further in his favor than the
witnesses' testimony has gone."
Similar technical proofs are required for foundation of sound recordings.
Steve M. Solomon, Jr., Inc. v. Edgar, 92 Ga. App. 207, 211-12, 88 S.E.2d 167,
171 (1955); Wright v. State, 38 Ala. App. 64, 79 So. 2d 66 (1954); Lamar v.
State, 282 N.E.2d 795, 800 (Ind. 1972) (modernizing Solomon rules); Ray v. State,
213 Miss. 650, 57 So. 2d 469 (1952).
38. See Utley v. Heckinger, 362 S.W.2d 13 (Ark. 1962); Williamson v. St.
Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 508, 252 S.W.2d 295 (1952); Richardson v. Mis-
souri-K.-T. Ry., 205 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
The speed of the film through the camera (measured in frames per second)
should not be confused with the light sensitivity of the film, often referred to
as film speed.
39. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., v. Marks, 230 Ala. 417, 161 So. 543 (1935).
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on the fact that by simple adjustments to the camera or projector, motion
can be made to appear faster or slower than that actually photographed. 40
With video tape this is not such a problem. Uniformity of tape speed
is critical,41 and any significant variation will cause the television picture
to "roll" or "smear" horizontally.42 The 2-inch quads employ "control"
tracks of synchronized pulses and computing units that sense these pulses
and vary the playback speed to keep it in constant synchronization with
the recording speed.43 Helical scan units also use control tracks, and
variations of playback speed from synchronization with the recording
speed result in immediate loss of picture. The slow- and stop-motion
effects seen on major television networks require additional electronic
paraphernalia. In short, to produce a recognizable picture the tape must
be run at the same speed at which it was recorded. Therefore, proof of
tape speed should not be unduly emphasized as additional foundation.
Because of their optical design, various types of lenses used in pho-
tography incorporate distortions. 4 Thus, depending upon the issue in
the lawsuit, inquiry into the type of lens and the manner and degree of
distortion may be proper. Camera position in relation to the subject
photographed is also significant.4 5
Additionally, television has its own inherent distortions. The tele-
vision camera is more sensitive than the motion picture camera to shadows
and coarse surfaces.4 6 Thus, a rough-surfaced object may appear in pro.
nounced contrast. Conversely, given the same camera angle a smooth
surface may appear "washed out." The position of the camera vis-.t-vis
This case has been criticized as overly technical. See Paradis, The Celluloid Wit-
ness, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 235 (1965).
40. Slow motion is produced by operating the camera at a more rapid rate
than the projector; fast motion is produced by operating the camera at a slower
rate than the projector. At the extremes of the spectrum, the change in speed
would be obvious. However, minor variations can be undetectable by the casual
viewer and might make a slowly ambulating plaintiff appear to walk at a normal
speed, or a cautious or hesitant machine operator appear reckless or facile.
41. See note 8 supra.
42. These effects are all too familiar to television viewers and are referred
to by technicians as "video tape breakup."
43. The need for this synchronization should be apparent. If the process
is visualized as creating a series of parallel lines diagonally across the width of
the tape, then the playback process must match those lines with the paths of
the whirling playback heads.
44. An example of this is the long telephoto lens frequently used in sur-
veillance photography. This lens has the apparent effect of bringing distant
objects closer to the camera and compressing objects into the same vertical plane.
Motion at right angles to the lens direction would not be subject to this distor-
tion, but motion parallel to the direction of the lens would appear distorted.
45. Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719, 725 (2d Cir. 1970); Philippi v.
New York, C. & St. L. Ry., 136 S.W.2d 339 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940); De Tunno
v. Shull, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 602, 144 N.E.2d 669 (1956).
46. H. ZTrrL, TELEVISION PRODUcrIoN HANDBOOK (2d Ed. 1968):
The camera picture tubes (imageorthicon and vidicon) have a
tendency to pick up and exaggerate certain shadow areas. For instance,
a boom [mike] shadow that is hardly noticeable in the studio may
show up clearly on the control room monitor. Dark shadows beneath
the eyes, nose, and chin quite frequently distort a person's face un-
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the subject and the position and intensity of the lighting4" have marked
effects on the appearance produced. Television also has the effect of
"fattening" its subject perceptibly. 4s Some subjects require special treat-
ment, such as make-up and special lighting, to achieve a "normal" appear-
ance on the screen.4 9 The dissent in Hendricks raises these points, arguing
that such flaws should bar admission of video tape into evidence in the
absence of special procedures. 50 The majority of the court apparently
rejected this argument.51 In a case where the appearance of the subject
is in issue,52 however, such inquiries would be proper, at least with regard
to the weight to be given the evidence.
When dealing with physical evidence that is by nature subject to
destruction, alteration, or contamination, courts often require a showing
of a chain of custody.5 3 Application of this requirement to motion pic-
tures5 4 and sound recordings55 is an attempt to insure against editing
or alteration.56
favorably. A man may be as clean-shaven as possible, but without make-
up his beard area may appear as dark, uneven blotches on the television
screen.
The monochrome picture tubes tend to photograph warm colors
(warm reds, oranges, browns, tans) lighter-that is, the colors appear
slightly washed-out-whereas cool colors (blue-reds, blues, blue-greens)
photograph darker. Correct make-up colors must be chosen to compensate
for these distortions.
The customary overhead television lighting creates several undesirable
shadows, notably under the eyebrows and beneath the eye, and under
the nose and chin area. In some cases the shadows are so objectionable
that corrective make-up must be applied....
Id. at 370-71 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 883.
49. See note 46 supra.
50. 456 F.2d at 508-09.
51. Id. at 506 (emphasis added):
We do not agree with our colleague as to the need for make-up and
other preparation to project a better image. To permit the applying of
make-up would defeat the true purpose of a statement which is to
present the facts as they are....
If a proper foundation is laid for the admission of a video tape by
showing that it truly and correctly depicted the events and persons
shown .. . it is ... a protection of defendant's rights....
The majority assumes the very point in issue and arguably does not meet
the dissent squarely on the ground of television's inherent distortive effects.
52. For example, suppose plaintiff sues for intentional infliction of emo-
tional harm, claiming severe weight loss; and defendant offers video tape of
plaintiff, who in the tape appears not to have lost any weight.
53. This requirement is commonly applied to drugs. See Gallego v. United
States, 276 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1960); Sorce v. State, 497 P.2d 902 (Nev. 1972).
54. McGoorty v. Benhart, 305 Ill. App. 458, 27 N.E.2d 289 (1940); Williams
v. Texas, 461 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970). But cf. Mikus v. United States,
433 F.2d 719, 725 (2d Cir. 1970).
55. McKeeman v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 320 F. Supp. 938 (D.
Neb. 1970); State v. Alleman, 218 La. 821, 51 So. 2d 83 (1950).
56. The party against whom evidence is offered may request expert examina-
tion if such would assist in authentication. Compare Commonwealth v. Roller,
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Video tape can be easily edited. On the 2-inch quads, editing can
be almost undetectable. This is accomplished by use of "black box"
circuitry, which blends the signal over the spliced area. This circuitry is
not available on the helical scan recorders except at substantial addi-
tional cost. Without this compensating circuitry, editing throws the ma-
chine's internal synchronization 57 awry, causing picture roll or smear
until synchronization can be restored by the control track. Examination
of the tape by an expert would reveal all but the most professional
editing jobs.58
Video tape is also subject to damage or destruction by exposure to
certain outside influences. Exposure to a magnetic field can destroy or
cause degeneration of the magnetic imprint.59 The possibility of this hap-
pening by accident is remote, since a very strong magnetic field is required
to be in close proximity to the tape to cause any discernible effect.
A more significant problem is the tape's vulnerability to heat and
humidity.0 0 The binder holding the layer of magnetic particles to the
flexible backingal is quite sensitive to its surrounding environment. Exces-
sive amounts of heat or humidity cause the binder to lose its grip on the
backing; patches of the binder and magnetic material will slough off the
backing, with resulting loss of the signal in that area of the tape. Alterna-
tively, the backing may become sticky and cause the tape to adhere to
portions of the recorder mechanism, thereby jamming the machine. 02
This latter defect renders the tape worthless, and is a particular problem
with helical scan recorders, where the tape is required to slide smoothly
across a large bearing surface.
Thus, in cases where the potential for abuse is high or the reper-
cussions of abuse would be particularly severe, imposition of the chain of
custody requirement is desirable. The recent development of video tape
cassettes may have some utility in faciliting such a requirement. 03
Specific foundation requirements vary with the relevancy of the film
and the particular issue it is offered to prove. In each case the court
should balance the probative value of the film against the potential to
100 Pa. Super. 125 (1930) with Alonzo v. State ex rel. Booth, 283 Ala. 607, 219
So. 2d 858, cert. denied, 896 U.S. 931 (1969).
For a practical discussion of the possibilities of editing sound recording tape,
see 17 Am JUR PROOF OF FAcTs §§ 14-24, at 12-21 (1966).
57. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
58. Detection of splicing would be by use of Carbonyl. When applied to
the video tape, this fluid makes the magnetically recorded signals visible. J.
BERNSTEIN, VIDEO TAPE RECORDING 250 (1960).
59. Id. at 257.
60. Id. at 258-59.
61. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
62. J. BERNSTIN, supra note 58, at 257-59.
63. Cassettes resemble in appearance (except for size) and operation the
tape cartridges or cassettes used in automobile car stereo players. The device,
which measures approximately 9" x 5" x 1", is entirely self-contained. Compatible
recording and playback units are loaded with the cassette by inserting the entire
device into the machine. No contact with the tape itself is required. Editing
of such a container would be difficult, and the cassette could have a seal placed
on it after recording. Costs are reasonable. A 60-minute cassette costs $35; the
compatible recorder lists at $1,400.
EvOl. 38
25
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
RECENT CASES
mislead, and impose appropriate requirements to insure accuracy. Given
the multiplicity of issues to which a film might be relevant, it should
be apparent that no procrustean listing of requirements is possible.6 ' The
matter instead falls within the discretion of the trial court.0 5
The obvious person to give much of the authentication testimony
relating to the technical details of video tape recording is the operator
of the recorder.60 No particular qualifications of the operator need be
shown. 7 If the authenticating witness is not the operator, there is some
authority that he must have been present when the film was made. 8
The cases indicate, however, that the witness need not have been present
at the filming if his absence does not affect his competency to give the
required authentication testimony.69
The use of video-taped statements or confessions as evidence against
a criminal defendant involves special considerations, because such use
brings the foibles of the medium into relief against the constitutional
paradigm of an essentially fair criminal procedure.70 Most courts consider
the greatest value of the video taped or filmed confession to be that it
provides highly probative evidence that the confession was truly voluntary
and free from coercion.7 1 If this value is to be maximized, the constitu-
tionally necessary warnings and waivers should be included in the taped
record.7 2 This provides protection for both the accused and the state by
dearly demonstrating the voluntary nature of the accused's acknowledg-
ments and waivers.73 Although no holdings have been discovered requir-
ing such procedure for video tape confessions, 74 some courts have indicated
64. See 3 J. WoTMORE, supra note 22, § 798 (a), at 203.
65. Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972); Oglesby v. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co., 338 S.W.2d 357 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
66. People v. Mines, 270 N.E.2d 265 (Ill. App. 1971); cf. Williams v. State,
461 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Grim. App. 1970).
67. People v. Mines, 270 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ill. App. 1971); cf. De Tunno v.
Shull, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 602, 144 N.E.2d 669, 672-73 (1956). The operation of the
helical scan recorders is simple and easily learned.
68. C. MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE § 214, at 583 n.72 (2d ed. 1972).
69. Compare Philippi v. New York, C. & St. L. Ry., 136 S.W.2d 889 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1940) with Williams v. State, 461 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970)
and Richardson v. Missouri-K.-T. Ry., 205 S.W.2d 819, 823-24 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947).
70. The body of law surrounding Miranda v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 456 (1966),
is clearly applicable to video tape. See, e.g., People v. Hayes, 21 Cal. App. 2d 320,
822, 71 P.2d 321, 328 (1987); Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969); State
v. Hendricks, 456 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1970); State v. Lusk, 452 S.W.2d 219 (Mo.
1970); 3 C. ScoTr, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1329 (2d ed. 1969).
These rules may additionally require an in camera viewing by the court to
determine the admissibility of the video tape. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 868(1964); Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969); State v. Lusk, 452 S.W.2d
219 (Mo. 1970); cf. Wright v. State, 38 Ala. App. 64, 79 So. 2d 66 (1954); State
v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962).
71. See Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972) (video
tape); People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d 491, 499, 197 P.2d 1, 5 (1948) (motion pic-
ture); People v. Hayes, 21 Cal. App. 2d 320, 322, 71 P.2d 321, 323 (1987) (motion
picture); State v. Hall, 253 La. 425, 433, 218 So. 2d 820, 828 (1969) (video tape).
72. People v. Ardella, 49 Ill. 2d 517, 276 N.E.2d 302 (1971).
78. Id. (video tape allowed state to sustain burden of proof of waiver).
74. But see State v. Edgell, 30 Ohio St. 2d 103, 288 N.E.2d 145 (1972).
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that such a procedure should be followed.75 Wise policy suggests that when
video tape is to be used to record an accused's confession, it record the
entire transaction surrounding the taking of the confession together with
the giving of the warnings by the interrogator and the accused's clear
waiver.70
Generally, if only a portion of the accused's statement or confession
is offered in evidence against him, he has the right to require that the
entire confession or statement be introduced so that he may take advantage
of any direct or contextual exculpations.77 This requirement precludes
editing of the confession by the state, either through alteration of the
recorded tape, or through turning the recorder on and off78 during the
recording of the confession. This principle might also apply where because
of faulty technical procedures or careless preservation, portions of the
taped signal have been lost.7 9 To minimize the risk of admitting an
edited or damaged tape, a court could require showing the chain of custody
of the tape from its original recording to the courtroom,8 0 or, as is sug-
gested by the dissent in Hendricks,81 it could require that the defendant
be given a copy of the tape. Use of the newly developed video cassette
could well be an answer to many of these problems, particularly where
editing is involved.8 2
There remains today little question that video tape evidence is admis-
sible in a criminal or civil trial provided a proper foundation has first
been laid. The foundation required by most of the courts that have con-
sidered its admissibility has been that which would have been required
to admit a similar sound motion picture. Certain cases may properly
75. People v. Ardella, 49 111. 2d 517, 276 N.E.2d 302 (1971); cf. Lamar v.
State, 282 N.E.2d 795 (Ind. 1972); Schmidt v. State, 265 N.E.2d 219 (Ind. 1970).
The dissent in Hendricks suggests this. 456 F.2d at 509.
76. Certain collateral advantages may result from this procedure. In Para-
more v. State, 229 So. 2d 855, 859 (Fla. 1969), the entire proceeding at the
police station between defendant and the interrogators had been video taped;
the state was not required to show continuity of possession.
77. United States v. Wenzel, 311 F.2d 164, 168-69 (4th Cir. 1962); State
v. Alleman, 218 La. 821, 51 So. 2d 83 (1950); cf. Williams v. State, 39 Ala. 532,
535 (1865). LA. R1v. STAT. § 15:450 (1950) provides:
Every confession, admission or declaration sought to be used against
anyone must be used in its entirety, so that the person to be affected
thereby may have the benefit of any exculpation or explanation that the
whole statement may afford.
78. State v. Edgell, 30 Ohio St. 2d 103, 283 N.E.2d 145 (1972).
79. See Lamar v. State, 282 N.E.2d 795 (Ind. 1972); State v. Driver, 38
N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962) (error to admit garbled tape); People v. Sacchitella,
31 App. Div. 2d 180, 295 N.Y.S.2d 880 (1968) (tape improperly admitted where
inaudible throughout); Hunter v. Hunter, 169 Pa. Super. 498, 502, 83 A.2d 401,
403 (1951) (recording excluded as incomplete). Tape may be admitted even
though portions are unintelligible if some probative value remains. E.g., Byrnes
v. United States, 327 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964); Addison v. United States, 317
F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1963); State v. Slater, 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P.2d 329 (1950).
The audio portion of the video tape may be excluded if it is garbled. People
v. Heading, 39 Mich. App. 126, 197 N.W.2d 325 (1972).
80. Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969).
81. 456 F.2d at 509 (dissenting opinion).
82. See note 63 supra.
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require additional proof going to authentication in order to guarantee
the accuracy of the video tape.
Hendricks v. Swenson may be read as rejecting the idea that the
inherent distortions in video tape and television preclude the admission
of video tape. But where video tape is used to preserve and display state-
ments or confessions of criminal defendants, courts may properly require
that a stricter standard of authentication be followed to preserve the
integrity of the taped confession. Additionally, courts should encourage
showing the required warnings and waivers on the video tape as a pro-
tection to both the state and the defendant. With proper consideration
of its idiosyncracies, the medium of video tape may be of significant aid




PROHIBITED DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYER
CONTRIBUTIONS WEIGHTED FOR
YEARS OF SERVICE'
Bernard McMenamy, Contractor, Inc. v. Commissioner2
Bernard McMenamy was the president, general manager, treasurer,
and sole stockholder of Bernard McMenamy, Contractor, Inc. McMenamy
and other corporate employees were participants in a profit-sharing plans
established by the corporation. The plan provided that employer con-
tributions were to be allocated among the accounts of the participants
according to a formula based on compensation and length of service. At
any given level of compensation, the longer the service of an employee, the
larger the proportion of employer contributions allocated to his account.4
1. For a compilation of the guides applicable to the qualification of pension
plans under INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 401 (a), see Rev. Rul. 69-421, 1969-2 Cum.
BULL. 59, 74.
2. 442 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1971), afrg 54 T.C. 1057 (1970).
'3. Treas. Reg. § 1.40-1 (b) (1) (ii) (1956) states:
A profit-sharing plan is a plan established and maintained by an em-
ployer to provide for the participation in his profits by his employees
or their beneficiaries. The plan must provide a definite predetermined
formula for allocating the contributions made to the plan among the
participants and for distributing the funds accumulated under the plan
after a fixed number of years, the attainment of a stated age, or upon
the prior occurrence of some event such as layoff, illness, disability,
retirement, death, or severance of employment.
4. This result was achieved by first multiplying each participant's com-
pensation by the following figures, cast in the form of percentages:
Years Percentage
Less than 2 years' service 100
2 years but less than 5 years 110
5 years but less than 10 years 120
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Because McMenamy had more years of service than any other par-
ticipant,5 the proportionate allocation of employer contributions to his
account was greater in relation to his compensation than the proportionate
allocation to the account of any other participant in relation to that
participant's compensation.8 The Tax Court7 found this scheme of al-
locating employer contributions to be discriminatory in favor of an officer,
shareholder, and supervisory employee under section 401 (a) (4) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provides:
(a) A trust . . . forming part of a... profit-sharing plan of an
employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees or their
beneficiaries shall constitute a qualified trust under this section-
(4) ... if the contributions or benefits provided under the plan
do not discriminate in favor of employees who are officers, share-
holders, persons whose principal duties consist in supervising the
work of other employees, or highly compensated employees.
The court ruled that because the plan was discriminatory, it failed to
qualify under section 401 (a).8 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 9 In so holding, the court appeared to apply
strictly the Internal Revenue Service's "compensation operations test"10
for determining whether a profit-sharing plan discriminates in favor of a
member of the prohibited group listed in section 401 (a) (4).11
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals case of Auner v. United States'2 as directly supporting its
holding in McMenamy. In Auner, a professional association established a
profit-sharing plan in which four doctors and eight supporting personnel
participated. The four doctors were officers of the association and, com-
pared to the other employees, "highly compensated." 13 Thus, if the con-
tributions or benefits provided under the plan discriminated in their
favor, it failed to qualify under section 401 (a).
Employer contributions to the plan were allocated to the individual
participants under a formula based on seniority points and training and
experience points. Each participant was assigned seniority points, which
increased with years of continuous service with the association and its
10 years but less than 15 years 150
15 years or over 200
The resulting product was called the participant's weighted contribution, and
employer contributions were then allocated to each participant's account accord-
ing to the proportion that his weighted contribution bore to the total weighted
contribution of all participants. 54 T.C. at 1057-58.
5. Id. at 1059. Bernard McMenamy had 11 years of service as of the first
year of contributions. All of the other participants had 6 years of service or less.
6. 'Id.
7. Id. at 1057.
8. Id. at 1063.
9. 442 F.2d at 360.
10. See text accompanying notes 28-30 infra.
11. See 442 F.2d at 360.
12. 440 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1971).
13. Id. at 519, citing Rev. Rul. 56-497, 1956-2 Cusm. BuLL. 284, 286, approved
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predecessor partnership. Each participant was also assigned training and
experience points, which increased with the number of years of experience
in previous similar employment and time spent in certain types of training.
Employer contributions were allocated to each participant's account in
amounts directly proportional to the product of his seniority points and
his training and experience points. 14
As a result of the formula the four doctors, who received only 87
percent of the total compensation paid to the participants, received 95
percent of the employer contributions.1 5 The court found this ratio of
contributions to compensation enjoyed by the group of doctors to be
discriminatory.10
Because both of these profit-sharing plans were discriminatory in
favor of a member of the prohibited group set forth in section 401 (a) (4),
they failed to qualify for the tax advantages available to plans qualifying
under section 401 (a). If a plan qualifies, the corporation receives an im-
mediate deduction for its contributions to the plan,17 the earnings of the
plan are tax exempt,' 8 and the employee may defer the tax payable on his
plan benefits until he receives them.19 In McMenamy the court disallowed
deductions to the corporation for its contributions to the profit-sharing
plan. In Auner the court disallowed deferral by an employee of the tax
payable on his plan benefits.
Both of these profit-sharing plans would have qualified under the
original provisions of the federal income tax law, which required only
that a qualified plan benefit "some employees." 20 By 1937 President
Roosevelt realized that the tax exemption had been "twisted into a
means of tax avoidance by the creation of pension trusts which include[d]
as beneficiaries only small groups of officers and directors who [were]
in the high income bracket." 21 Therefore, Congress adopted section
401 (a) (4) in order
to insure that stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plans are
operated for the welfare of employees in general, and to prevent
the trust device from being used for the benefit of shareholders,
officials, or highly paid employees. 22
Current Treasury Regulations reflect this policy.23
14. 440 F.2d at 518.
15. Id. at 519.
16. Id. at 520.
17. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 404.
18. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, §§ 401, 501.
19. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, §§ 402, 403.
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, § 165 (a), 53 Stat. 67 (now INT. REv.
CODE Of 1954, § 401).
21. 81 CONG. REc. 5125 (1937) (letter to Congress from President Roosevelt).
22. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 103-04 (1942). See also S. REP.
No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 136-38 (1942).
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4 (a) (1) (i) (1956) states:
In order to qualify under section 401 (a), a trust must not only meet
the coverage requirements of section 401 (a) (3), but, as provided in section
401 (a) (4), it must also be part of a plan under which there is no dis-
criiation in contributions or benefits in favor of officers, shareholders,
1973]
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The Internal Revenue Code contains no positive definition of the
"discrimination" referred to in section 401 (a) (4). However, section
401 (a) (5) states that a profit-sharing plan is not discriminatory if the
allocation of employer contribution bears a uniform relationship to total
compensation or the basic or regular rate of compensation of plan par-
ticipants.2 4 Nor do the Treasury Regulations define "discrimination."
They merely state that employer contribution allocation formulas other
than the one expressly approved in section 401 (a) (5) may be permissible25
and that variations in contributions are permissible so long as the plan,
"viewed as a whole for the benefit of employees in general, with all its
attendant circumstances," does not discriminate in favor of members of
the prohibited group.20 The Senate and House reports to the 1942 In-
ternal Revenue Code also fail to indicate how "discrimination" should
be defined.27
In an attempt to correct this deficiency the Internal Revenue Service
has adopted a "compensation operations test" to determine whether a
profit-sharing plan discriminates in favor of the prohibited group. Under
this test no formula for allocating employer contributions to plan par-
ticipants will be regarded as discriminatory per se. If at any time,28 how.
ever, the operation29 of such a formula results in employer contributions
allocated to a member of the prohibited group being proportionately
greater in relation to his compensation than the contributions to the other
plan participants in relation to their compensation,3 0 the plan is dis.
criminatory. The courts of appeals in McMenamy and Auner applied this
test strictly.
Profit-sharing plans that allocate employer contributions according to
such formulas as salary times years of service,3 ' salary plus years of service,3 2
or salary weighted for years of service 33 are considered non-discriminatory
if they meet the "compensation operations test." The above formulas
would meet the test only where all plan participants have the same years
employees whose principal duties consist in supervising the work of other
employees, or highly compensated employees as against other employees
whether within or without the plan.
24. INT. REV. CODE of 1954. § 401 (a) (5).
25. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4 (a) (2) (ii) (1956); Rev. Rul. 69-421, 1969-2
Cum. BULL. 59, 74.
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4 (a) (2) (iii) (1956).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 2383, supra note 22; S. REP. No. 1631, supra note 22.
28. The Tax Court in McMenamy stated that the Internal Revenue Service
will "judge the plan on the basis of the facts existing before it." 54 T.C. at 1063
(1970).
29. Rev. Rul. 69-421, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 59, 74.
30. Id.; Rev. Rul. 57-77, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 158. Under this test, shareholders
are compared to all other participants, including other members of the pro-
hibited group. The Tax Court in McMenamy rejected McMenamy's argument
that it should have compared the contributions made on behalf of all employees
in the prohibited group with the contributions made on behalf of other employees.
See 54 T.C. at 1064.
31. Rev. Rul. 68-652, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 176.
82. Rev. Rul. 68-653, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 177.
33. Rev. Rul. 68-654, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 178.
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of service or where members of the prohibited group have fewer years of
service than other plan participants.
The "compensation operations test" for discrimination in profit-
sharing plans is to be distinguished from the "benefits test" for dis-
crimination in fixed-benefit pension plans.3 4 In the latter test, the
comparison for purposes of discrimination is based upon benefits ulti-
mately to be received, rather than contributions presently being made.35
Thus a pension plan is discriminatory if the benefits received by a member
of the prohibited group are proportionately greater in relation to his
compensation than the benefits received by the other plan participants in
relation to their compensation. This difference in focus permits a fixed-
benefit pension plan to take years of service into account in allocating
employer contributions, even though, in the earlier years of the plan, a
larger share of employer contributions may be allocated to members of
the prohibited group with long service in order to fund their retirement
benefits adequately.3 6 Judge Drennen of the Tax Court, dissenting in
McMenamy, saw no reason for prohibiting profit-sharing plans from doing
the same. Because section 401 sets forth the same requirements for quali-
fication of pension and profit-sharing plans, he would apply the "bene-
fits test" to both.3 7
The "benefits test" is inapplicable to profit-sharing plans for two
reasons, however. First, in a fixed-benefit pension plan, the benefits
to be ultimately received are predetermined and thus can be examined
at any time during the plan's existence; in a profit-sharing plan, the
benefits are not predetermined, because employer contributions are geared
to profits, which fluctuate yearly, and the amount of profits to be shared
each year is subject to the discretion of the board of directors.3 8
34. A fixed-benefit pension plan is one that provides definitely determinable
benefits. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-I (b) (1) (i) (1956).
35. See Rev. Rul. 57-77, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 158.
86. Volchening Inc.. 13 T.G. 723 (1949).
87. 54 T.C. at 1066 (dissenting opinion).
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (b) (1) (ii) (1956). Previously, the Internal Revenue
Service had insisted that a qualified profit-sharing plan include a definite con-
tribution formula for determining the percentage of profits to be shared each
year. I.T. 8661, 1944 CUM. BULL. 815. The courts later held, however, that such
a formula was not required. McClintock Trunkey Co. v. Commissioner, 217
F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Produce Reporter Co., 207 F.2d 586
(7th Cir. 1953); Lincoln Elc. Co. Employees' Profit-Sharing Trust v. Commis-
sioner, 190 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1951); E.R. Wagner Mfg. Co., 18 T.C. 657
(1952). The Internal Revenue Service officially abandoned its definite formula
rule in 1956 in T.D. 6189, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 973.
The "benefit test" applies more appropriately than the "compensation opera-
tions test" to two other types of plan. In a money-purchase pension plan the em-
ployer makes an annual contribution to the employee's account in accordance with
a definite formula. Rev. Rul. 68-592, 1968-2 GUM. BULL. 168, states:
Contributions in this case are fixed without being geared to profits.
Furthermore, the contributions are allocated to employees' accounts in
accordance with a definite formula that takes into account each em-
ployee's compensation and length of service. Thus, each employee's share
of these contributions is definitely determinable.
Thus it would appear that the "benefits test," rather than the "compensation
operations test," would apply to money-purchase pension plans. However, such
1973]
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Second, the "compensation operations test" for profit-sharing plans
only was clearly enunciated in 1944.39 In 1954, Congress arguably ap-
proved this test by re-enacting the Internal Revenue Code without altering
this Internal Revenue Service interpretation of discrimination.4 0
Judge Drennen also considered the profit-sharing plan in McMenamy
qualified because it satisfied the test for qualification set out in Ryan
School Retirement Trust.41 Ryan states that a profit-sharing plan is dis-
qualified under section 401 (a) (4) only if
[some] provision of the plan itself was inherently discriminatory,
[and if there was some] ulterior motive to frame its provisions
to channel the major part of the funds to the officer group be-
cause of any events or circumstances which the management
foresaw or expected to occur.4 2
There are three reasons, however, why this language is inapplicable to
McMenamy.
First, Ryan is distinguishable on its facts. In Ryan, adverse business
conditions arising after the establishment of the pension plan caused
the employment of many of the original plan participants to be terminated.
Upon the termination of an employee's service, a percentage of the amount
of trust funds that had been allocated to his account was forfeited to the
plan and allocated among the accounts of the remaining plan participants,
five of whom were officers. As a result, the five officers' share of the trust
fund increased from 8.4 percent at the inception of the plan to 58 percent
seven years later. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue argued that the
plan operated to discriminate in favor of the officers because the amount
credited to them as a group exceeded the amount credited or paid to
the rank and file employees. In rejecting the Commissioner's position,43
the Tax Court stated that even if the officer group was credited with a
past service contributions may not be immediately deductible. See Rev. Rul.
59-67, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 87.
Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (b) (1) (iii) (1956) states that a stock bonus plan is one
established and maintained by an employer to provide benefits similar
to those of a profit-sharing plan, except that the contributions by the
employer are not necessarily dependent upon profits and the benefits
are distributed in stock of the employer company. For the purpose of
allocating and distributing the stock of the employer which is to be shared
among his employees or their beneficiaries such a plan is subject to the
same requirements as a profit-sharing plan.
If the contributions are not dependent upon profits, the "benefit test" would seem
to apply to stock bonus plans also.
59. P.S. No. 28 (1944) (now Rev. Rul. 68-652, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 176;
I.T. 3685, 1944 GuM. BULL. 324 (now Rev. Rul. 68-653. 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 177);
I.T. 3686, 1944 Cum BULL. 326 (now Rev. Rul. 68-654, 1968-2 GuM. BULL. 179).
40. 54 T.C. at 1062. In United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967), the
Court said:
Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without sub-
stantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes,
are deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect
of law. Id. at 305.
41. 24 T.C. 127 (1955).
42. Id. at 134.
43. Id. at 133.
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disproportionate amount of the trust funds, it was due to unforeseen
circumstances, rather than the operation of the plan.44 In contrast, the
allocation formula in McMenamy was known at the time of the establish-
ment of the plan to operate in favor of a member of the prohibited group.45
Second, the language "inherently discriminatory" is inconsistent with
the "compensation operations test." The "compensation operations test"
examines a plan to determine whether seemingly neutral factors used in
allocating contributions cause it to operate in favor of prohibited group
members. On the other hand, the language "inherently discriminatory"
suggests a concern with form rather than operation. An example of "in-
herently discriminatory" form is the establishment of two plans,46 or
two groups within one plan,47 and then the allocation of higher contribu-
tions to the group or plan benefiting members of the prohibited group.
Obviously, the Internal Revenue Service would be concerned with such
discrimination. But Treasury Regulations state the Internal Revenue
Service is also concerned with a plan's effects in operation.48
Third, Ryan is inconsistent with Treasury Regulations if it requires
the Internal Revenue Service to prove "ulterior motive" to channel the
major part of the funds to the prohibited group in order to disqualify
the plan. The Treasury Regulations state that "[a]ll of the surrounding
and attendant circumstances and the details of the plan will be in-
dicative of whether . . . a plan is for the exclusive benefit of employees
in general." 49 Thus, the Regulations allow a finding of discrimination
merely on the basis of a plan's effects in operation.
McMenamy and Auner support the Internal Revenue Service's strict
application of its "compensation operations test" to profit-sharing plans.
As Judge Drennen's dissent in McMenamy5 O correctly points out, these
decisions will have their greatest impact on closely held corporations.
Such corporations usually have few employees, and some of these em-
ployees are usually shareholders. Because these shareholders usually are
the founders of the corporation, they have the most years of service. Until
these shareholder-employees retire, the corporation will be barred from
allocating contributions on the basis of past years of service, unless it
considers only those years of service after the establishment of the plan.51
RoBERT L. CoPE
44. Id. at 132. See also Ets-Hokin & Galvan, Inc., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
717, 724-25 (1962), where the court said that the mere existence of discrimination
was insufficient to condemn the plan since it was the accidental and peculiar
result of the conditions and circumstances of the business.
45. 54 T.C. at 1064.
46. Peter F. Mitchell Corp., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1030 (1968), aff'd on
rehearing, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 425 (1969); Rev. Rul. 66-15, 1966-1 CuM.
BULL. 83
47. Rev. Rul. 69-158, 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 126; H.R. REP. No. 2333, supra
note 22, at 51, where it is stated that "the use of one scale for officials and a less
generous scale for other employees would be discriminatory."
48. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (b) (3) (1956).
49. Id.
50. 54 T.C. at 1065.
51. The Tax Court in McMenamy suggested this arrangement. Id. at 1062.
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LABOR LAW-WILDCAT STRIKES AND SECTION
301 OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil Workers Union'
In January, 1969, Sinclair Oil Corporation and the defendant union
were negotiating a new contract for both the production and maintenance
employee unit and the clerical employee unit at a Sinclair plant. Em-
ployees of both units were members of the defendant union. Pending
agreement, members of both units went on strike. With regard to the pro-
duction and maintenance unit, Sinclair and the union reached an agree-
ment that contained a no-strike clause; but they reached no agreement
as to the clerical unit. The clerical unit remained on strike; and employees
in the production and maintenance unit refused to cross the picket line,
thereby breaching the no-strike clause in their agreement with Sinclair.
Based on this breach, Sinclair brought this action, consisting of three
counts, in federal district court. In count I Sinclair sought damages from
the union under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,2 alleging that the
union had authorized the work stoppage. In count 2, also brought under
section 301, Sinclair alternatively sought damages from six named in-
dividual members of the union for their refusal to cross the picket line
"despite, and contrary to, the express instructions" of the union. Finally,
in count 3, Sinclair sought damages from the same six individuals named
in count 2, basing its claim on state law and predicating federal jurisdiction
upon diversity of citizenship.
On the union's motion, the district court dismissed count 2 as failing
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, but denied the union's
motions to dismiss counts I and 3. Sinclair appealed from the order grant-
ing the dismissal of count 2, and the union appealed only from the denial
of its motion to dismiss count 3. Basing its decision on federal labor policy
and congressional intent, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of count 2.3 How-
l. 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971).
2. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1970) provides:(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor or-
ganizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and any employer whose
activities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall be bound
by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be
sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents
in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a
labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be
enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its
assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member
or his assets.
3. 452 F.2d at 54.
[Vol. S8
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ever, the court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of the union's
motion to dismiss count 3. The court reasoned that because federal law
controls in all actions based on a breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, inconsistent decisions based on state law could not be upheld.
Therefore, if the individual strikers could not be held liable for damages
in count 2 based on federal law, they likewise could not be held liable in
count 3 for the same acts based on state law.4
At the time of the enactment of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
Congress perceived a deteriorating labor situation deserving national at-
tention. 5 This reaction was prompted by an increase in the number of man-
days lost as a result of work stoppages from 8,720,000 in 1944 to 116,000,000
in 19460 and an unprecedented 4,985 strikes in 1946.7 Congress believed
that one means of combating this increase of industrial strife would be to
make unions more responsible for breaches of collective bargaining agree-
ments.8 Prior to the enactment of section 301, unions were often effectively
immune from contract violation suits. In many states, procedural require-
ments made it necessary for the plaintiff to serve process on all the
members of an unincorporated union-an almost impossible task.9 In
addition, the NLRB had decided that an employer could not require a
union to incorporate or post bond in order to facilitate recovery in the
event of a union breach.10
In debates leading to the enactment of section 301, Senator Taft ex-
pressed the widely held view that legislation should also exempt individual
union members from personal liability for the breach of a collective bar-
gaining agreement by their union."1 This reticence to hold individual
union members liable for breaches of collective bargaining agreements
was occasioned by the results in Loewe v. Lawlor,12 the so-called Danbury
Hatters case. In that case, an employer recovered damages from individual
union members for the loss resulting from a union-ordered, nationwide
boycott of his product. The members' liability was based on their con-
tinued dues-paying membership in the union under circumstances in
which they knew or should have known of the union's illegal interference
4. Id. at 55.
5. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1947), which states:
During the last few years, the effects of industrial strife have at times
brought our country to the brink of general economic paralysis. Employees
have suffered, employers have suffered-and above all the public has
suffered.
6. U.S. BUREAU oF =- CENsus, STATISTCAL ABSTRAcr OF mmE UNrTED STATEs
206 (72d ed. 1951).
7. Id.
8. S. REP. No. 105, supra note 5, at 16 which states: "If unions can break
agreements with relative impunity, then such agreements do not tend to stabilize
industrial relations. The execution of an agreement does not by itself promote
industrial peace."
9. Id. at 15.
10. Scripto Mfg. Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 411 (1941); Jasper Blackburn Prod.
Corp., 21 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1940).
11. 92 CONG. RFc. 5705 (1946).
12. 208 U.S. 274 (1908), on remand 209 F. 721 (2d Cir. 1913), affd 235 U.S. 522
(1915). See also Loewe v. Savings Bank, 236 F. 444 (2d Cir. 1916).
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with the employer's interstate commerce.13 Although the individual mem-
bers probably could not have altered the union's actions had they tried,
liability was nevertheless imposed. As a result, many of the members suf-
fered financial disaster.14
By enacting section 301, Congress sought to increase union responsi-
bility by providing for suits by and against labor unions as legal entities
in federal courts without regard to the citizenship of the parties or the
amount in controversy. In addition, section 301 gave the advantages of
limited liability to union members without the incorporation of the
union.15 These provisions were enacted to promote the federal labor policy
of maintaining industrial peace by providing for equality of bargaining
power between employers and employees and encouraging the processes
of collective bargaining.'0
The Supreme Court furthered this federal labor policy by holding
that by implication section 301 "authorizes federal courts to fashion a
body of federal law for the enforcement of ... collective bargaining agree-
ments"1 7 and that the courts must fashion such law "from the policy of
our national labor laws."' 8 The Court subsequently stated that this federal
substantive law is to prevail over conflicting state law whether the action
is brought in state' 0 or federal court.20
13. 235 U.S. at 534-35.
14. See Loewe v. Savings Bank, 236 F. 444 (2d Cir. 1916).
15. See statute quoted note 2 supra.
16. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970),
which states:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees . . . and em-
ployers.., substantially burdens... the flow of commerce ...
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . .. by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining....
S. REP. No. 105, supra note 5, at 17, states:
It is apparent that until all jurisdictions, and particularly the Federal
Government, authorize actions against labor unions as legal entities, there
will not be the mutual responsibility necessary to vitalize collective-
bargaining agreements.
... [Such a step] will promote a higher degree of responsibility upon the
parties to such agreements, and will thereby promote industrial peace.
17. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957). In
this case, the union sued under section 301 to compel arbitration in accordance
with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The lower courts,
unable to find any authority under federal or state law, denied relief. The Su-
preme Court reversed and held that federal labor policy required the granting
of relief.
18. Id. at 456.
19. By granting jurisdiction to the federal courts, section 301 does not
divest state courts of jurisdiction over actions for breach of collective agreements
(Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962)), nor is the jurisdiction
of the courts preempted by the NLRB even when the breach also constitutes an
unfair labor practice. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1965).
20. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). The Court
stated:
[T]he possibility that individual contract terms might have different
meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive
[Vol. 38
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If employees strike without union authorization in violation of a
no-strike clause in the collective agreement, the union may under certain
circumstances escape liability. Although in order to avoid liability the
union need not do everything within its power to stop a wildcat strike,
it must refrain from encouraging, adopting, or prolonging the strike.21
This concept of narrow liability for the union is logical in that the union
may not have the loyalty of all its members, and to hold the union re-
sponsible for an unauthorized strike would be unfair.22
If the union is not liable, the employer may well inquire whether he
may sue the employees directly for his damages under section 301. Though
an argument can be made that employees are excluded as parties by the
language of section 301,23 the Supreme Court has held that the individual
employee is a proper plaintiff to an action enforcing his individual rights
under section 801 against his employer,24 his union, or both.25 Thus, it
would seem that employees could be made defendants by the employer
when they breach a collective bargaining agreement. Though employers
have failed in attempts to recover from employees under section 301, in
each case the union was also arguably liable. In dismissing such attempts,
the Supreme Court has held that where a union is liable in damages for
the violation of a collective agreement, its officers and members can-
not be.26 In so holding, however, the Court specifically reserved the
question whether the individual members would be liable in the absence
of union liability.
The present case is the first to decide the question of individual mem-
ber liability for breach where the union is not liable.27 In holding that the
individual members could not be held liable, the court relied heavily on
congressional intent and federal labor policy. In view of the congressional
concern with limiting the liability of the members for acts of the union,28
a reaction stemming from the result in the "Danbury Hatters" case,29
the court felt that it was unlikely that Congress intended to subject em-
ployees to the possibility of financial ruin solely because they struck
without the union's approval. Further, the court pointed out that when
Congress debated section 301, reference was made to discharge and disci-
influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective
agreements.
Id. at 103.
21. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1958), modified on
other grounds, 361 U.S. 459 (1960); United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking
Co. 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955).
22. Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 672, 701 (1967).
23. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 614, 619 (1951).
24. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
25. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
26. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
27. The court states that this question is one of first impression. 452 F.2d
at 50. No other case has been found deciding this question.
28. See S. REP. No. 105, supra note 5, at 16.
29. See Loewe v. Savings Bank, 236 F. 444 (2d Cir. 1916) (involving an ex-
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pline, and not civil damages, as remedies the employer might utilize
when faced with a wildcat strike.8 0 In addition, the court, aware of its
duty to formulate federal substantive law in accordance with the federal
labor policy 31 of promoting industrial peace, 2 rejected Sinclair's argu-
ment that employers' recovery of damages from wildcat strikers would
encourage peaceful settlements of labor disputes. The court pointed to
the majority opinion in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local
770,03 which noted that an award for damages "would only tend to ag-
gravate industrial strife and delay an early resolution of the difficul-
ties ...",s4 Though not utilized by the court, an additional, supporting
argument that has been suggested is that to award an employer damages
against individual strikers would be inconsistent with national labor policy
as revealed in sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.86
These sections regulate wildcat strikes on the assumption that the severest
penalty inflicted upon an unprotected employee is discharge.8 0
As a result of the court's decision, the only recognized remedies left
to an employer faced with a wildcat strike are discipline and discharge.
Although they are well established,37 these remedies may be inadequate.
Any strike, whether authorized by the union or not, has an adverse economic
effect on the employer. Not only are immediate orders lost, but future
business may be affected as well, as customers switch to other suppliers
who can deliver on time.38 Thus, the employer's goal is an immediate end
to the illegal strike, but discharge or discipline of a few strikers may
actually prolong the strike by increasing industrial strife. On the other
hand, mass discharges of the wildcat strikers may not be feasible where
the strikers are particularly numerous or so skilled that training of re-
placements would involve considerable delay.
An alternative remedy the employer may seek is an injunction against
striking employees.39 An injunction would provide the employer with
the means to gain an immediate resumption of operation. Injunctive
relief would also avoid some of the evils associated with the damage award.
The individual employee may be held liable for damages whether or not
he realizes that the unauthorized strike was in violation of the collective
agreement. Because the rights of the strikers are judicially determined
before an injunction is issued, however, employees who incur liability for
failure to obey an injunction must necessarily realize the illegality of their
30. See 92 CoNG. Rzc. 5705-06 (1946).
31. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
32. See statute quoted note 16 supra.
33. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
34. Id. at 248.
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-58 (1970).
56. Gould, supra note 22, at 703.
37. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); Mastro Plastics Corp.
v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir.
1944).
38. Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 MICH. L. REv. 675,
674-75 (1961).
39. The court in the present case reserved the question whether the em-
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actions. Also, an employee is more likely to obey an injunction than to
accede to threats of a damages suit, because violation of an injunction
entails immediate and assured liability rather than the distant and con-
tingent liability usually associated with an action for damages. An in-
junction also is likely to create less industrial strife, because any penalty
assessed against the strikers for their illegal conduct will go to the court
and not to the employer. Furthermore, if the injunction is ignored, the
court will have broad discretion in shaping punishment; 40 in a damage
suit, on the other hand, the amount of daimages depends on the objective
harm done. Given this discretion, the court can avoid the harsh results,
demonstrated by the "Danbury Hatters" case, 41 that may occur when em-
ployees are charged with damages.
Attempts to secure injunctions under section 301 have met resistance,
however. Although section 301 read alone would seem to provide for in-
junctions as a possible remedy,42 section 4(a) of the Norris-La Guardia
Act 43 forbids the issuance by federal courts of injunctions compelling
employees to return to work in situations involving labor disputes. The
coexistence of these two statutes has presented the Supreme Court with
the problem of determining whether the prohibition on issuance of in-
junctions in the Norris-La Guardia Act should be interpreted so as to
prevent the use of injunctions to enforce collective bargaining agreements
against unions under section 301. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 4
the Court held that a strike that violated a no-strike clause in a collective
agreement was a labor dispute as defined by the Norris-La Guardia AcO
and that therefore a federal court could not issue an injunction against the
union to stop the strike. Six years later, the Court expanded the reach of
the Sinclair decision by holding that a suit by the employer in a state
court to enjoin a strike in violation of a no-strike clause could be removed
as a matter of course to a federal court, where such injunctions are pro-
hibited.40
In the Boys Markets case, the Supreme Court overruled its decision in
40. 43 C.J.S. injunctions § 276 (1945).
41. See Loewe v. Savings Bank, 236 F. 444 (2d Cir. 1916) (involving an
execution issued upon the judgment in the "Danbury Hatters" case).
42. Stewart, supra note 38, at 680, states:[R]ead alone, 301 means just what it says-suits may be brought to en-
force labor agreements in federal courts. Federal courts may hear these
suits and grant whatever relief prayed for seems proper. Since "suits"
encompasses legal or equitable proceedings, the federal courts should be
able to issue injunctions....
43. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970) states:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-
straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case in-
volving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such dispute (as the terms are
herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the
following acts:(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any rela-
tion of employment....
44. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 113 (c) (1970).
46. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
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Sinclair, and held that federal courts could issue injunctions prohibiting
strikes in violation of a no-strike clause where the collective bargaining
agreement provided for binding arbitration of the dispute that led to
the strike. The Court stated that the Sinclair case stood "as a significant
departure from [the Court's] otherwise consistent emphasis upon con-
gressional policy to promote the peaceful settlement of labor disputes
through arbitration."47 Although the Boys Markets case involved a union-
authorized strike, the rationale of the opinion applies as well to wildcat
strikes, requiring the strikers to arbitrate their disputes rather than strike.
In addition, the Court stated that whether an injunction will be granted
in each case will depend on
[o]rdinary principles of equity-whether breaches are occurring
and will continue, or have been threatened and will be committed;
whether they have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the
employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from denial
of an injunction than will the union from its issuance.45
The same balancing of interests might also be applied to determine whether
an injunction will be issued against wildcat strikers.
In the present case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
an employer cannot recover damages from individual employees who strike
in violation of a collective bargaining agreement and without their union's
authorization. The court concluded that this holding was required in view
of congressional intent and federal labor policy. Although discharge and
discipline remain as recognized remedies that the employer may utilize
to deal with illegally striking employees, such methods are of questionable
effectiveness in ending the strike. Injunctive relief, on the other hand,
avoids many of the undesirable aspects of the damage award while being
more effective than discharge or discipline in ending the strike. More-
over, the rationale of the Boys Markets case suggests that injunctive relief
should be available against individual union members.
JonN HoLTMANN
47. 398 U.S. at 241.
48. Id. at 254, quoting Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228
(1962) (dissenting opinion by Brennan, J.).
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REMEDIES-ENJOINING A NUISANCE-DAMAGES TO
THE DEFENDANT AS A CONDITION OF
GRANTING THE INJUNCTION
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.'
In 1956, defendant Spur Industries' precedessors in interest began
development of cattle feedlots in an area approximately 15 miles west
of the urban center of Phoenix, Arizona. At that time the land in the
area was essentially devoted to agriculture and ranching. In 1959, plaintiff
Del E. Webb Development Co. completed the purchase of 20,000 acres of
ranch land, the southwestern portion of which was within 500 feet of de-
fendant's feedlots. Webb began construction of a golf course with the
intention of developing an extensive retirement community to be known
as Sun City. A year later the first homes were sold in an area approximately
two and one-half miles north of the feedlots.
In 1967, plaintiff Webb filed its original complaint, alleging that the
feedlots prevented further development of over 1,300 lots and that the
defendant's operations were a public nuisance to those residents in the
southern portion of the new community because of the flies and odors.
The trial court granted a permanent injunction against Spur's operation
of a cattle feedlot near Sun City. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed
the injunction order, but also declared that "Webb must indemnify Spur
for a reasonable amount of the cost of moving or shutting down."2 In
effect, the court granted a conditional injunction, because in order to
obtain the injunction, the plaintiff was compelled to indemnify the de-
fendant for his costs in moving or shutting down his business.
A private nuisance generally is considered to be an unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of another's land.3 In determining
whether to grant injunctive relief, the courts apply a two step balancing
test. First, they balance several factors to determine whether the activity
constitutes a nuisance. 4 Second, if the activity is a nuisance, they often
balance the hardships to determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate.5
In this case, the appellate court had little difficulty in agreeing with the
trial court that the feedlots constituted a private nuisance- and that the
damage sustained by the residents of Sun City justified the issuance of a
permanent injunction.7
1. 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
2. Id. at __ , 494 P.2d at 708.
3. Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 577 (1876); W. PROSSER, IAw Or ToRTS
§ 89 (4th ed. 1971).
4. RMESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 826-29 (1939).
5. RySTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 936, 941 (1939). See generally Annot., 40
A.L.R.3d 601 (1971).
6. With regard to feedlots as nuisances, see Note, "Ill Blows the Wind that
Profits Nobody," Control of Odors from Iowa Livestock-Confinement Facilities,
57 IowA L. REv. 451 (1971); Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1033 (1951).
The court also stated that the activity constituted a public nuisance and
that the residents of Sun City could have successfully maintained an action to
abate it. 108 Ariz. at . 494 P.2d at 706. This aspect of the case is beyond
the scope of this note.
7. 108 Ariz. at - 494 P.2d at 706.
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Having established that a nuisance existed and that a permanent in-
junction was the proper remedy, the court made the relief conditional
upon indemnification of the party creating the nuisance for its costs of
moving or shutting down. Although the court cited no precedent for this
novel remedy, conditional injunctions are not unprecedented.8 The leading
case is Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.9 In that case, injunctive relief was
denied, conditional upon defendants paying permanent damages to the
plaintiff. After determining that the activity was a nuisance, the court
balanced the relative hardships and determined that the benefits to the
community from defendants' $45 million cement plant outweighed the
plaintiff's interests in enjoining the nuisance. Bartman v. Shobe1t is a
case reaching a similar result, in dealing with a partially constructed waste
disposal plant that would have permitted sewage effluent to drain Onto
the plaintiff's land. Again, the activity was held a nuisance but injunctive
relief was denied. However, the defendant was required to pay the plaintiff
damages.
In the above cases injunctive relief was denied upon the condition
that damages be paid by the defendant. In contrast, the Spur court granted
the injunctive relief upon the condition that damages be paid by the
plaintiff. The only case comparable to Spur in this regard is New Castle
City v. Raney.11 In Raney, the court granted an injunction conditional
upon the plaintiff's payment of the expense of removing the nuisance.12
The decisions differ in that in Spur the plaintiff was required to pay the
cost of shutting down or moving the feedlots; in Raney the plaintiff was
required to pay only the costs of shutting down the milldam.
The factor that caused the court to grant an injunction only upon the
condition that plaintiff pay defendant's costs of moving or shutting down
its activity was that plaintiff "came to the nuisance." Some courts view
the doctrine of "coming to the nuisance" as an absolute defense to a
nuisance action.13 The rationale is threefold: (1) Granting injunctions
in such cases would encourage litigation and speculation; 14 (2) according
such relief would be contrary to the ancient maxim volenti non fit in-
juria ("no legal wrong is done to him who consents"); 15 and (3) those who
8. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 809
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). See also Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L.
REv. 999, 1064 (1968).
9. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
10. 353 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1962).
11. 6 Pa. County Ct. 87 (Lawrence County C.P. 1889), rev'd on other
grounds, 130 Pa. 546, 18 A. 1066 (1890).
12. Id. at 94.
13. 58 AM. JuR. 2D NuISANCES § 216 (1971); 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 82 (1950);
Annot., 42 A.L.R.8d 344, 347 (1972); 25 VA. L. REV. 465, 466 (1939). Recent cases
adopting the minority view include: Hi Hat Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Kelly, 205 F.
Supp. 764, 770 (E.D. Ky. 1962); Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 183 Kan. 513, 525, 3831
P.2d 539, 548-49 (1958); Patton v. Westwood Country Club Co., 18 Ohio App.
2d 137, 141, 247 N.E.2d 761, 764, 47 Ohio Op. 2d 247, 250 (1969); East St. Johns
Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 195 Ore. 505, 525, 246 P.2d 554, 563 (1952).
14. Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46, 52 (1878); East St. Johns
Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 195 Ore. 505, 525, 246 P.2d 554, 563 (1952).
15. Patton v. Westwood Country Club Co., 18 Ohio App. 2d 137, 141, 247
N.E.2d 761, 764, 47 Ohio Op. 2d 247, 250 (1969).
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seek the benefits of locating in the country must be prepared to accept
the disadvantages. 16 On the other hand, the majority of jurisdictions
treat "coming to the nuisance" as merely one of the factors to be con-
sidered in the weighing process when determining the unreasonableness
of defendant's conduct.17 The Arizona court found Spur to be the victim
of a "knowing and willful encroachment" by the plaintiff and appeared
to adopt the minority view.'8
This would normally have foreclosed the plaintiff from obtaining
injunctive relief. However, the court proceeded to inject the public in-
terest in health into the balance and concluded that this public interest
demanded that injunctive relief be granted. 19 But, because Webb came
to the nuisance, the court felt that he should be required to indemnify
the defendant. The court expressly limited the application of this novel
remedy to those situations
[wiherein a developer has, with forseeability, brought into a pre-
viously agricultural or industrial area the population which makes
necessary the granting of an injunction against a lawful business
and for which the business has no adequate relief.2 0
The applicability of this doctrine may not be limited to those
jurisdictions that accept the "coming to the nuisance" doctrine as an
absolute defense. In jurisdictions where it is merely one of the factors to
be considered, the doctrine conceivably could be justification for invoking
this remedy. For example, the Raney court concluded that the "coming to
the nuisance" doctrine was not a defense to an injunctive action but was
a factor to be considered and that because the defendant was without
fault, it would be an undue burden to force him to bear the costs of
shutting down his operation. 2'
In cases such as Boomer and Bartman, where the court denies in-
junctive relief upon the condition that defendant pay damages, the result
is that a private party is allowed to continue its nuisance if he pays the
plaintiff permanent damages. This is frequently called "inverse condemna-
tion."22 It has been argued that this violates the prohibition, contained
16. Dill v. Excel Packing Co., 183 Kan. 513, 525. 331 P.2d 539, 549 (1958).
17. Bates v. Quality Ready Mix Co., 263 Iowa 696, 704, 154 N.W.2d 852,
858 (1967); Schott v. Appleton Brewery Co., 205 S.W.2d 917, 920 (St. L. Mo. App.
1947); Weber v. Pieretti, 72 N.J. Super. 184, 206, 178 A.2d 92, 104 (1962); Watts
v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 619, 124 S.E.2d 809, 815 (1962). See also
RESrATENMEfNT OF TORTS § 826, comment b at 242 (1939).
18. 108 Ariz. at _ , 494 P.2d at 706.
19. Id. at 4 94 P.2d at 707.
20. Id. at -, 494 P.2d at 708.
21. 6 Pa. County Ct. at 93-94.
22. This author would make a distinction between involuntary and voluntary
"inverse condemnation." Involuntary inverse condemnation occurs when a party
seeks to enjoin a nuisance created by a private party and the court denies the
injunctive relief conditional on the payment of damages by the defendant. Thus,
the defendant is permitted to condemn an easement on plaintiff's property.
Voluntary inverse condemnation describes a cause of action against a
governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been
taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal
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44
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/11
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
in most state constitutions, 2 3 against condemnation for private use.24
There are two theories upon which the objection can be overcome.
First, it is arguable that since the injunction was granted because of an over-
riding public interest, the taking was a public taking. Although it was not
verbalized by the court, this might be the proper analysis of the Bartman
case, where the court placed great emphasis on the public interest in waste
disposal.2 5 The court implied that if the defendant had been a public
organization, it would have had the eminent domain power. The court
also said that the normal procedure after completion was for the plant to
be conveyed to a public agency, and therefore equity demanded that the
injunction be denied.26
Boomer presents an entirely different picture. The only public in-
terest was the community interest in the economic benefits derived from
defendant's cement plant. Under the American rule, this type of interest
would often not be a sufficient basis for the use of the governmental
eminent domain power, i.e., the community could not have condemned a
tract of land so that the defendant would have been able to expand his
factory.27 Hence, the taking in Boomer could not be characterized as a
"public taking"; and another theory would have to be relied on.
A second theory is that courts may approve such private condemna-
tions in the exercise of their general equity powers, despite the private
condemnation prohibition. In fact, the courts have assumed that they
have this power. The Bartman court dismissed the objection based on
private condemnation, because the relief sought was equitable in nature,2 8
and the Boomer majority ignored the issue altogether. In City of Harrison-
ville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Manufacturing Co.,2 9 the United States Supreme
Court seemed to approve this theory:
Where substantial redress can be afforded by the payment of
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking
agency.
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 180 n.l., 376 P.2d 100, 101, n.l. (1962).
This commonly arises in the "airport cases." See Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation:
The Constitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wisc. L. REV. 3; Note,
Inverse Condemnation, Forseeability Abandoned in California, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rv.
871 (1966).
23. See 2A NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.1, nn. 1 & 2 (1970).
24. Note, Enjoining Private Nuisances: Consideration of the Public Interest,
43 COLO. L. Rv. 225, 231-32 (1971); Note, Environmental Law-Individual's Right
to Injunction in a Private Nuisance Suit, 19 KAN. L. REV. 549, 551-54 (1971);
13 COLUM. L. RE v. 635, 637 (1913); 25 VA. L. Rtv. 465, 472 (1939). Cf. Peters v.
Archambault, 278 N.E.2d 729, 731 n. 3 (1972).
25. 353 S.W.2d at 556.
26. Id. at 553, 556.
27. See, e.g., City of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal. 2d 52, 59, 279 P.2d 529,
533 (1955); H. A. Bosworth & Son, Inc. v. Tamiola, 24 Conn. Supp. 328, 335,
190 A.2d 506, 510 (Hartford County Super. Ct. 1963); State v. Cotney, 104 So. 2d
846, 348 (Fla. 1958); Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 440, 446, 131 A.2d 904,
907 (1957); Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 573, 91 S.E.2d 280, 283-84
(1956). But see Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d 316, 324 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 772 (1946).
28. 353 S.W.2d at 555.
29. 289 U.S. 334 (1933).
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money and issuance of an injunction would subject the defendants
to grossly disproportionate hardship, equitable relief may be de-
nied, although the nuisance is indisputable. This is true even if
the conflict is between interests which are primarily private.30
Thus, it would appear that many courts have chosen to ignore the private
condemnation issue. By ignoring the issue, the courts imply that in
equity the constitutional objection is not applicable.
The Spur court's approach in granting a conditional injunction
might be subject to a more substantial objection based on private con-
demnation. The court decided that "coming to the nuisance" was ordi-
narily an absolute bar to the issuance of an injunction and that Webb
came to the nuisance. The defendant could argue that at this point as to
Webb it had the privilege to commit a nuisance. The court balanced this
factor against the interests of the residents of Webb's development and
decided to issue an injunction conditional upon Webb's paying Spur its
costs of moving or shutting down its operation. By so ruling, the court
allowed Webb, a private party, to obtain a negative easement 31 over
defendant's land if he paid the defendant's costs of moving or shutting
down. Thus, the court arguably allowed a taking of defendant's property
for private use.32
In the final analysis, the court in Spur in an exercise of its equitable
power balanced the interests of the public in health against the defend-
ant's priority of occupation and the plaintiff's coming to the nuisance,
and concluded that an injunction conditional on payment of damages by
the plaintiff was the proper remedy. The Arizona court recognized that it
was incumbent upon it to protect the interests of both parties and that
conditional equitable relief lends itself well to this.33 While the result
is novel, upon the facts it is the only proper result. The alternatives are
inadequate: either deny the injunction, thus continuing the public health
hazard, or grant the injunction but deny compensation to the innocent
defendant.
JOHN M. CARNAHAN III
30. Id. at 338.
31. A negative easement is "one which precludes the owner of land subject
to such easement from doing an act which if no easement existed, he would be
entitled to do." Wilson v. Owen, 262 S.W.2d 19, 24 (Mo. 1953).
32. In the normal situation where a court grants an injunction against a
nuisance, the courts have long recognized that no condemnation has occurred.
The rationale is that an owner's privilege to use his property is limited and
does not include the privilege to commit a nuisance. Thus, when equity enjoins
a nuisance, it does not deprive the owner of his property. See Clutter v. Blanken-
ship, 346 Mo. 961, 964, 144 S.W.2d 119, 121 (1940). Spur can be distinquished
in that the court indicated that as to Webb, the defendant had a defense. 108
Ariz. at _ ,494 P.2d at 707. The Arizona court fails to raise this issue, perhaps
under the assumption that in equity the constitutional objection is not applicable.
33. Sedler, Conditional, Experimental and Substitutional Relief, 16 RUTGERS
L. REv. 639 (1962). See also Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 226,
257 N.E.2d 870, 874, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317 (1970); H. MCCLINTOCK, PINCIpLES
oF Equiry § 146 (2d ed. 1948); Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv.
L. REv. 999, 1063 (1968).
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RETROACTIVE TERMINATION OF INTERESTS IN LAND-
NEBRASKA REVERTER ACT HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Education Society'
On June 20, 1891, for a consideration of $100, Hiram R. and Minnie
Avery conveyed an acre of land by warranty deed to the trustees of School
District No. 60. In the description of the land the deed stated: "This Deed
is to become null and void as soon as the land ceases to be used as school
property."2 The land was used as school property until November, 1968,
when the School District of Omaha, successor in interest to School District
No. 60, sold the land as surplus to the Nebraska Jewish Education Society.s
Nine years before this sale by the school district, the Nebraska legis-
lature had passed a statute providing that:
Neither possibilities of reverter nor rights of entry or reentry for
breach of condition subsequent, whether heretofore or hereafter
created, where the condition has not been broken shall be valid
for a longer period than thirty years from the date of the creation
of the condition or possibility of reverter. If such a possibility of
reverter or right of entry or reentry is created to endure for a
longer period than thirty years, it shall be valid for thirty years.4
If constitutional, this statute teminated the interest retained by Hiram
Avery or his successors as of May 15, 1959, because at that time the oc-
currence upon which the estate was limited had not happened.5
Attacking the retroactive feature in the statute, Martha Avery Hid-
dleston and others, as heirs-at-law of the original grantor, brought a suit
to quiet title, alleging a conveyance in fee simple determinable and the
happening of the stated event. Plaintiffs alleged the statute violated the
contract and due process clauses of the United States and Nebraska Con-
stitutions.6 Relying on the new Nebraska statute, the Education Society
demurred.7 The trial court dismissed the petition, and the Nebraska
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither on its face nor as applied
in this situation did the Nebraska statute violate either constitution. 8
The Nebraska statute is one of several state statutes that deal with
1. 186 Neb. 786, 186 N.W.2d 904 (1971).
2. Id. at 788, 186 N.W.2d at 905.
3. Id.
4. NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-2,102 (1970), enacted by Nebraska Laws 1959, at
1237, § 4.
5. Section 76-2,103 provides that possibilities of reverter and rights of
reentry created more than 30 years prior to May 15, 1959, which were exer-
cisable before May 15, 1959, could be enforced if action was brought within 1
year. Obviously, this saving provision would be of no help in the instant case,
as the condition was broken 9 years after the act was passed and 8 years after
any action was maintainable.
6. 186 Neb. at 788-89, 186 N.W.2d at 905-06.
7. The defendant society also contended that the original deed to the
school district passed title in fee simple absolute, with the additional words of
description setting forth the purpose of the conveyance, rather than limiting
it. That argument was rejected by the Nebraska Supreme Court. Id. at 788, 186
N.W.2d at 905.
8. Id. at 790-91, 186 N.W.2d at 907.
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the termination of possibilities of reverter and rights of reentry.9 These
statutes have been prompted by the problems caused by the case and
statutory law governing such interests. For example, in a number of
American jurisdictions possibilities of reverter and rights of reentry cannot
be devised or transferred inter vivos.1o Consequently, they pass on the
death of the holder of such interest by intestate succession. As a result,
after a period of time the interest is usually divided among many indi-
viduals who are scattered over wide areas, making cooperation to release
the interest unfeasible. 1 Other problems stem from the fact that reverters
and reentry rights have been held to be exempt from the rule against
perpetuities.12 This exemption is rationalized by the fact that these in-
terests are owned by living and, theoretically, ascertainable persons.
Finally, in the absence of statute, possibilities of reverter and rights of
9. To date 14 states have enacted statutes dealing with these interests:
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, and Rhode Island. The
statutes are cited in notes 19 and 21 infra. Many other states have title market-
ability statutes that have been used to affect titles by barring or extinguishing
all interests of ancient origin unless appropriate measures are taken to place the
interests on the recent record. P. BAYSE, CLEARING LAND Trrm § 171 (2d ed.
1970). The prime object of the Marketable Title Acts enacted in Connecticut,
Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin is to limit the
time needed to search and examine records by requiring periodic rerecording of
nonpossessory interests in order to preserve them. Id. §§ 172-90 (discussing the
statutes of each of the above states). Possibilities of reverter and rights of re-
entry are usually excepted from these statutes, however, and the Ohio and Min-
nesota statutes seem to be the only authorities for a marketable title act cutting
off a reversionary possibility of record. The latter statute was used in Wichelman
v. Mesner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957). See also L. Snvms & C. TAYLOR,
IMPROVING CoNVEYANCES BY LEGiSLATION 3-17, 295-362, especially 349-858 (1960);
J. ScuRLocK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AFFECTING INTERESTS IN LAND, 80-85,
227-31 (1953); Barnett, Marketable Title Acts-Panacea or Pandemonium, 53
CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1967) (with a Model Act at 95-97); Bayse, Trends and
Progress-The Marketable Title Acts, 47 IoWA L. REV. 261 (1962).
10. L. Smrs & A. SAmH, THE LAW OF FuruRx INTERES, §§ 1860-63, 1902-03
(2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter referred to as SnEs & S IH]. RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
RTY § 159 (1936) says a possibility of reverter is alienable, but section 160 says
a right of entry is not unless the conveyance falls within one of the exceptions
of section 161. These exceptions are: If the conveyance is an effective release;
when the conveyor and the conveyee both hold the same right of entry and
could by acting jointly assert the right on breach of condition; where the right
supplements a reversionary interest in the same land held by a holder of right,
and he conveys both interests. See also Fratcher, A Modest Proposal for Trimming
the Claws of Legal Future Interests, 1972 DUaE L.J. 517, 521-22, 525-26.
11. In Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922
(1950), land given to a church bad greatly increased in value, but the church
could not sell because of a condition in the deed. The church later went out of
existence. So many heirs were involved that expenses for a receiver, a genealogist,
and attorneys amounted to $14,609.75. The heirs ultimately received amounts
varying from $6.45 to $744.00. W. LEACH & J. LOGAN, CASES ON FuulE INrEREsTs
AND ESTATE PLANNING 44-46 (1961). See also Fratcher, Exorcize the Curse of Re-
versionary Possibilities, 28 J. Mo. B. 34 (1972).
12. SrAs & Srrmsr §§ 1238-39; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 372 (1944); Leach,
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reentry are not generally subject to policy restraints such as those on
restrictive covenants.' 8
In answer to these problems, some states have allowed free alienability
and devisability of reverters and reentry rights.14 Other states have enacted
statutes that in some way limit the effectiveness of such a limitation on a
fee simple. These statutes fall into several categories. One type, found in
Arizona,15 Michigan, 1 Minnesota, 17 and Wisconsin,' 8 purports to elimi-
nate nominal conditions where there is no intended actual and sub-
stantial benefit to the person in whose favor the conditions are to be
performed. A second type, found in Florida,' 9 provides that after 21 years
the condition triggering the reverter or reentry right will be enforced only
as a covenant. This approach allows the court to deny enforcement be-
cause of a change in conditions. A third type of statutory solution allows
the sale of the fee simple free of such future interests as reverters and
reentry rights, with the future interest to attach to the proceeds of the
sale.20 The fourth, and most common, variety limits the period for ef-
fective enforcement of limitations (usually to 21 or 30 years)21 and may
18. SIMvs & SMrTH §§ 1992-98; Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 1111, 1116-17 (1949);
Note, Proposed Illinois Statute on Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry
as Affecting Land Use Policy, 14 U. Cm. L. REv. 638 (1947).
14. Sims & SMrrH §§ 1960-68, 1902-03.
15. Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 71-128 (1956).
16. MicH. Comm. LAWs § 554.46 (1948).
17. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.20 (1947).
18. Wis. STAT. § 230.46 (1953).
19. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.18 (1969).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 22 § 50 (1969); N.Y. REAL PROP. & PROc. LAW §§ 1602-15(McKinney 1968); W. VA. CODE §§ 36-2-1 to 36-2-13 (1971); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-974
to 1-982 (1959). See also L. Smrzs & C. TAYLOR, IIPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING
By L_ isLATiox 237-38 (1960), where a model act for the sale of real estate affected
with a future interest is set out.
The four states that have passed this type of legislation protect holders of
future interests by providing that interested persons shall be given notice and
shall be made parties to any action seeking to authorize a transfer of the
property. If the court authorizes a transfer, the typical result is that
the proceeds of sale ... shall, in all respects, be substituted for and
stand in the place of the property sold or leased as regards the ownership
and enjoyment thereof, and all persons shall have the same estates or
interests, vested, contingent, or executory, in such proceeds of sale ....
W. VA. CODE § 86-2-12 (1971).
21. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-97 (1960) (30 year duration with no pro.
vision for preserving preexisting reversionary possibilities); ILL. Rv. STAT. ch.
30, § 37e (1969) (40 years); IowA CODE ANN. § 614.24 (Supp. 1972) (21 years;
owner may rerecord to preserve every 21 years); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 381.218-.223(1971) (80 years; owner may preserve prior interests by recording); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 103-06 (1964) (same as Connecticut statute supra); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 21, § 143 (Supp. 1971) (30 years; owner may preserve by
recording); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 184A, § 3 (1958), as amended, Mass. Stat.
1961, ch. 448, §§ 2, 4; MicH CoMnP. LAws ANN. §§ 554.61-.65 (Supp. 1971) (30
years with preservation by recording every 30 years); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
500.20 (2)(8) (1947) (80 years; applicable only to interests created after 1937);
NEB. R.wv. STAT. §§ 76.2,100-05 (1966); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 345 (McKinney
1968) (40 years with renewal provisions; provision for recording prior interests);
Omo REv. CODE §§ 5301.48-.56 (1970) (40 years with recording provision); R.I.
GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-4-19 (1970) (20 years).
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or may not provide for periodic recording of the interest to preserve
it for subsequent periods.22 The Nebraska statute is of this last type and
provides for both prospective and retroactive application. It does not
allow recording to save pre-existing interests which had not matured by
the effective date of the legislation.23
Six other states whose statutes allowed retroactive termination of
possibilities of reverter and rights of reentry had previously decided the
constitutional issues raised by Hiddleston. Four upheld the constitution-
ality of the statute; two held the retroactive provisions invalid. In Biltmore
Village, Inc. v. Royal,24 the Florida Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a section of the Florida statute that provided a one-year period in which
to file suit on those interests matured by the effective date of the legis-
lation,2 5 saying it "arbitrarily cuts off the right in one year unless suit is
brought to enforce it. Such saving provision affords no remedy.. . where
[the] breach of covenant has not accrued .... "26 The court also said
that the interest involved was a "vested right."2 7
A year later the Illinois Supreme Court reached the opposite result
in Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf.28 In that case the court said a possibility
of reverter created by an 1895 deed to a school district was extinguished
because the limitation had not matured by the effective date of the act. In
reversing a trial court decision favoring the validity of the possibility of
reverter, the court said that the act was passed
in recognition of the operation of possibilities of reverter as
"clogs on title, withdrawing property thus encumbered from the
commercial mortgage market long after the individual, social or
economic reason for their creation has ceased, and at a time when
the heirs from whom a release could be obtained would be so
numerous as to be virtually impossible to locate. •" 29
Prior to Batdorf, Illinois courts had laid the groundwork for such a de-
cision, holding, in a line of cases dealing with statutory dedication of
streets, that reverters and reentry rights could be dealt with by the legis-
lature free from "any constitutional limitation."3 0 Illinois courts had also
previously held that such interests were not "vested."31 While some writers
22. See statutes cited note 21 supra.
23. See note 5 supra.
24. 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954).
25. F1." STAT. ANN. § 689.18 (6) (1969).
26. 71 So. 2d at 729.
27. Id. at 729-30. The dissent in Royal doubted that the case was a test of
the statute, asserting that the reverter failed to survive a tax sale in the chain of
title. The case has been criticized for its failure to discuss adequately the case of
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See Comment, Legis-
lative Limitation of Reverter and Forfeiture Provisions in Conveyances and
Devises of Land-A Proposed Statute for Kansas, 15 KAN. L. Rrv. 346, 354-56
(1967).
28. 6 IlI. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955).
29. Id. at 492-93, 130 N.E.2d at 114-15.
30. People ex rel. Franchere v. Chicago, 321 IlL. 466, 476, 152 N.E. 141,
144-45 (1926); Pral v. Burhartt, 299 IM. 19, 36, 132 N.E. 280, 287 (1921).
31. People v. Lindheimer, 327 Ill. 367, 21 N.E.2d 318 (1939): "[A] right,
to be within [the contract clause] protection, must be a vested right. It must be
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saw possible grounds for a successful constitutional attack on the statute,82
the Batdorf decision and its reasoning have generally been well accepted. 88
In 1965 New York became the third state to rule on the retroactive
feature of its statute and the second state, along with Florida, to strike
it down on constitutional grounds. In Board of Education v. Miles,84 the
New York Court of Appeals held that section 345 of the New York Real
Property Law3 5 was
not drawn for the protection of subsequent purchasers in good
faith, so as to uphold the constitutionality of the impairment of
a property right ... and would [not be] sustainable as within
the police power for the reason that [it] alter[s] the obligation
of a deed ... without necessarily doing so for the protection of
bona fide subsequent grantees.88
The Miles case has been criticized, but not just for its holding that section
345 could not be used to terminate retroactively old, previously unmatured
and unrecorded interests. The decision's focus on the burden of recording
rather than the issue of public and economic welfare, which is the basis
for such legislation, has borne the brunt of the criticism. 87
something more than a mere expectation based upon an anticipated continu-
ance of the existing law. . . ." Id. at 373, 21 N.E.2d at 321. Note, supra note 13,
at 646. But see 1 AMmuC LAw or PROPERTY § 4.12 (L. Simes ed. 1952), and
6 A oAsrN LAw oF PROPERTY § 24.3 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952), for the suggestion
that most American jurisdictions consider reverters and reentry rights to be vested
future interests.
32. See, e.g., Comment, An Illinois Statute Relating to Rights of Entry and
Possibilities of Reverter, 43 ILL. L. R.v. 90 (1948).
33. See, e.g., 34 CHr.-KEIr L. Rr.v. 250 (1956); 5 DEPAuL L. Rlv. 325 (1956);
1965 ILL. L. F. 941. But see 54 Micr. L. Rzv. 863 (1956), which questions the
Illinois decisions and holdings that such interests are not "property"; and 1956
ILL. L. F. 297, in which the author asserts the constitutional question is not
settled and that another case with different facts may limit the scope of Batdorf.
The later case of Blackert v. Dugosh, 12 Ill. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 606 (1957), though,
took the same position as Batdorf.
34. 15 N.Y.2d 364, 207 N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965).
35. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 345 (McKinney 1968). The statute was passed
in 1958. Holders of previously created interests had until September 1, 1961, to
record and preserve their holdings. It should be noted that N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 59 (McKinney 1968), allows the devise and sale of reverters and rights of re-
entry before maturation.
36. 15 N.Y.2d at 372, 207 N.E.2d at 185, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 135. The court
also said that there was too much of a burden on unascertained or unborn
persons to record to preserve the reverter. "[U]nder the circumstances ... [it is
unconstitutional] since it purports to bar the remedy before the right to enforce
it has matured." Id. at 374, 207 N.E.2d at 186-87, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 137-38.
37. The lower court, in upholding the statute, had said it was in the public
interest to regulate this kind of title, and that without regulation such interests
could adversely affect free alienability and development of land. "It is neither
the impairment of contract nor a denial of due process to require a man who
owns so tenuous and troublesome an interest to put it down in a public record."
Board of Educ. v. Miles, 18 App. Div. 2d 87, 93, 238 N.Y.2d 766, 772 (1963).
See Comment, supra note 26, at 356; 1966 DurER L. J. 272; 1965 ILL. L. F. 941;
and 17 SYRAcusE L. REv. 571 (1966), where the writer questions the compatibility of
such a decision with the freedom from outdated restrictions needed in an urbanized
society. The constitutionality had previously been questioned in Smith, Constitu.
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Since the New York decision in Miles, every state that has had its
statute challenged has upheld the statute's constitutionality. In Atkinson
v. Kish88 the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that a right of entry created
in 1927 ceased to exist on July 1, 1965, because its owner failed to record
an intention to preserve that interest.3 9 The court noted that rights of
entry and possibilities of reverter were no more than expectancies with
none of the constitutional protection of "vested rights." 40
The constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute was upheld in
Town of Brookline v. Carey.41 In this case, the town took certain land in
1864 to form part of a parcel on which a school was later built. In 1933,
the land ceased to be used for educational purposes.42 At the time of the
original taking, a Massachusetts statute provided for a reverter upon
discontinuation of use as a school for one year.48 In affirming a decree
registering title in the town free from the statutorily created possibility of
reverter, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said that the Massa-
chusetts termination statute was in part a statute of limitations and as
such was consitutional because it provided for a reasonable time after
enactment to enforce the right.4 4 The statute allowed seven and one-half
years to enforce a condition already broken at the time of the statute's
passage or to preserve by recording a condition that had not yet been
breached.
The Supreme Court of Iowa in Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. City of Osage45
ruled upon their "non-claim statute", so called because the right, and
not merely the remedy, is extinguished. By an 1891 deed the City of Osage
conveyed land to the Chicago & North Western Ry. to be used for rail-
road purposes. The railway ceased to use the land for railroad purposes in
1967, and sought to have title to the land quieted in its name. The Iowa
statute46 provided one year from July 1, 1964, in which to record and
preserve interests created by deeds over 25 years old. The city had filed
tional Problems Presented by Retroactive Extinguishing of Forfeiture Restric-
tions on the Use of Land: §§ 345-49 of the New York Real Property Law, 27
ALBANY L. REv. 267 (1963). The writer's conclusion, however, was in favor of
constitutionality, because of the liberal amount of time allowed for preserving
the interest by recording, in view of what had previously been interpreted as the
"reasonableness" necessary for due process. The New York Law Revision Com-
mission, in its 1958 report, also favored passage of the reverter registration statute
because of the favorable effect on land titles. N.Y. STATE LAw R IsioN COM'N
REPORT 227-36 (1958).
38. 420 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1967).
39. Id. at 109-10.
40. Id.
41. 355 Mass. 424, 245 N.E.2d 446 (1969). The constitutionality of the
statute had been suggested previously in Selectmen of Town of Nahant v. United
States, 293 F. Supp. 1076 (D.C. Mass. 1968), when a possibility of reverter
created in 1898 was barred on January 1, 1964, by failure to record as provided
by statute.
42. 355 Mass. at 425, 245 N.E.2d at 446-47.
43. GEN. STATS. (1860) ch. 38 § 39, later repealed by STATs. 1874 ch. 342, § 2.
44. 355 Mass. at 427, 245 N.E.2d at 448.
45. ---- Iowa., 176 N.W.2d 788 (1970).
46. IowA CODF ANN. § 614.24 (Supp. 1972).
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no such claim of interest. The trial court ruled the land reverted to the
city. The supreme court, in reversing and quieting title in the railway, said:
In construing statutes we must look to the object to be accom-
plished, the evils sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be
subserved, and place on it a reasonable or liberal construction
which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will
defeat it.47
In the present case, the Nebraska Supreme Court was confronted with
this conflict among its sister courts. Therefore, the court examined its
own precedents to detemine which rule was more compatible. In State
v. County of Cheyenne,48 the court had said that a reverter was not an
estate in land, "but only a possibility of being an estate. It cannot have a
value until it can be determined that the event upon which the estate is
limited will happen and when it will occur."49 Despite this, at least one
writer had asserted, prior to Hiddleston, that three possible grounds existed
for holding the statute unconstitutional: (1) As a denial of due process;
(2) as a taking for private purposes; and (3) as an impairment of contract.60
The Hiddleston court took advantage of her sister courts' reasoning
in the Batdorf, Atkinson, Carey, and Chicago & N.W. Ry. cases,51 as well
as certain decisions of the United States Supreme Court construing the
contract and due process clauses.5 2 The court weighed the harm caused by
termination of an interest against the general public policy in favor of
increased utility of land and marketability of title, and found the scales
tipped in favor of public policy.53 This would seem to be entirely in accord
with Goldblatt v. Hempstead,54 where the Supreme Court of the United
States said that interference in behalf of the public is justified if the
public interest requires such interference, and the means used are rea-
sonably necessary for accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. 55
It is submitted that the Hiddleston decision is sound. Commentators
47. --- Iowa at.. , 176 N.W.2d at 792.
48. 157 Neb. 533, 60 N.W.2d 593 (1953).
49. Id. at 536, 60 N.W.2d at 595.
50. See Zuber, Validity of the Nebraska Reverter Act, 39 NEB. L. REv. 757,
765-69 (1960). The latter ground was admittedly weak, however, after the
Nebraska decision in Placek v. Edstrom, 151 Neb. 225, 37 N.W.2d 203, cert
denied, 338 U.S. 892 (1949). In that case, chapter 11 of Nebraska Laws 1945
(commonly known as the "par-check law") was challenged as an unconstitutional
impairment of contract and a violation of due process. The court denied both
attacks, holding the statute to be within the fair and reasonable exercise of
the police power. Id. at 232-34, 37 N.W.2d at 206-08.
51. See Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Il1. 2d 486, 491-92, 130 N.E.2d 111,
114-15 (1955). See also text accompanying notes 28-33 supra.
52. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965); Veix v. Sixth Ward
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940); Home Bldg. &c Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398 (1934).
53. 186 Neb. at 791, 186 N.W.2d at 907. "The Legislature may reasonably
have intended the reverter act to increase utility of land and marketability of
titles by methods that were certain, uniform, and inexpensive." Id.
54. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
55. Id. at 594-95. Even this rule is not applied strictly, and in debatable
situations the courts are to defer to the legislature. Id.
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have pointed out that statutes of the Nebraska type are much more
vulnerable to attack because of the absence of recording provisions.56 Yet,
given the evils that these interests cause if left unchecked for generations,
it may be better from a policy standpoint to uphold a statute that terminates
retroactively all interests over 30 years old than to allow an untold amount
of land, increasingly needed in an urbanized society, to be burdened by the
prospect of low utility and unmarketable title.57 The concurring opinion
in Hiddleston is a more lengthy discussion of the use of the police power
by the legislature to impair private rights, pointing out that the benefits
from land alleviated of such conditions far outweigh the loss sustained
by individual holders of possibilities of reverter.58 It is fortunate that the
Nebraska court was willing to confront the real issues presented by such
a statute and uphold and interpret it in the spirit in which it was enacted.
ROBEaT FE StUN DEis
TORTS-RES IPSA LOQUITUR-DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
CONTROL AS SATISFYING THE "CONTROL" REQUIREMENT
Niman v. Plaza House, Inc.'
Mr. and Mrs. Niman sued the owner and manager of the apartment
house in which they were tenants for personal injuries and property
damage caused by hot water escaping through a ruptured fitting on the
radiator in their apartment. The building had a hot-water heating system;
the water was circulated from a boiler through pipes and radiators. The
radiator and fitting in question were covered by a metal cover. The Nimans
could regulate the amount of heat by turning a knob, which was the
only part protruding from the cover. There was no contention that the
Nimans were negligent in operating the knob.2
Plaintiffs submitted and recovered under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. Defendants appealed, arguing: (1) Plaintiffs were not entitled
to relief under a res ipsa loquitur theory because they failed to prove that
the radiator was under the exclusive control and management of the
defendants; and (2) a modified instruction from the Missouri Approved
Jury Instructions was given that was improper because it included elements
that were confusing and misleading.3 The Missouri Supreme Court re-
56. Ryman, The Iowa "Stale Uses and Reversions Statute": Parameters and
Constitutional Limitations, 19 DRarm L. REv. 56 (1969); Comment, supra note 27;
Comment, Proposed Restrictions on Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry,
34 Miss L.J. 176 (1963); Comment, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter-
The Perpetual Title Cloud-a Need for Legislative Limitation, 71 Dxc, L. Ruv.
349 (1967).
57. See note 11 supra.
58. 186 Neb. at 791-93, 186 N.W.2d at 908 (concurring opinion of
Newton, J.).
1. 471 S.W.2d 207 (Mo. En Banc 1971).
2. id. at 208-09.
3. Id. at 209.
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jected both contentions. This note will discuss only the court's treatment
of defendant's first point.4
"Res ipsa loquitur" is a term employed to describe a negligence case
in which the character of the accident itself is sufficient to take the case
to the jury without proof of specific negligent acts.5 The classic definition
of res ipsa loquitur is found in Scott v. The London and St. Katherine
Docks Co.:6
[W]here the [injuring instrumentality] is shewn to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reason-
able evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants,
that the accident arose from want of care.7
4. As its second allegation of error, defendant objected to plaintiff's verdict-
directing instruction, which was a modification of § 31.02, Missouri Approved
Jury Instructions. Section 31.02 reads as follows:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, defendant was the driver of the automobile, and
Second, the automobile left the street and ran across the sidewalk, and
Third, such movement of the automobile was the direct result of de-
fendant's negligence, and
Fourth, as a direct result of such negligence the plaintiff sustained damage.
The plaintiffs inserted the following as the third paragraph: "[Tjhe defendants
possessed superior knowledge or means of information as to the cause of the
occurrence and such occurrence is one that does not ordinarily happen when
those in charge use due care. .. ." 471 S.W.2d at 212.
Defendant's sole criticism of the instruction was that in this modification
plaintiff violated Mo. R. Crv. P. 70.01 (e) by inserting additional elements into
the instruction that were confusing and misleading to the jury and should not
have been so unduly emphasized. The court, citing Brown v. Bryan, 419 S.W.2d
62, 66 (Mo. 1967), acknowledged that the two res ipsa elements in the modified
third paragraph were not necessary for a res ipsa instruction. The court found
that the two elements inserted by the plaintiffs were matters that determine the
right of a plaintiff to submit a case to the jury, and thus were for judicial deter-
mination. See Hoock v. S. S. Kresge Co., 230 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. En Banc 1950).
The Niman court did not state specifically that the modification was a violation
of Mo. R. Civ. P. 70.01 (e), which requires impartial modifications. Assuming
that the rule was violated, however, the court proceeded to determine whether
the unnecessary inclusion of these elements was prejudicial and required a reversal.
See Mo. R. Cirv. P. 70.01 (c). The court found that it was not prejudicial and
that "[ilf anything, plaintiffs only assumed an additional and unnecessary burden."
471 S.W.2d at 214.
On its face this seems to present a logical argument; however, the interpreta-
tion given to the res ipsa loquitur instruction by cases such as Stemme v. Siedhoif,
427 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. 1968), indicates the elements omitted in Bryan were not
only unnecessary but also not allowed at all. It is improper for an instruction
to submit that the facts warrant an inference of negligence in res ipsa cases,
and this is why the court in Bryan omitted those elements. It remains to be seen
whether their inclusion here was an intentional step by the court. If so it indi-
cates there may be some significant changes in res ipsa loquitur instructions
in the future.
5. The doctrine is a qualified exception to the general rule that the mere
fact of injury creates no inference of negligence. Parlow v. Dan Harm Drayage
Co., 391 S.W.2d 315 (Mo. 1965); Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 222 S.W.2d
87 (Mo. 1949).
6. 3 H. S C. 596, 159 Eng. Rep. 665 (Ex. 1865).
7. Id. at 601, 159 Eng. Rep. at 667.
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The Scott case indicates that there are certain conditions for the ap-
plication of the doctrine. In most jurisdictions, these conditions are: (1)
The accident must be one that would not ordinarily occur without neg-
ligence; (2) the defendant must have had exclusive control of the injuring
instrumentality; and (3) the accident must not have been caused by any
negligent act by the plaintiff.8 Missouri has adopted the general doctrine,
but has modified these conditions by replacing the third requirement, that
there be no evidence of contributory negligence, with the requirement
that defendant possess superior knowledge or means of information as
to the cause of the accident. 9 The leading case of McCloskey v. Koplario
states the Missouri requirements:
(a) the occurrence resulting in injury was such as does not ordi-
narily happen if those in charge use due care; (b) the instrumental-
ities involved were under the management and control of the
defendant; and (c) the defendant possesses superior knowledge
or means of information as to the cause of the occurrence. 11
Evidence sufficient to warrant a finding that these three conditions exist
is, as a matter of law, circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrant a finding
that the defendant was negligent.' 2 Thus, upon production of evidence
sufficient to convince the trial court that these three conditions exist,
plaintiff is able to get to the jury on the issue of defendant's negligence.18
Moreover, the plaintiff need not present evidence to rebut every reason-
able theory of nonliability that defendant might propose.' 4
In Niman, the trial court ruled that the plaintiffs satisfied these re-
quirements. The defendants appealed, arguing only that the radiator was
not under the exclusive management and control of the defendants. While
some Missouri cases have stated, in dictum, that in order for the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur to apply it must be shown that the instrumentality
causing the injury was under the exclusive control of the defendant,' 5
most have tempered this by saying "control" means exclusive control or
the right to control.' 6 In the McCloskey case, the Missouri Supreme Court
en banc held that "management and control of the defendant does not
mean, or is not limited to, actual physical control, but refers rather to the
right of control at the time the negligence was committed."' 7
8. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 19 (1956).
9. Layton v. Palmer, 309 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. 1958).
10. 329 Mo. 527, 46 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. En Banc 1932).
11. Id. at 533, 46 S.W.2d at 559.
12. Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 1110, 75 S.W.2d 1001, 1004 (1934), quoting
Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233 (1913).
13. Id. at 1110, 75 S.W.2d at 1003.
14. Cruce v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 358 Mo. 589, 216 S.W.2d 78 (1948): "If a
plaintiff in such a case were required to produce evidence which would exclude
every reasonable theory but that of the negligence of the defendant the doctrine
would be annihilated." Id. at 594, 216 S.W.2d at 81; accord, Littlefield v. Laughlin,
327 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Mo. 1959).
15. See, e.g., Combow v. Kansas City Ground Inv. Co., 218 S.W.2d 539 (Mo.
1949); Wiedanz v. May Dep't Stores Co., 156 S.W.2d 44 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941).
16. See McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. En Banc
1932); cases cited note 19 infra.
17. 329 Mo. at 535, 46 S.W.2d at 560. Likewise, in Van Horn v. Pacific Ref.
1973]
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The Missouri courts have continually reaffirmed this view. Of 19
recent res ipsa loquitur cases surveyed, the element of control was at
issue in 8. In only a single case, Willis v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n,18 did the
court allude to an exclusive control requirement. That case did not in-
volve division of control between plaintiff and defendant, however; con-
trol of the injuring instrumentality was divided between two defendants,
and there was no contention that plaintiff had any control whatsoever.
The other 7 cases dealing with "control" defined it as including the right
to control.19 Although the courts spoke of "exclusive" control in the
cases in which control was not in issue, there was no reason for them to
determine whether the word "control" might also include the right to
control.
The Niman court followed the majority view. In determining that
the plaintiffs' cause of action was properly submitted to the jury under
the res ipsa loquitur theory, a majority of the court concluded that
"within the legal connotation of the word 'control' as it is used in the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the defendants had sole and exclusive control
of the entire heating system ... .-"20 In reaching this conclusion, the court
relied on the language in McCloskey to the effect that "control" under
res ipsa loquitur includes the right to control.21
The court also relied upon a definition of control developed in suits
against landlords on simple negligence theory. A landlord can be held
liable for injuries received on premises that he retains under his control
if he fails to exercise ordinary care in keeping them in a reasonably safe
condition for their intended use.22 To be in control, the landlord need
not be entitled to exclude persons from the premises; it is suffident that
he retain a general supervision over the premises for a limited purpose,
such as making repairs or alterations.23 In Gladden v. Walker and Dunlop24
a federal court, in explaining this control requirement, said:
It is familiar law that a landlord who keeps control over parts
of an apartment house must use reasonable care for their
& Roofing Co., 27 Cal. App. 105, 148 P. 951 (1915), the court stated:
The rule ... to the effect that the exclusive control and management of
the appliance causing the injury must be shown to have been in the
defendant, must be taken to refer to the right of control; otherwise ...
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could seldom if ever be given ap-
plication.
Id. at 109, 148 P. at 953.
18. 421 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. 1967).
19. Crystal Tire Co. v. Home Serv. Oil Co., 465 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. 1971);
Furlong v. Stokes, 427 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1968); Smith v. Wabash R.R., 416
S.W.2d 85 (Mo. En Banc 1967); Walsh v. Phillips, 399 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. 1966);
Anderson v. Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines, Inc., 393 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1965); Ef-
finger v. Bank of St. Louis, 467 S.W.2d 291 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971); Collins v.
Stroh, 426 S.W.2d 681 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968).
20. 471 S.W.2d at 211.
21. Id.; see text accompanying note 17 supra.
22. Lemn v. Gould, 425 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1968); Green v. Kahn, 391 S.W.2d
269 (Mo. 1965); Thompson v. Paseo Manor South, Inc., 331 S.W.2d 1 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1959).
23. Cases cited note 22 supra.
24. 168 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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safety .... With regard to plumbing and heating systems, the
principle extends to operative fixtures in the apartments leased to
tenants and operation through them .... Accordingly the tenant
who uses them is not usually expected to maintain them, but only
to notify the landlord when they appear to be out of order ....
The law should follow custom and convenience in classifying such
fixtures among the things that the landlord controls.25
Moreover, the Missouri Supreme Court has stated:
The [tenants] actually had possession of nothing more than the
rooms of their apartment and the use of the appliances, with the
landlord controlling everything else. . . . [T]he [tenants] had
the use, but not the control, of the bathroom gas heater and its
connections. 26
This definition of "control" is obviously akin to the "right to control"
concept. At any rate, the majority relied on the negligence cases in which
this definition had been applied in holding that plaintiffs satisfied the
res ipsa loquitur control requirement by showing defendant's right to
control the heating system.
A dissenting opinion was filed in Niman, in which the dissenters
objected to the use of these negligence cases in resolving the control issue
in a res ipsa loquitur case. They stated that the definition of control
applied in those cases should not be transferred to res ipsa loquitur cases,2 7
but offered no arguments for this position. Thus, at least for the moment,
whether a landlord has sufficient control of an injuring instrumentality
to be subjected to tort liability is likely to be determined in the same
manner whether the plaintiff submits his case on a simple negligence theory
or on a res ipsa loquitur theory.
The dissent did raise an issue that deserves close attention. It argued
that because control of the radiator was divided between plaintiffs and
defendant, the trial court should have directed a verdict against plaintiffs
when they failed to produce evidence tending to show a greater probability
that the acts of defendant, rather than those of the plaintiffs, caused the
injury.28 In contrast, the majority opinion would send the case to the
jury merely upon a finding that defendant had the right to control the
heating system. 29 Thus, the majority's view leaves the issue of whose acts
more likely caused the injury to be resolved by the jury; under the dissent's
view, the trial judge would make that determination.
The dissent's formulation would increase the trial court's role in a
res ipsa loquitur case, while diminishing the role of the jury. In a situ-
ation where there is a division of control, the dissent would require a
preponderance of evidence absolving the plaintiff of responsibility for
the accident before the case could go to the jury. In this regard, the dis-
senters appear to be moving toward a view of res ipsa loquitur resembling
the theory that obtains in most jurisdictions, where plaintiff must show
25. Id. at 322.
26. Minton v. Hardinger, 438 S.W.2d 3, 7 (Mo. 1968).
27. 471 S.W.2d at 216.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 211.
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his freedom from contributory negligence in order to be able to submit
on a res ipsa loquitur theory.80
The dissenting opinion also seems to indicate a general trend on the
part of the supreme court toward a more restrictive view in res ipsa
loquitur cases. Cannamore v. Bi-State Development Agency,8 ' decided well
after Niman, illustrates this trend. In Cannamore, the plaintiff fell as she
stepped from defendant's bus. Her only explanation of the accident was
that she felt as if something had taken hold of her foot. On appeal, the
Missouri Supreme Court dealt with the issue of what constitutes a sub-
missible case under res ipsa loquitur. In the original dissenting opinion,32
the following language from a Missouri Court of Appeals case was quoted
with favor: "[T]o make a prima fade case under the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, the evidence reasonably must exclude plaintiff's negligence as
a contributing cause of the injury . ". . ."8 Upon rehearing, the plaintiff's
recovery at trial was reversed, with the dissenters joining the new majority.
The court decided the case on the theory that this was not the type of
accident that would not ordinarily happen in the absence of negligence on
the defendant's part. The court spoke in terms of balancing the evidence
to determine whose acts may have caused the accident:
From [plaintiff's evidence] it cannot be said that it is more likely
than not that the fall resulted from negligence of the defendant.
Therefore, plaintiff did not make a submissible case under the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine.3 4
In conclusion, the court in Niman has reiterated the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur as it stands in Missouri. The element of control con-
tinues to mean exclusive control or right to control. However, there is a
dissenting view that in cases where the control of the injuring instru-
mentality is divided between the plaintiff and the defendant, the trial
court, after balancing the evidence, must determine that it is more
likely that defendant's acts caused the injury before it can submit the
case to the jury on a res ipsa loquitur theory. It remains to be seen
whether Missouri will join the majority of jurisdictions and require plain-
tiff to prove freedom from contributory negligence as an element of a
res ipsa loquitur case. At any rate, the dissenting view in Niman seems
to represent a trend toward restricting the availability of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine in Missouri.
JAMES R. BICKEL
30. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
31. 484 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
32. Cannamore v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, Docket No. 57,100 (filed Apr. 10,
1972), reild on rehearing, 484 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. En Banc 1972).
33. Id., quoting Copher v. Barbee, 361 S.W.2d 137, 144 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
34. 484 S.W.2d at 311.
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WITNESSES-IMPEACHMENT-ECESSITY OF
A FOUNDATION TO SHOW BIAS
State v. Dent'
In December of 1968, Oscar King, Jr., was subjected to multiple beat-
ings, both en route to and at the headquarters of the Black Liberators in
St. Louis. King identified Leon Dent, a Lieutenant-General in the Black
Liberators, as the chief assailant.2 At Dent's trial for assault with intent to
do great bodily harm with malice, King's testimony was substantially
the only evidence against Dent. Although the defense produced witnesses
who related a different version of the assault,3 Dent was convicted.
The defense offered testimony that King had threatened to get even
with Dent for Dent's having expelled King from the Black Liberators,
but the trial court excluded it because the defense had not questioned
King about this threat on cross-examination. On appeal, the defense alleged
this was error on the ground that King's denial of having been a member
of the Black Liberators had obviated the need for further inquiry. The
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling, saying that in
Missouri a proper foundation must be laid by asking a witness "whether
or not he made the statement intended to be proved against him ' 4 before
he can be impeached by a statement evidencing bias. The inquiry made
of King as to his membership in the Black Liberators was held to be
inadequate, since it did not put him on notice "that he was to be im-
peached by prior statements evidencing bias against the accused." 5 This
note will discuss two of the questions involved in Dent: (1) When is a
foundation necessary to impeach for bias? (2) What constitutes a sufficient
foundation?
The issue of the necessity of a foundation to impeach for bias was
first presented in The Queen's Case0 in 1820. The question before the
court was whether a foundation must be laid where the witness is accused
of witness tampering as proof of his bias for one side. The court said a
foundation must be laid to enable the -witness to give explanations or
exculpations for his conduct, to preveit surprise, 7 and to avoid the situa-
tion where a party waits until a witness leaves the courtroom before
attempting to discredit him.8 Although the court recognized that witness
tampering consists of both statements and conduct, it refused to distinguish
1. 473 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. 1971).
2. This was the second version of the incident given by King. At first he
told police he had been beaten by a gang of boys, a story he said Dent had told
him to tell. Id. at 372.
3. The defense witnesses testified that King's first version of the incident
(see note 2 supra) was correct. 473 S.W.2d at 372.
4. Id. at 373. The accuracy of this statement is questionable. See State v.
Day, 339 Mo. 74, 95 S.W.2d 1183 (1936); text accompanying notes 50-54, 57 supra.
5. 473 S.W.2d at 373.
6. 2 Br. & B. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (H.L. 1820).
7. Id. at 313-14, 129 Eng. Rep. at 988.
8. Id. at 314, 129 Eng. Rep. at 988. The inability to lay a foundation due
to the unavailability of a witness foreclosed any evidence of his bias, according
to early treatises. See, e.g., 3 T. STARKIE, EVIDENCE 1755 (2d ed. 1828).
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between the two.9 Instead, it viewed the situation as involving statements
only, because the witness's statements were necessary to give meaning to
his conduct.10 Thus, the court applied the requirement for a foundation
to both statements and conduct evidencing bias.
Almost all of the earlier treatise writers supported this reasoning,
apparently confusing the discrediting of a witness by contradictory state-
ments with statements evidencing bias, and then assuming that conduct
evidencing bias would be treated the same way.11 This agreement among
treatise writers continued, with only negligible dissent,12 until the turn
of the century. The most notable break in this concurrence came in 1904
when Professor Wigmore, while acknowledging that a foundation was
required for both contradictory statements and statements evidencing bias,
contended that because of its inflexible application this requirement should
not apply to conduct or circumstances evidencing bias.18
Although the possibility of a distinction between conduct and state-
ments showing bias had been alluded to as early as 1837,14 the main point
of disagreement through the early 20th century was whether a foundation
need be laid at all.'5 Bates v. Holliday,16 the first Missouri case 17 to decide
whether a foundation should be laid when attempting to discredit a wit-
ness for bias, did not even discuss a possible difference in treatment of
9. 2 Br. & B. at 315, 129 Eng. Rep. at 988. In regard to such a distinction
the judges said, "Nice and subtle distinctions are avoided in our courts as much
as possible. .. ." Id.
10. Id.
11. G. BRADNER, EvmENc. § 19 (1895); 1 S. G ax.NuAr, EVIDENCE § 462
(4th ed. 1848); B. JONFS, CML EVIDENcE §§ 850-51 (3d ed. 1924); 1 S. PHILLIPrs &
A. Amos, EVIDNcE 413 (5th Amer. ed. 1839); 2 S. PmLLipps & T. ARNOLD, EvW-
DENcE 961 (4th Amer. ed. 1859); H. Roscoe, DiGsT OF CRIMINAL EVWDENCE 97
(11th ed. H. Smith & G. Kennedy 1890); 3 T. STAR=, EvmENcE 1753 (2d ed.
1828); H. UNDE RHLL, EvmEN CE § 354 n.2 (1894); F. WHARTON, CRImINAL Evi-
DNCE §§ 477, 488 (9th ed. 1884).
12. While this writer has found no 19th century writers who opposed this
rule, some acknowledged that it only applied to statements and "acts done by
[the witness] through the medium of declarations or words." 2 S. PHILLiPps & T.
ARNoLD, EVmIENCE 961 (4th Amer. ed. 1859). See also 1 S. GRNLr.EA_, EVIDENCE§ 462 (5th ed. 1850).
13. 2 J. WIGM OPE, EVMIENCE § 953 n.1 (1904). It is interesting to note that
in Wigmore's first edition the contention that statements and conduct should be
contrasted appeared only in a footnote. In his second edition in 1924, the sentence
containing this statement was placed in the text, although no authority was cited
to support it. In 1940, the third edition added a footnote in support of this contrast,
which said:
It is of course erroneous to extend this rule to require prior inquiry as to
an objective circumstance from which bias may be inferred: 1924, Brody
v. Cooper, 45 RI. 453, 124 A. 2 (ins. adj. as witness).
3 J. WIGmoRE, EvImcE § 953, at 514 n.2 (3d ed. 1940).
14. See Pierce v. Gilson, 9 Vt. 216 (1837). The court upheld the necessity
of a foundation to impeach in this case, but said that it could not see why it
would be necessary to lay one in all cases, as in showing the existence of a violent
quarrel, since it is necessary and right that the jury know of bad feeling or
hostility on the witness's part.
15. See Annot., 16 A.L.R. 984 (1922), which divides the jurisdictions by
whether they require a foundation or not.
16. 31 Mo. App. 162 (St. L. Ct. App. 1888).
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utterances and conduct. Confronted with a situation of attempted witness
tampering, the court in Bates relied heavily upon the The Queen's Case
in holding that a foundation must be laid in Missouri.' 8 Although conduct
was not mentioned, the heavy reliance on The Queen's Case caused the
assumption that Missouri would require a foundation for both conduct
and statements.' 9 A subsequent Missouri case involving a statement affirmed
the foundation requirement. 20
Then, in Barraclough v. Union Pac. R.R.21 the Missouri court clarified
its position. Stating that "it seems reasonable" 2 2 and "[t]he Missouri
decisions do not seem to be in conflict with this rule,"23 the court adopted
the Wigmore position that a foundation is needed for statements evidencing
bias but no foundation is required for conduct or circumstances evidenc-
ing bias.24 The court's heavy reliance on Wigmore indicates that it also
adopted his rationale for the foundation requirement. Wigmore's rationale,
which is basically the one stated in The Queen's Case,2 5 is that the witness
should be afforded the opportunity to explain his statement.2 6
Present Missouri law preserves this distinction.2 7 Moreover, Missouri
courts have specifically identified at least five categories that do not
require a foundation because they constitute conduct or circumstances
evidencing bias: (1) assault; (2) employment; (3) relationship by blood
or marriage; and (4) pending litigation or (5) the existence of a quarrel
or trouble between the witness and the party against whom he is testifying.2 8
The Missouri approach can best be illustrated by use of an example
from one of the five categories-a quarrel. According to Barraclough a
17. An earlier case, State v. Downs, 91 Mo. 19, 3 S.W. 219 (1887), had in-
timated that a proper foundation was necessary before bias could be proved, but
a foundation had been laid so the issue was not decided.
18. In light of later Missouri decisions, it is important to note that witness
tampering was said to be a statement or was treated as such in The Queen's Case,
2 Br. & B. 284, 315, 129 Eng. Rep. 976, 988 (H.L. 1820).
19. See Annot., 16 A.L.R. 984 (1922).
20. See Hoagland v. Modem Woodmen of America, 157 Mo. App. 15, 137
S.W. 900 (St. L. Ct. App. 1911). This is not the rule where a party is the witness;
no foundation is necessary then. Owens v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 95 Mo.
169, 8 S.W. 350 (1888). See also B. JONEs, EVimEN E § 851 (3d ed. 1924).
21. 331 Mo. 157, 52 S.W.2d 998 (1932).
22. Id. at 164, 52 S.W.2d at 1001.
23. Id. at 165, 52 S.W.2d at 1002.
24. Id. Missouri was not the first state to make this distinction between
statements and conduct evidencing bias. See Sexton v. State, 13 Ala. App. 84, 69
So. 341, cert. denied, 195 Ala. 697, 70 So. 1014 (1915); People v. Mallon, 116 App.
Div. 425, 101 N.Y.S. 814, affd, 189 N.Y. 520, 81 N.E. 1171 (1906). New York sub-
sequently rejected this distinction. See People v. Michalow, 229 N.Y. 325, 128
N.E. 228 (1907) (admitting evidence of statements showing bias without a
foundation).
25. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
26. 3 J. WIGMoRE, EvmENcE § 1025 (2d ed. 1924). See also 28 R.C.L. Wit-
nesses § 221 (1921).
27. See, e.g., State v. Pigques, 310 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1958); Strahi v. Turner,
310 S.W.2d 833 (Mo. 1958).
28. See Moe v. Blue Springs Truck Lines, Inc., 426 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. 1968);
Barraclough v. Union Pac. R.R., 331 Mo. 157, 165, 52 S.W.2d 998, 1002 (1932).
Anything else should be presumed to be a statement evidencing bias and treated
as such.
62
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss1/11
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
quarrel is conduct. Therefore, no foundation is needed; such conduct may
always be shown as evidence of bias unless the court in its discretion decides
the proof is too remote and uncertain. 29 Showing a quarrel is of little
value, however, unless it can be shown that the quarrel was likely to result
in ill feelings that are still present. 30 Thus, a showing of the character,
nature, and extent of the quarrel is desirable, and at least one Missouri
case has said that such a showing is permissible without a foundation.8 1
The attorney may also wish to prove the ultimate facts, i.e., the basis of
the quarrel, in order to show that the hostility engendered by the quarrel
persists. The permissible extent of this proof is once again in the discretion
of the trial court, limited by the rule that details, such as statements made
during the quarrel, may never be shown, 32 so that the jury will not be
tempted to try the merits of the former controversy.83 This is true even
where, as in Barraclough, the controversy was an argument consisting only
of statements. Thus, the fact that an argument occurred could be shown;
the statements made during the argument could not be.
From the foregoing it can be seen that although Missouri has guide-
lines for a trial court to follow in exercising its discretion as to requiring
a foundation for proof of bias, the Missouri standard is not as certain
as it appears at first glance. There are obvious definitional problems
confronting the attorney in determining whether the situation or occurrence
fits within one of the five categories. Another problem of the Missouri
standard is that its categorizations may lead to arbitrary application of
the foundation requirement. This is illustrated by the fact that the Mis-
souri courts treat witness tampering as statements while they treat a quarrel
as conduct. Each consists of both conduct and statements; yet, a foundation
is required for the former, while none is required for the latter. Although
these problems may seldom cause damage, their consequences to the unwary
can be disastrous. 34 Is there a better way?35
29. State v. Umfrees, 438 S.W.2d 284 (Mo. En Banc 1968) (statement showing
bias was too speculative); State v. Brewer, 286 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1956) (cannot
show that the witness was the girlfriend of an employee of a party); State v.
Punshon, 133 Mo. 44, 34 S.W. 25 (1896) (defacing a picture of the party
testifying against is not direct enough). But see State v. Solven, 871 S.W.2d 328
(Mo. 1968) (refusal of a witness to talk to the defense attorney on the circuit
attorney's advice could be shown as a "circumstance tending to support an in-
ference of bias, if unexplained," and was for the jury to decide); State v. Horton,
247 Mo. 657, 158 S.W. 1051 (1918) (only circumstances tending to show bias).
80. State v. Pigques, 310 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1958).
81. Id. (dictum).
32. State v. Winn, 824 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. 1959); State v. Pigques, 310 S.W.2d
942 (Mo. 1958); State v. Rose, 389 Mo. 317, 96 S.W.2d 498 (1986); Wills v.
Sullivan, 211 Mo. App. 818, 242 S.W.180 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922). In Warren v.
Pulitzer Pub. Co., 886 Mo. 184, 78 S.W.2d 404 (1934), the court said that details
of a controversy might sometimes be shown, although the extent of such exami-
nation would be within the trial court's discretion.
83. State v. Pigques, 810 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1958).
84. See State v. Dent, 478 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. 1971), where the defense's failure
to lay a foundation precluded it from introducing evidence of the bias of the
state's chief witness.
35. See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 407 (1968). Only the three most generally ac-
cepted positions will be discussed in this note. Other unique positions are as
[Vol. 38
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Either expressly or by implication, a majority of states still require
a foundation for the introduction of evidence of both statements and
acts showing bias. 6 This rule, which has historical precedent,37 avoids
much of the confusion that may be involved in trying to decide what is
a declaration and what is an act. It also avoids surprise and assures the
witness of a chance to explain, admit, or deny his bias. However, while
follows: Florida: Davis v. Ivey, 93 Fla. 387, 112 So. 264, cert. denied, 275 U.S.
526 (1927) (distinguishing between evidence that is "secondary" and used to
contradict, for which a foundation must be laid, and independent evidence of
bias and hostility for which no foundation need be laid); Tennessee: Creeping
Bear v. State, 118 Tenn. 322, 87 S.W. 653 (1905) (implying that no foundation
is necessary for proof of conduct evidencing bias, but a foundation should be
laid for statements at the discretion of the trial court); Texas: In Texas a founda-
tion must be laid for proof of both statements and conduct evidencing bias in
civil cases. In criminal cases, however, a foundation need only be laid to prove
statements evidencing bias. Southern Truck Leasing Co. v. Manieri, 325 S.W.2d
912, 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); see Whitfield v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 136
S.W.2d 626 ('ex. Civ. App. 1940); Nite v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 340, 54 S.W. 763
(1899). But see Crockrell v. State, 60 Tex. Crim. 124, 131 S.W. 221 (1910). A
foundation is not needed when conduct evidencing bias is involved in criminal
cases. Buraman v. State, 70 Tex. Crim. 361, 159 S.W. 244 (1913).
There is a division in the federal courts on this issue. Some say a founda-
tion is necessary. See Smith v. United States, 283 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1960); Mc-
Knight v. United States, 97 F. 208 (6th Cir. 1899); United States v. White, 225
F. Supp. 514 (D.D.C. 1963). Others say it is not. See Comer v. Pennsylvania .KR.,
323 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1963); Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir.
1943); United States v. Schindler, 10 F. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1880).
36. Some of these states may yet declare positions similar to Missouri's. For
this reason the jurisdictions have been placed in three categories, each less likely
to distinguish between acts and statements evidencing bias than the one before it.
Some jurisdictions have required a foundation for statements without discussing
conduct: Arkansas: Hawkins v. State, 223 Ark. 519, 267 S.W.2d 1 (1954); Dela-
ware: State v. Deputy, 19 DeL 19, 50 A. 176 (1900); Idaho: State v. Goodrich, 3
Idaho 654, 196 P. 1043 (1921); Iowa: Cleophas v. Walker, 211 Iowa 122, 233
N.W. 257 (1930); Kentucky: Homer v. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. L. Rptr. 710, 41
S.W. 561 (1897); Michigan: Smith v. Hockenberry, 146 Mich. 7, 109 N.W. 23
(1906) (noting only that a proper foundation had been laid); Montana: State v.
Cams, 136 Mont. 126, 845 P.2d 735 (1959); Ohio: Kunlkel v. Cincinnati St. R.R.,
82 Ohio App. 341, 80 N.E.2d 442 (1948); but see O'Hara v. Cincinnati St. Ry.,
68 Ohio App. 7, 36 N.E.2d 823 (1941); Oregon: State v. Stewart, 11 Ore. 52,
4 P. 128 (1883); Vermont: State v. Barditti, 78 Vt 102, 62 A. 44 (1905); but see
Ellsworth v. Potter, 41 Vt. 685 (1869); Washington: State v. Harmon, 21 Wash.
2d 581, 152 P.2d 814 (1944); Wisconsin: Baker v. State, 69 Wis. 32, 33 N.W. 52(1887); but see Martin v. Barnes, 7 Wis. 239 (1858). Some jurisdictions have
stated broadly that a foundation is needed, although not expressly extending the
rule beyond the facts of the case: Arizona: Ross v. State, 23 Ariz. 302, 203 P. 552
(1922); Georgia: McCauley v. State, 86 Ga. App. 509 (1952); Indiana: Singer
Sewing Mach. Co. v. Phipps, 49 Ind. App. 116, 94 N.E. 793 (1911); Nebraska:
Davis v. State, 51 Neb. 801, 70 N.W. 984 (1897); Rhode Island: Brody v. Cooper,
45 R.I. 453, 124 A. 2 (1924). Some jurisdictions have expressly stated that a
foundation is necessary for proof of both statements and conduct that show
bias: California: In re Bedford's Estate, 158 Cal. 145, 110 P. 302 (1910); Illinois:
People v. Payton, 72 Ill. App. 2d 240, 218 N.E.2d 518 (1966); North Carolina:
State v. Dickerson, 98 N.C. 708, 8 S.E. 687 (1887); North Dakota: State v. Maim-
berg, 14 N.D. 523, 105 N.W. 614 (1905); Virginia: Langhorne v. Commonwealth,
76 Va. 1012 (1882).
37. See The Queen's Case, 2 Br. & B. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (H.L. 1820).
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this rule fulfills its purpose of justice to the witness,38 it may work in-
justices to the party, especially if applied strictly,3 9 by denying him the
right to show the bias of the witness because of a mere oversight in cross-
examining the witness.
A minority of jurisdictions follow the rule that no foundation is
necessary for the admission of any evidence showing bias. 40 This rule
assures that the jury will be informed of the hostility of the witness and
thus will be able to give his testimony proper weight.4 1 The courts apply-
ing this rule apparently feel that justice to the parties overrides the
possibility of surprising or offending a witness. Unfortunately, this rule
allows frivolous charges of bias to be leveled against all witnesses.4 2
A third set of jurisdictions make application of the foundation re-
quirement discretionary with the trial court.4 3 This rule has the advantage
of flexibility and protects against arbitrary exdusions when properly
applied. The fact that it is so flexible probably prevents wide acceptance
of this rule, however, since the lack of standards to guide opposing parties
may nullify its benefits.
The question is which of these alternatives protects both the party
and the witness and best serves the ends of justice. This question can be
answered only in conjunction with another, however: What constitutes
a sufficient foundation? If the jurisdiction's rules and procedures for
laying a proper foundation do not operate to give the witness a chance
to explain his conduct or statements, the foundation requirement serves
38. S. GREENLF, Evminzc § 462 (5th ed. 1850); B. JoNEs, CIVIL EVIDNCZ
§ 852 (8d ed. 1924).
This rule would work an injustice to the party by preventing him from
showing the bias of a witness if, for instance, the witness had not been cross-
examined as to his bias and then had died or left the jurisdiction. The proof of
bias would then be excluded.
39. 3 T. STARKmE, EvmwEcE 1753, 1755 (2d ed. 1828).
40. Colorado: Angelopoulos v. Wise, 133 Colo. 133, 293 P.2d 294 (1956);
Hawaii: Territory v. Yodao, 35 Hawaii 198 (1939); Louisiana: Chavigny v. Hava,
125 La. 710, 51 So. 696 (1910); Maine: New Portland v. Kingfield, 55 Me. 172
(1867); but cf. State v. Benson, 155 Me. 115, 151 A.2d 266 (1959); New Hampshire:
Titus v. Ash, 24 N.H. 319 (1851); New Mexico: State v. Kidd, 24 N.M. 572, 175
P. 772 (1918); New York: People v. McDowell, 9 N.Y.2d 12, 172 N.E.2d, 79, 210
N.Y.S.2d 514 (1961); Puerto Rico: People v. Ruiz Arzola, 66 P.R.R. 339 (1946);
South Dakota: Lass v. Lass, 52 S.D. 302, 217 N.W. 383 (1927). Mississippi (see
Hardin v. State, 232 Miss. 470, 99 So. 2d 600 (1958)) and New Jersey (see Roth-
Schlenger, Inc. v. Schlenger, 121 N.J. Eq. 536, 191 A. 762 (1937)) have at times
been listed among these states, but the authority of Hardin and Roth-Schlenger to
support this position is questionable.
41. Houfberg v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 283 S.W.2d 539, 548-49 (Mo.1955). 942. Cleophas v. Walker, 211 Iowa 122, 233 N.W. 257 (1930).
43. Connecticut: State v. Mahmood, 158 Conn. 536, 265 A.2d 83 (1969);
Pennsylvania: Caffery v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 261 Pa. 251, 104 A. 569 (1918).
New Jersey (State v. D'Adame, 84 N.J.L. 386, 86 A. 414 (1913)) was listed as a
discretionary state in Note, Evidence-Impeachment of Witnesses-Proof of Prior
Threats to Show Bias, 39 YALE L. REV. 129, 130 (1929); and Tennessee (Creeping
Bear v. State, 113 Tenn. 322, 87 S.W. 653 (1905)) was listed as discretionary in
Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 407, 418 (1963). A close reading of the Tennessee case and
subsequent developments in New Jersey (see, e.g., Roth-Schlenger, Inc. v. Schlenger,
121 N.J. Eq. 536, 191 A. 762 (1937)) reveal that these positions are questionable.
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no positive purpose no matter when it is applied; rather, it remains only
as a trap for the unwary party.
A foundation is usually laid on cross-examination of a witness, although
a witness may be recalled for this purpose in most jurisdictions.44 It has
been argued that foundation questions must be about particular facts
and that questions as to the state of the witness's feelings toward the party
are therefore improper.4 5 The trial court has the discretion to exclude
questions it deems objectionable, and appellate courts are reluctant to
overrule such rulings.4 6 Whatever form the foundation takes, it should
give the witness notice that he is to be impeached.4 ' The area of most
disagreement concerns what is sufficient to accomplish this objective.
In Missouri there is some question as to what constitutes a sufficient
foundation. In the 1911 case of Hoagland v. Modern Woodmen of
America,48 the St. Louis Court of Appeals said that the witness to be
impeached must have his attention called to the time, place, and person
to whom he made the statements.4 9 This rule is often applied strictly in
all details in other jurisdictions, 50 although some courts have allowed
44. 3 T. STARKim, EvmENcE 1753, 1756 (2d ed. 1828) says that the witness
should be recalled as a matter of law. Some authorities state that the trial court
has the discretion whether to recall the witness or not. See Aneals v. People, 134
111. 401, 25 N.E. 1022 (1890); State v. Schuman, 89 Wash. 9, 153 P. 1084 (1915);
B. JoNES, Crvm EvmEn cE § 852 (3d ed. 1924). Florida follows a more complicated
rule, saying that a witness who testified in the plaintiff's case in chief may be
recalled in the defendant's case in chief, or a witness in the plaintiff's case in
rebuttal may be recalled in the defendant's surrebuttal, but a witness in plaintiff's
case in chief may not be recalled in surrebuttal, since the judges felt that the recall-
ing of witnesses to lay a foundation must be stopped at some point. Davis v. Ivey, 93
Fla. 387, 112 So. 264, cert. denied, 275 U.S. 526 (1927).
45. F. WHARTON, CpRmuNAL EvmrENca § 488 (9th ed. 1884). In at least one
jurisdiction, however, it is improper not to ask the witness the state of his feelings
toward a party before laying a foundation. See Southern Ry. v. Harrison, 191 Ala.
436, 67 So. 597 (1914). See also McCauley v. State, 86 Ga. App. 509, 71 S.E.2d
664 (1952).
46. See State v. Curry, 372 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1963); State v. Gyngard, 333
S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1960). The foundation questions may not even be allowed if
the party against whom the witness is biased does something to make the un-
friendly witness his own. See Brody v. Cooper, 45 R.I. 453, 124 A. 2 (1924). In
this case the party had taken the witness's deposition, making the witness his own.
Because of this the party was not allowed to lay a foundation for purposes of im-
peachment. Although the Missouri cases on this point are inconsistent, the cases
that address the point most directly state that a party cannot lay a foundation for
impeaching his own witness by evidence of bias. See Ross, Impeaching One's Own
Witness in Missouri, 37 Mo. L. R.rv. 507, 512-13 (1972).
47. State v. Dent, 473 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. 1971).
48. 157 Mo. App. 15, 137 S.W. 900 (St. L. Ct. App. 1911).
49. Id. at 18, 137 S.W. at 900. Most jurisdictions that require a foundation
require as much as the Hoagland case, because that is thought necessary to give
a witness proper notice. See cases cited Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 407, 431-32 (1963).
Some jurisdictions may ask for the circumstances surrounding the statements
also. See, e.g., In re Craven, 169 N.C. 561, 86 S.E. 587 (1915).
50. See People v. Nelson, 90 Cal. App. 27, 265 P. 366 (1928) (foundation
insufficient since "time and circumstances" part omitted); Kunkel v. Cincinnati
St. Ry., 82 Ohio App. 341, 80 N.E.2d 442 (1948) (improper foundation because
time and place omitted); State v. Harmon, 21 Wash. 2d 581, 152 P.2d 314 (1944)
(improper foundation because time, place, and circumstances omitted).
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Few variations have been as great as that allowed by the Missouri
Supreme Court in State v. Day. 52 There the court said that where the
witness had denied any ill will or any feeling against the appellant, a
sufficient foundation had been laid.58 Although this type of foundation
is much easier to lay than that required by Hoagland, it is not as fair to
the witness, since he may not recall the transaction with which he is to
be impeached.54
The Dent case, which required that the witness be asked whether he
made the statements with which he is to be impeached,55 may be a return
to the strict standards of Hoagland in order to give more effective notice
to the witness. 50 On the other hand, Dent may mean merely that the
statement must be repeated to the witness and that the rest of the details
of the statement (i.e., time, place, and addressee) either are unnecessary
or may be required in the discretion of the trial court. In any event, the
only unquestionably adequate foundation in Missouri is one that recalls
the person, place, and time, for although arguments can be made that
considerably less is necessary, the consequences are too severe to risk a
lesser foundation.57
Missouri's rule of requiring a foundation for statements evidencing
bias and not for conduct is unsound.58 The objective of fairness to both
the party and the witness is poorly served, since the rule as applied to
statements is so rigid and arbitrary that it may be harmful to the party,
unless the practitioner follows the wise practice of always laying a founda-
tion. Moreover, the rule can be applied so as to give little notice of
impeachment to the witness, because the foundation requirements may
be so minimal that the witness may not recall the precise incident from
the facts given.
Better practice would provide: (1) That a foundation be required
generally for both statements and conduct; (2) that the foundation consist
51. People v. Ye Foo, 4 Cal. App. 730, 89 P. 450 (1907) (foundation suf-
ficient even though the parties that were present were not recalled to the witness);
State v. Goodrich, 33 Idaho 654, 196 P. 1043 (1921) (time and place omitted
but foundation sufficient because the witness had only one conversation with
the person inquired about); State v. Ellsworth, 80 Ore. 145, 47 P. 199 (1896)(foundation included only a description of the man involved, not his name, but
the court said that was sufficient).
52. 359 Mo. 74, 95 S.W.2d 1183 (1956).
53. Id. at 79, 95 S.W.2d at 1185; accord, Magill v. Boatmen's Bank, 250 S.W.
41 (Mo. 1923); Knapp v. Knapp, 183 S.W. 576 (Mo. 1916).
54. See State v. Hyder, 258 Mo. 225, 167 S.W. 524 (1914) involving a prosecu-
tion for assault with intent to kill, where the court held threats made a year before
the crime were admissible to prove defendant's ill will toward the victim at the
time of the crime.
55. 473 S.W.2d at 373.
56. "Notice" is the only reason given for a foundation in Dent. Id.
57. The Dent case is a good example of the consequences, because discrediting
evidence against the state's main witness was never shown. Id.
58. The Queen's Case, 2 Br. & B. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820); Note,
Witnesses-Impeaching for Bias-Laying Foundation, 15 Iowa L. Ray. 482 (1927):
"The same reasons that require a witness to be cross-examined before proving
his specific statement apply with equal force to proving specific conduct."
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of enough detail to remind the witness of the statements or acts; and
(3) that the foundation requirement be waived where it is impossible to
lay a foundation,59 or otherwise at the discretion of the trial court.60
This practice would not be perfect, but it would cure many of the present
ills. The trial judge could weigh the circumstances freely, and the result
would be more fairness to both the witness and the party.
RoBERT J. BLAcEwELL
WATER POLLUTION-USER OF CITY SEWER SYSTEM
CREATES NUISANCE AGAINST LOWER RIPARIAN
Ratzlaff v. Franz Foods1
Arthur Ratzlaff was a riparian landowner on Dry Creek in the state
of Arkansas. He sought damages against Franz Foods for discharging
certain noxious wastes into the sewer system of the City of Green Forest,
thereby overloading the city's sewage treatment plant and polluting Dry
Creek to Ratzlaff's detriment. Ratzlaff alleged in his complaint that Franz
Foods was under contract with the City of Green Forest to eliminate from
its deposits into the sewer system all "offensive and noxious waste products."
He further alleged that the purpose of this contract was to prevent the
overloading of the city sewer system and, in turn, to prevent harm to the
riparian landowners located downstream from the city sewage facilities.
Ratzlaff also alleged that Franz Foods had negligently failed to determine
whether the wastes were forbidden by the contract, and whether the entry
of the wastes into the system would cause harm to lower riparians.2 The
trial court dismissed Ratzlaff's complaint, basing its decision upon the
general rule that "a user of a city sewer is clothed with immunity from
liability once he lawfully deposits his sewage in the sewage system." S
However, the Sppreme Court of Arkansas reversed the trial court's decision,
reasoning that a "party who owes no obligation to third persons or the
public in general may by contract assume an obligation to use due care
towards such third persons or the public in general."4
59. As, for instance, where the testimony consists only of a deposition.
60. What constitutes fairness must be determined in the light of all the
surrounding circumstances.... Doing away with an arbitrary application
rather than discarding the requirement will preserve all expected bene-
fits without causing the occasional injustices on which objection to it
are based.
Note, supra note 58, at 483. The practice in Connecticut (State v. Mahmood, 158
Conn. 536, 265 A.2d 83 (1969)) and Pennsylvania (Caffery v. Philadelphia &
R. Ry., 261 Pa. 251, 104 A. 569 (1918)) is the closest to this standard at present.
1. 250 Ark. 1003, 468 S.W.2d 239 (1971).
2. Id. at 1004, 468 S.W.2d at 240.
3. Id. at 1005, 468 S.W.2d at 241. Accord, Carmichael v. City of Texarkana,
116 F. 845 (8th Cir. 1902); Kraver v. Smith, 164 Ky. 674, 177 S.W. 286 (1915).
4. 250 Ark. at 1005, 468 S.W.2d at 241. Accord, Hogan v. Hill, 229 Ark.
758, 318 S.W.2d 580 (1958), construed in Ferguson v. Ben Hogan Co., 307 F. Supp.
658 (W.D. Ark. 1969); Collision v. Curtner, 141 Ark. 122, 216 S.W. 1059 (1919).
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I. APPLICABLE RIGHTS OF RIPARIANS TO RELIEF FROM WATER POLLUTION
The creator of water pollution may be liable to lower riparians and
other landowners on either or both of two theories: nuisance and the rea-
sonable use theory of riparian rights.5 In order to state a cause of action
under the reasonable use theory,0 the lower riparian must show (1) a use
of the water by the polluter that unreasonably interferes with his use,
and (2) substantial injury.7 In order to state a cause of action under
nuisance theory, the lower landowner, who does not necessarily have to
be a riparian,8 must show substantial interference with the use and en-
joyment of his property.9 The reasonableness of the polluter's activity
under a nuisance theory is a less significant factor than under the reason-
able use theory of riparian rights, because the focal points of the two
theories differ. Private nuisance is solely aimed at the use and enjoyment
of the lower landowner's land, whereas the reasonable use theory em-
phasizes the use of a common watercourse by both landowners under a
comparative reasonableness test.
The purpose of the reasonable use theory of riparian rights is to free
the riparian from unreasonable interference with his use of the water.10
5. 250 Ark. at 1005, 468 S.W.2d at 241. Accord, Spartan Drilling Co. v.
Bull, 221 Ark. 168, 252 S.W.2d 408 (1952); Smith v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp.,
212 Ark. 491, 206 S.W.2d 442 (1942). For an excellent discussion of the nuisance
and riparian rights theories, see Davis, Theories of Water Pollution Litigation,
1971 Wis. L. R.wv. 738 [hereinafter cited as Davis].
6. The traditional American cases stating the reasonable use theory are:
Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (No. 14,312) (D.R.I. 1827); Evans v. Merri-
weather, 4 IMI. 492, 38 Am. Dec. 106 (1842). See also J. CRmn-rr, PRINCIPLES OF
TE LAW OF PROPERTY 298-317 (1962).
The minority theory of riparian rights is the natural flow theory. It gives
the riparian the right to have the watercourse maintained in its natural state,
not sensibly diminished in quantity nor impaired in quality. Jessup & Moore
Paper Co. v. Zeitler, 180 Md. 395, 24 A.2d 788 (1942 ; City of Newark v. Chestnut
Hill Land Co., 77 N.J. Eq. 23, 75 A. 644 (Ch. 1910); RESTATEmENT OF ToRTs
342-43 (1939) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMWT OF ToRTs]. This theory favors
the downstream user and creates more certainty as to what a riparian can and
cannot do. Id. at 344; Davis, supra note 5, at 745.
7. RFsrATEmENT o TORTs 344; Davis, supra note 5, at 745.
8. Generally, a non-riparian does not have equal rights in a watercourse
with a riparian. Masonite Corp. v. Burnham, 164 Miss. 840, 146 So. 292 (1933);
Armstrong v. Westroads Dev. Co., 380 S.W.2d 529 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964) (riparian
rights case). But there are certain situations which establish reciprocal rights and
liabilities between riparians and non-riparians. Compare McKinney v. Dineen,
231 N.C. 540, 58 S.E.2d 107 (1950), with Prairie Pipe Line Co. v. Dalton, 243
S.W. 619 (Tex. 1922). A non-riparian's rights, if any, may be contingent upon
his legal right to use the watercourse. Stanton v. Trustees of St. Joseph's College,
254 A.2d 597 (Me. 1969).
There is a conflict as to whether a person who voluntarily buys riparian
land while the nuisance is in existence can recover from the upstream polluter.
The majority view holds that notice does not prevent recovery. See Kraver v. Smith,
164 Ky. 674, 679, 177 S.W. 286, 292 (1915). But there is authority to the contrary.
See City of Valparaiso v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337, 54 N.E. 1062 (1899); City of Battle
Creek v. Goguac Resort Ass'n, 181 Mich. 241, 148 N.W. 441 (1914); City of Cape
Girardeau v. Hunze, 314 Mo. 438, 284 S.W. 471 (1926), modified, 43 S.W.2d 882
(St. L. Mo. App. 1931).
9. Davis, supra note 5, at 740.
10. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS 344.
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Normally, the lower riparian must show an unreasonable discharge" or
diversion 12 by an upstream riparian which substantially damages his own
use of the water.13 Because the reasonable use theory is based upon a
co-equal right to use a common watercourse, the scope of actionable inter-
ferences with the lower riparian's water uses may be broader 14 than under
private nuisance, which focuses only on an individual's right to use his
land. Likewise, because the reasonable use theory emphasizes the com-
parative reasonableness of various water users, the scope of an upper
riparian's right to use the watercourse without incurring liability may
also be broader than it may be under nuisance law.
Private nuisance actions apply to situations involving non-trespassory
injury to the lower riparian's "ordinary" use of the water15 (such as for
livestock and for water supply), as well as to those involving a condition
that is either destructive of physical health and comfort or causes tangible
injury to the property.1 6 Pollution that does not cause these types of harm
would not form the basis for a nuisance action. For example, in situations
where the use of the lower riparian is deemed "artificial" (such as indus-
trial use), the injured riparian may be forced to rely solely upon the reason-
able use theory of riparian rights, with its comparative reasonableness test,
rather than private nuisance. In Ratzlaff, the injury was to plaintiff's live-
stock, and the court characterized it as a non-trespassory injury falling
within the traditional bounds of private nuisance. But, regardless of whether
the injury is viewed as arising from a nuisance or an unreasonable riparian
use, the harm will inevitably flow from upstream use such as industries,' 7
farms,' 8 or municipalities.' 9 A city that is the user of a watercourse has
all of the obligations 20 and rights21 of other riparians. And, in situations
similar to Ratzlaff, the city is subject to suit for the creation of a nuisance22
or an unreasonable use.
II. LIABILITY FOR POLLUTION CAUSED BY DISCHARGE INTO A
MUNICIPAL SEWER SYSTEM
A. Control of Discharge
When there is a nuisance created by the pollution of a watercourse
11. Atkinson v. Herington Cattle Co., 200 Kan. 298, 436 P.2d 816 (1968).
12. Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 A. 18 (1892); Lawrie v. Silsby, 82 Vt.
505, 74 A. 94 (1909).
13. Davis, supra note 5, at 747.
14. Id. at 745.
15. Id. at 742.
16. Bowman v. Humphrey, 124 Iowa 744, 100 N.W. 854 (1904).
17. See Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 910 (1971).
18. Atkinson v. Herington Cattle Co., 200 KMm. 298, 436 P.2d 816 (1968).
19. Merrifield v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216, 14 Am. R. 592 (1872).
20. Id.; Young v. City of Asheville, 241 N.C. 618, 86 S.E.2d 408 (1955); Clinard
v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939); Trevett v. Prison
Ass'n, 98 Va. 332, 36 S.E. 373 (1900).
21. Harvey Realty Co. v. Borough of Wallingford, 111 Conn. 352, 150 A.
60 (1930).
22. Grey ex rel. Simmons v. City of Patterson, 58 N.J. Eq. 1, 42 A. 749(Ch. 1899), rev'd on other grounds, 60 N.J. Eq. 385, 45 A. 995 (Ct. Err. & App.
1900); Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939); Hamp-
ton v. Town of Spindale, 210 N.C. 546, 187 S.E. 775 (1936); Johnson v. Kraft-
Phenix Cheese Corp., 19 Tenn. App. 648, 94 S.W.2d 54 (1935).
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by a city sewer system, the more accepted nile is that the city itself is
liable, and those who empty sewage into the city sewer system are im-
mune.2s The rationale for this immunity is based upon the individual's
loss of "control" of the polluting substance once it enters the sewer system
of the city, and the city's assumption of "control" of the functioning of
the system.24 But the court in Ratzlaff, pointing to the contractual relation-
ship between the city and the defendant, found the rationale behind his
traditional immunity to be inapplicable. The court stated that "it does
not logically follow that a user in violation of his contract can wrest con-
trol of the city's sewage facilities from the city and at the same time stand
behind the immunity which the law accords."2 5 The court's reasoning
took the "logical step" that previous cases concerned with this question
had avoided. In holding the individual citizen immune regardless of any
contractual obligation to the city, these previous cases had evoked the
"control" idea in order to sidestep troublesome issues in situations where
a defendant wrongfully discharged sewage into the sewer system,20 negligent-
ly disrupted the sewer system,27 or merely contributed to the cumulative
overloading of the system.2s But in Ratzlaff, where the defendant was found
23. Kraver v. Smith, 164 Ky. 674, 177 S.W. 286 (1915).
24. Carmichael v. City of Texarkana, 116 F. 845 (8th Cir. 1902), construed
in People v. City of Los Angeles, 83 Cal. App. 2d 627, 189 P.2d 489 (1948);
Kraver v. Smith, 164 Ky. 674, 177 S.W. 286 (1915); State ex rel. Fed. Lead Co. v.
Dearing, 244 Mo. 25, 148 S.W. 618 (1912); Johnson v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp.,
19 Tenn. App. 648, 94 S.W.2d 54 (1935).
The issue of control in this sense has seldom been litigated in Missouri. How-
ever, it has been stated in another context that a municipal corporation has no
control over nuisances caused within its city limits, except by statute. Martinowsky
v. City of Hannibal, 35 Mo. App. 70 (St. L. Ct. App. 1889). Compare Bartlett v.
Hume-Sinclair Coal Mining Co., 851 S.W.2d 214 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961), with Roth
v. City of St. Joseph, 180 Mo. App. 881, 167 S.W. 1155 (K.C. Ct. App. 1914).
However, there is now an abundance of statutory authority in Missouri providing
the state and municipalities with the power to control water pollution, both
by abatement and criminal remedies against the abuser. See ch. 204, RSMo 1972
Supp. &c §§ 252.210, 564.010, RSMo 1969.
25. 250 Ark. at 1006, 468 S.W.2d at 241. The court cited Carmichael v. City
of Texarkana, 116 F. 845 (8th Cir. 1902), which held the individual user to be
immune from liability, because he had no control whatsoever over the opemtion
of the city sewer system. The court in Carmichael stated:
When all of these statements are read together with the statutes which
vest the rights to construct, to change, to repair, and to control this sewer
exclusively in the city, there is no escape from the conclusion that the
acts and omissions of the city and not those of the citizens, constituted
the proximate cause of the injury to the complainants, and that the in-
habitants who requested the construction and operation of the improve-
ment are not liable for those acts and omissions, because they had no power
to command or control the city in their performance.
Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
The court in Ratzlaff believed that this statement implied that in certain other
instances, where some of the control was divested to the user, the individual user
could be liable.
26. Johnson v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 19 Tenn. App. 648, 94 S.W.2d
54 (1935).
27. Hampton v Town of Spindale, 210 N.C. 546, 187 S.E. 775 (1936).
28. Grey ex rel. Simmons v. City of Patterson, 58 N.J. Eq. 1, 42 A. 749 (Ch.
1899), rev'd on other grounds, 60 N.J. Eq. 385, 45 A. 995 (Ct. Err. & App. 1900).
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to have committed all three of these wrongs, the court would have been
hard pressed to find Franz Foods not liable without granting it absolute
immunity.
The court in Ratztaff was not completely without support in holding
the user of a sewer system liable, notwithstanding the majority rule grant-
ing such a user immunity. In the 1946 Kansas case of Klassen v. Central
Kansas Cooperative Creamery Association,29 the plaintiff brought a private
nuisance action for pollution of an underground water supply which
watered the plaintiff's livestock. The defendant argued loss of control
because the wastes from its creamery went through the city sewer system
before seeping into the underground water supply. But the court found
a noncontractual duty in the defendant to prevent any harmful waste
products from leaving his premises.3 0 Kiassen thus radically departed from
the majority rule, by finding a common law duty despite the intervening
carrier of the polluting substance. Ratzlaff does not conflict as strongly
with the individual immunity rule as does Klassen, because breach of an
assumed contractual obligation was also involved. Therefore, Ratzlaff is
the more viable (although more limited) result, in that it deviated to a
lesser degree from the well-established rule of individual immunity.
B. Third Party Beneficiary Theory
The distinguishing factor in Ratzlaff which aided the court in over-
coming the common law grant of immunity to the user of a sewer system
was the existence of a contract between Franz Foods and the city. The
primary obligation of Franz Foods under the contract was its promise
not to overload the sewer system. The plaintiff claimed rights as a third
party beneficiary to this contract, which required him to show that the
intents' of the parties in making the contract was to directly (not in-
cidentally) benefit him.32 Also, such an intent had to be evident from the
terms of the contract.33 The plaintiff's burden in establishing the third party
beneficiary relationship was further complicated because one of the con-
tracting parties was a municipal corporation. Before allowing an action
against a private individual on its contract with a municipality, the RE-
srAT mENT OF CoNTRnArs emphasizes that the "public policy" authorizing
the contract should be observed.3 4 The presumption is against such an
29. 160 Kan. 697, 165 P.2d 601 (1946).
30. Id. at 706, 165 P.2d at 607. See also State Highway Comm'n v. Empire Oil
& Ref. Co., 141 Kan. 161, 40 P.2d 355 (1935); Berry v. Shell Petrol. Co,, 140 Kan.
94, 33 P.2d 953 (1984).
31. Armstrong v. School Dist., 28 Mo. App. 169 (K.C. Ct. App. 1887); Vogel
v. Reed Supply Co., 277 N.C. 119, 177 S.E.2d 273 (1970).
32. Chacksfield v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 245 Cal. App. 2d
193, 53 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1966).
33. Stewart v. Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 446 P.2d 895 (1968).
34. RESTATEAMNT (SEcoND) OF CoiNcRAcrs § 145 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1967)
states:
(1) The rules stated in this chapter apply to contracts with a govern-
ment or governmental agency except to the extent that application would
contravene the policy of the law authorizing the contract or prescribing
remedies for its breach.
(2) In particular, a promisor who contracts with a government or a
governmental agency to do an act for or render a service to the public
is not subject to contractual liability to a member of the public for con-
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action,3 5 because the burden is on the third party to show either by the
terms of the promise or by the existence of some potential liability to him
by the city, that he was the intended beneficiary.80 Of course, the riparian's
task of rebutting the presumption is simplified if he can show on the face
of the contract that he was the intended beneficiary.8 7 However, if there
is no such express intent, he must show that the intent can be reasonably
inferred, because the duty assumed by the promisor (user of sewer system)
was a duty which the promisee (city) already owed to the third party.
This inference of intent is not readily allowed; 80 but in the water pollu-
tion situation the lower riparian's burden of establishing the requisite
intent is lessened. Because the city already owed him a common law duty
to exercise its riparian rights in a reasonable manner, the individual user
of the sewer, as promisor under the contract, has arguably assumed the
city's obligation in this respect by accepting limitations on his use of the
system.
In Ratzlaff the court did not quote the language of the contract be-
tween Franz Foods and the city, but the contract apparently expressed
no clear intent to benefit lower riparian owners. Therefore, the third
party beneficiary theory in this case could not be based upon any express
promise by Franz Foods which directly obligated it to observe and protect
the rights of lower riparians. Rather, the theory of recovery was based
upon an implicit assumption by Franz Foods of the duty of the city to
use its riparian rights in a reasonable manner. This is indeed a more distant
duty owed to lower riparians, but the public policy behind the formation
of the contract limiting discharges into the sewer system can reasonably
encompass the protection of lower riparians against the malfunctions of
an overloaded sewer system caused by the sewer user-promisor. It is at this
sequential damages resulting from performance or failure to perform unless
(a) the terms of the promise provide for such liability; or
(b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of the
public for the damages and a direct action against the promisor is con-
sistent with the terms of the contract and with the policy of law authoriz-
ing the contract and prescribing remedies for its breach.
Section 145 may not be completely applicable, because it is geared to the situation
in which the promisor provides services to the municipality. Harvey Aluminum,
Inc. v. De Chabert, 266 F. Supp. 143 (D.V.I. 1967). But section 145 does include
contracts "to do an act for ... the public." The act in Ratzlaff would be the
"act" of not overloading the system.
35. This is evidenced by the leading case of H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer
Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). Missouri cases stating the Moch
view include: Metz v. Cape Girardeau Waterworks & Elec. Light Co., 202 Mo.
324, 100 S.W. 651 (1907), and Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Trenton Water Co., 42 Mo.
App. 118 (K.C. Ct. App. 1890).
36. Glencoe Lime &e Cement Co. v. Von Phul, 133 Mo. 561, 34 S.W. 843
(1896); RFSrATEm rr (SECOND) OF CONTRACTrS § 145, supra note 34.
37. New York Tel. Co. v. Secord Bros., 62 Misc. 2d 866, 309 N.Y.S.2d 814(1970); Collins Constr. Co. v. Taylor, 372 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. 1963). But cf. Mc-
Whirter Material Handling Co. v. Georgia Paper Stock Co., 118 Ga. App. 582,
164 S.E.2d 852 (1968); Stewart v. Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 446 P.2d
895 (1968); Archer v. Rogers Constr., Inc., 252 Ore. 165, 447 P.2d 380 (1968).
38. Lesofski v. Ravalli County Elec. Co-op., 151 Mont. 104, 439 P.2d 370
(1968). Compare Casco v. Gotbaum, 67 Misc. 2d 205, 323 N.Y.S.2d 742 (1971),
with Boyle v. Pure Oil Co., 16 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), rev'd, 26 S.W.2d
161 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
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public policy level that the nexus between the city's duty to lower riparians
and the defendant's obligation to these lower riparians arising from that
duty is formed.
III. PossmLE RECOVERY UNDER THE RATZLAFF APPROACH iN MIssouRi
There exists in Missouri the framework for applying the Ratzlaff ap-
proach to allow recovery by a lower riparian against a polluter who dumps
into a municipal sewer system. To enforce his rights against an upstream
polluter, the downstream riparian in Missouri can use the common law
actions of private nuisance and reasonable use against an upstream pol-
luter.3 9 These rights are recognized by statute, and, while Missouri statutes
do not indicate the scope and extent of these causes of action,40 Missouri
case law takes a broad view of what constitutes an actionable nuisance
and of the manner in which such a nuisance can be established.41 Further,
it is dear in Missouri that pollution is actionable by a riparian either as
a private nuisance4 2 or as a public nuisance, because his damages are
deemed different in degree and kind.43 Also, Missouri follows the majority
position that a city cannot maintain a nuisance without compensating
the injured riparian,44 and uses the theory of eminent domain to provide
for this compensation.4 5 However, there remains slight precedent that a
riparian must suffer, without remedy, the natural drainage of a city.46
There has been considerable litigation on the question whether a city
39. E.g., Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964); Keener v. Sharp, 341
Mo. 1192, 111 S.W.2d 118 (1937); Jones v. Des Moines & Miss. River Levee Dist.,
369 S.W.2d 865 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963); Burrell & Stubbs, The Rights of a Riparian
Landowner in Missouri, 19 Mo. L. REv. 138 (1954).
Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899), expanded the
permissible uses of the upstream riparian under the reasonable use theory by
emphasizing a derivative theory, the "comparative convenience" doctrine. This
refinement insures a balancing of the equities in determining the reasonableness
of the use. See also City of Battle Creek v. Goguac Resort Ass'n, 181 Mich. 241,
148 N.W. 441 (1914); Davis, supra note 5, at 762. Thus, the economic necessities
or the health needs of a region may increase the breadth of water uses afforded to
its riparians.
40. § 204.031, RSMo 1972 Supp., states:
Nothing in this act alters or abridges any right of action now or hereafter
existing in law or equity, civil or criminal, nor is any provision of this
act construed as prohibiting any person, as a riparian owner or othenvise,
from exercising his rights to suppress nuisances.
41. Compare Martin v. City of St. Joseph, 136 Mo. App. 316, 117 S.W. 94
(K.C. Ct. App. 1909), and Haynor v. Excelsior Springs Light, Power, Heat, &c Water
Co., 129 Mo. App. 691, 108 S.W. 580 (K.C. Ct. App. 1908), with Manhattan Oil
v. Mosby, 72 F.2d 840 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 623 (1934).
42. Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899).
43. See generally Edmonson v. City of Moberly, 98 Mo. 523, 11 S.W. 990
(1889); Scheurich v. Southwest Mo. Light Co., 109 Mo. App. 406, 84 S.W. 1003
(St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
44. City of Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 210 (8th Cir.
1932), rei'd on other grounds, 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Riggs v. City of Springfield,
344 Mo. 420, 126 S.W.2d 1144 (1939).
45. Stewart v. City of Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (En Banc
1942).
46. See City of Cape Girardeau v. Hunze, 314 Mo. 438, 284 S.W. 471 (1926),
modified, 43 S.W.2d 882 (St. L. Mo. App. 1931).
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sewer system constitutes a temporary or a permanent nuisance, 47 which
can become significant both as to the running of the statute of limitations
and as to the fixing of damages.4 8 In conclusion, it is dear that the creator
of a nuisance is liable to lower riparians for non-trespassory injury arising
from his activity.
To pierce the traditional immunity of the polluter who discharges
into a city sewer system, the lower riparian could use third party beneficiary
theory. Missouri accepts this theory49 and, in fact, provides for such an
action by statute.6 0 However, Missouri courts have been reluctant
to allow third party beneficiary actions against parties contracting with
a municipal corporation,5 ' save in contracts for the construction of a public
47. Clark v. City of Springfield, 241 S.W.2d 100 (Spr. Mo. App..1951), gave
the first hint that a sewer system might be considered a temporary nuisance.
48. The five-year statute of limitations has been a decisive factor in Mis-
souri nuisance actions by lower riparians. See § 516.120, RSMo 1969. The original
Missouri view was that a sewer system constituted a permanent nuisance, so the
statute of limitations began running with the sewer system's construction and
not when the harm became apparent. Newkirk v. City of Tipton, 186 S.W.2d
147 (K.C. Mo. App. 1939); Thompson v. City of Springfield, 184 S.W.2d 1082(Spr. Mo. App. 1939); King v. City of Rolla, 234 Mo. App. 16, 130 S.W.2d 697(Spr. Ct. App. 1939); RESTATEMENT or TORTS 343. However, the courts hesi-
tated to grant the cities prescriptive rights to maintain the nuisance without
compensation. See generally Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907
(1899); Fansler v. City of Sedalia, 189 Mo. App. 454, 176 S.W. 1102 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1915); But cf. Luckey v. City of Brookfield, 167 Mo. App. 161, 151 S.W.
201 (K.C. Ct. App. 1912). Then, with new emphasis on the reasonable use theory,
the courts began to wait until substantial harm became apparent to the lower
riparian before running the statute of limitations. Lewis v. City of Potosi, 317
S.W.2d 623 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958); Person v. City of Independence, 114 S.W.2d
175 (K.C. Mo. App. 1938); RESTAT MNT or TORTS 345. The question of when the
harm becomes apparent is one of fact for the jury. Hillhouse v. City of Aurora, 316
S.W.2d 883 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958).
If the nuisance created by the sewer system is permanent, Missouri allows
for one recovery under eminent domain theory. But with scientific advancements
in the treatment of sewage, the courts have been more willing to recognize that
pollution is abatable and, therefore, temporary in nature. See Newman v. City of
El Dorado Springs, 292 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956). This would allow
the lower riparian to recover damages each time the harm occurs. The temporary-
permanent question is also one of fact for the jury. The factors to be considered
in deciding whether the nuisance is temporary are: (1) The type of treatment
plant which would abate the nuisance; (2) whether such treatment is scientifically
approved; (3) the probable cost and economic feasibility of employing such a
process; (4) the financial ability of the municipality (but not the willingness of
its citizens) to provide the funds required for the abatement of the nuisance.
Hillhouse v. City of Aurora, supra. at 890.
49. See, e.g., Schuster v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 60 Mo. 290 (1875);
Rogers v. Gosnell, 58 Mo. 589 (1875); Black & White Cabs v. Smith, 370 S.W.2d
669 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963); Farns v. Pitts, 221 Mo. App. 1204, 300 S.W. 840 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1927). See also Willard, Third Party Beneficiary Contracts in Missouri,
25 Mo. L. Rrv. 71 (1960).
50. See § 507.010, RSMo 1969. See generally Allen v. Globe-Democrat Pub.
Co., 368 S.W.2d 460 (Mo. 1963); Binswanger v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp.,
224 Mo. App. 1025, 28 S.W.2d 448 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930). But cf. Beattie Mfg. Co.
v. Clark, 208 Mo. 89, 106 S.W. 29 (1907).
51. Silton v. Kansas City, 446 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1969).
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building.52 But, because there is statutory authority extending the power
of the municipality to prevent or abate water pollution 8 public policy
might dictate broader contractual liability in this area. In particular,
section 250.230, RSMo 1969, grants the municipality the power to contract
"in the public interest" with any industrial concern to establish adequate
facilities to cope with its discharges and to receive due compensation for
this service. When this section is combined with section 204.031,54 which
preserves all common law rights and actions of riparians, there is support
in Missouri for a riparian's action against an industry when it has entered
into a sewage disposal contract with a city. Furthermore, because the
riparian has specific rights to the flow of the water, as opposed to those
of the general public,5  he is the proper party to assert the public's interest
in such a situation.
Another alternative open to the lower riparian would be to act against
the city first and then reach the individual through the joinder statutes.56
There can be no joint liability in the city and the individual if they are
acting independently,57 but the joinder statutes may require the lower
riparian to join both in an action, because of the contractual relationship,
before damages will be awarded.58 However, even though third party
beneficiary recovery in pollution cases like Ratzlaff will not provide an
automatic cause of action (even with a favorable construction of the
statutes) the framework for formulating such an action exists in Missouri.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order for the lower riparian in Ratzlaff to recover, he had to
fashion his position within three rules of law. First, he had to fit the confines
of private nuisance, which only protects his "ordinary" uses. For the lower ri-
parian whose use is "artificial" (such as an industry), only the reasonable use
theory of riparian rights may be available; this, however, broadens the scope
of reasonableness of the upstream riparian's use. Finally, the lower riparian
had to overcome the traditional immunity of the user of the city sewer sys-
tem. This immunity is not substantially diminished by this case, because it
hinged upon the third party beneficiary theory of recovery. The establish-
ment of this theory of recovery has usually encountered significant judicial
52. In construction contracts for public buildings, because a lien cannot be
taken on the building itself, third party beneficiary recovery is more often allowed
on the contract. See generally School Dist. ex rel. Koken Iron Works v. Livers,
147 Mo. 580, 49 S.W. 507 (1899); Corrington v. Kalicak, 319 S.W.2d 888 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1959).
53. § 250.240, RSMo 1969.
54. See statute quoted note 40 supra. See also Aa.F STAT. ANN. § 82-1943(1965).
55. State ex rel. Wear v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 204 S.W. 942 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1918).
56. See §§ 73.940, 75.850, 507.230, RSMo 1969.
57. Johnson v. City of Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 247 N.W. 572 (1933).
58. Joint liability of the city and its contracting partner has been upheld in
several related situations. See Somerset Villa, Inc., v. City of Lee's Summit, 436
S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1968); State ex rel. Fed. Lead Co. v. Dearing, 244 Mo. 25, 148
S.W. 618 (1912); Corrington v. Kalicak, 319 S.W.2d 888 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959).
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